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  1. Why philosophers should be designers.Aaron Sloman - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):529.
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  • Connectionism, Realism, and realism.Stephen P. Stich - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):531.
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  • What really matters.Charles Taylor - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):532.
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  • The notional world of D. C. Dennett.Arthur C. Danto - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):509.
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  • The stance stance.Fred Dretske - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):511.
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  • Qualia for propositional attitudes?Frank Jackson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):52-52.
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  • The ontological status of intentional states: Nailing folk psychology to its perch.Paul M. Churchland - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):507.
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  • Dennett's realisation theory of the relation between folk and scientific psychology.Adrian Cussins - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):508.
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  • Unraveling introspection.John Heil - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):49-50.
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  • Goldman has not defeated folk functionalism.James H. Fetzer - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):42-43.
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  • The naked truth about first-person knowledge.Michael Chandler & Jeremy Carpendale - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):36-37.
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  • Knowing levels and the child's understanding of mind.Robert L. Campbell & Mark H. Bickhard - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):33-34.
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  • The concept of intentionality: Invented or innate?Simon Baron-Cohen - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):29-30.
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  • Causes are perceived and introspected.D. M. Armstrong - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):29-29.
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  • Intentionality, theoreticity and innateness.Deborah Zaitchik & Jerry Samet - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):87-89.
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  • Common sense, functional theories and knowledge of the mind.Max Velmans - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):85-86.
    A commentary on a target article by Alison Gopnik (1993) How we know our minds: the illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality. Focusing on evidence of how children acquire a theory of mind, this commentary argues that there are internal inconsistencies in theories that both argue for the functional role of conscious experiences and the irreducibility of those experiences to third-person viewable information processing.
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  • Beyond modularity: Neural evidence for constructivist principles in development.Steven R. Quartz & Terrence J. Sejnowski - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):725-726.
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  • Where redescriptions come from.David R. Olson - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):725-725.
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  • Representational redescription, memory, and connectionism.P. J. Hampson - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):721-721.
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  • Beyond connectionist versus classical Al: A control theoretic perspective on development and cognitive science.Rick Grush - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):720-720.
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  • What's getting redescribed?Robert L. Campbell - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):710-711.
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  • A Fodorian guide to Switzerland: Jung and Piaget combined?Péter Bodor & Csaba Pléh - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):709-710.
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  • Précis of Beyond modularity: A developmental perspective on cognitive science.Annette Karmiloff-Smith - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):693-707.
    Beyond modularityattempts a synthesis of Fodor's anticonstructivist nativism and Piaget's antinativist constructivism. Contra Fodor, I argue that: (1) the study of cognitive development is essential to cognitive science, (2) the module/central processing dichotomy is too rigid, and (3) the mind does not begin with prespecified modules; rather, development involves a gradual process of “modularization.” Contra Piaget, I argue that: (1) development rarely involves stagelike domain-general change and (2) domainspecific predispositions give development a small but significant kickstart by focusing the infant's (...)
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  • Transforming a partially structured brain into a creative mind.Annette Karmiloff-Smith - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):732-745.
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  • The challenge of representational redescription.Thomas R. Shultz - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):728-729.
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  • From the decline of development to the ascent of consciousness.Philip David Zelazo - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):731-732.
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  • Emotions and their computations: Three computer models.Michael G. Dyer - 1987 - Cognition and Emotion 1 (3):323-347.
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  • Author’s response.Paul Griffiths - 1999 - Metascience 8 (1):49-62.
    The air of consensus in these reviews is, as McNaughton notes, methodological. The future of philosophical emotion theory is in synthesising what a wide range of science has to tell us and using this to reflect on the nature of mind in general. In this respect the philosophy of emotion has been seriously out of step with the rest of a very exciting contemporary scene in the philosophy of mind. Whatever the shortcomings of my own attempt to bring the philosophy (...)
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  • The Import and Export of Cognitive Science.Robert L. Goldstone & Loet Leydesdorff - 2006 - Cognitive Science 30 (6):983-993.
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  • Culture, biology, and human behavior.Horst D. Steklis & Alex Walter - 1991 - Human Nature 2 (2):137-169.
    Social scientists have not integrated relevant knowledge from the biological sciences into their explanations of human behavior. This failure is due to a longstanding antireductionistic bias against the natural sciences, which follows on a commitment to the view that social facts must be explained by social laws. This belief has led many social scientists into the error of reifying abstract analytical constructs into entities that possess powers of agency. It has also led to a false nature-culture dichotomy that effectively undermines (...)
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  • Aristotle, final cause, and the intentional stance.Aaron Ben-Zeev - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):758-759.
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  • Meaning, prototypes and the future of cognitive science.J. Brakel - 1991 - Minds and Machines 1 (3):233-257.
    In this paper I evaluate the soundness of the prototype paradigm, in particular its basic assumption that there are pan-human psychological essences or core meanings that refer to basic-level natural kinds, explaining why, on the whole, human communication and learning are successful. Instead I argue that there are no particular pan-human basic elements for thought, meaning and cognition, neither prototypes, nor otherwise. To illuminate my view I draw on examples from anthropology. More generally I argue that the prototype paradigm exemplifies (...)
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  • Perspectives on Self-Deception.Brian P. McLaughlin & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.) - 1988 - University of California Press.
    00 Students of philosophy, psychology, sociology, and literature will welcome this collection of original essays on self-deception and related phenomena such as ...
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  • Are Computational Transitions Sensitive to Semantics?Michael Rescorla - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):703-721.
    The formal conception of computation (FCC) holds that computational processes are not sensitive to semantic properties. FCC is popular, but it faces well-known difficulties. Accordingly, authors such as Block and Peacocke pursue a ?semantically-laden? alternative, according to which computation can be sensitive to semantics. I argue that computation is insensitive to semantics within a wide range of computational systems, including any system with ?derived? rather than ?original? intentionality. FCC yields the correct verdict for these systems. I conclude that there is (...)
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  • The Case against Stephen Stich's Syntactic Theory of Mind.Kevin Possin - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 49 (3):405 - 418.
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  • Is Psychological Individualism a Piece of Ideology?Louise M. Antony - 1995 - Hypatia 10 (3):157 - 174.
    I analyze and criticize Naomi Scheman's argument for the claim that psychological individualism-the thesis that psychological states are entities or particulars over which psychological theories may quantify-has no legitimate philosophical backing and is instead an element of patriarchal ideology. I conclude that Scheman's argument is flawed and that her thesis is false. Psychological individualism is perfectly compatible with and may even be required by feminist political theory.
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  • Commonsense psychology, dual visual streams, and the individuation of action.Thor Grünbaum - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):25 - 47.
    Psychologists and philosophers are often tempted to make general claims about the importance of certain experimental results for our commonsense notions of intentional agency, moral responsibility, and free will. It is a strong intuition that if the agent does not intentionally control her own behavior, her behavior will not be an expression of agency, she will not be morally responsible for its consequences, and she will not be acting as a free agent. It therefore seems natural that the interest centers (...)
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  • Evolution and the Kantian Worldview.Mark Risjord - 2006 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (S1):72-84.
    Nonhuman animals seem to make inferences and have mental representations. Brandom articulates a Kantian (and Hegelian) account of representation that seems to make nonhuman mental content impossible: animals are merely sentient, not sapient. His position is problematic because it makes it impossible to understand how our cognitive capacities evolved. This essay discusses experimental and ethological work on transitive inference. It argues that to fit such evidence within the Kantian framework, there must be degrees of normativity. This invites us to understand (...)
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  • Kant's Anti-Scientism and the Origins of Phenomenology.Richard McDonough - 1998 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 29 (3):281-298.
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  • The fictionalist paradigm.John Paley - 2011 - Nursing Philosophy 12 (1):53-66.
    The fictionalist paradigm is introduced, and differentiated from other paradigms, using the Lincoln & Guba template. Following an initial overview, the axioms of fictionalism are delineated by reference to standard metaphysical categories: the nature of reality, the relationship between knower and known, the possibility of generalization, the possibility of causal linkages, and the role of values in inquiry. Although a paradigm's ‘basic beliefs’ are arbitrary and can be assumed for any reason, in this paper the fictionalist axioms are supported with (...)
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  • Tacit-knowledge of linguistic theories.Alexander Barber - unknown
    What is the best way to understand 'applies to' when it is said of a linguistic theory that it applies to a particular language-user? We can answer by saying that a linguistic theory is applicable to an individual language-user just in case that individual tacitly-knows the theory. But this is an uninformative answer until we are told how to understand 'tacit-knowledge'. The end goal of this thesis is to defend the claim that we should take tacit-knowledge to be, simply, knowledge. (...)
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  • Comments on Dennett from a cautious ally.Jonathan Bennett - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):381-385.
    In these notes, unadorned page numbers under 350 refer to Dennett (1987) - The Intentional Stance, hereafter referred to as Stance - and ones over 495 refer to Dennett (1988) - mostly to material by him but occasionally to remarks of his critics. Since the notes will focus on disagreements, I should say now that I am in Dennett’s camp and am deeply in debt to his work in the philosophy of mind, which I think is wider, deeper, more various (...)
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  • Washing Away Original Sinn.Eros Corazza - 1999 - Dialogue 38 (4):743-764.
    RÉSUMÉ: L'objectif de cet article est essentiellement négatif. Suivant en cela Dummett, j'introduis deux manières attrayantes d'interpréter le Sinn original de Frege, que j'appelle respectivement la doctrine du sens privé et la doctrine du sens public. Je montre que ces conceptions ne peuvent être utilisées dans le traitement frégéen de l'oratio obliqua. Il faut donc abandonner soit l'interprétation du Sinn par Dummett, soit le traitement frégéen de l'oratio obliqua.
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  • Should we tolerate people who split?Simon Beck - 1992 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):1-17.
    Thought-experiments in which one person divides into two have been important in the literature on personal identity. I consider three influential arguments which aim to undermine the force of these thought-experiments – arguments from David Wiggins, Patricia Kitcher and Kathleen Wilkes. I argue that all three fail, leaving us to face the consequences of splitting, whatever those may be.
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  • A pieced quilt: A critical discussion of Stephen Schiffer'sRemnants of Meaning.Louise Antony - 1991 - Philosophical Psychology 4 (1):119-137.
    Abstract Stephen Schiffer, in his recent book, Remnants of Meaning, argues against the possibility of any compositional theory of meaning for natural language. Because the argument depends on the premise that there is no possible naturalistic reduction of the intentional to the physical, Schiffer's attack on theories of meaning is of central importance for theorists of mind. I respond to Schiffer's argument by showing that there is at least one reductive account of the mental that he has neglected to consider?the (...)
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  • Does Knowledge Entail Belief?Masaharu Mizumoto - 2008 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 41 (1):59-78.
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  • Behavior, ISO functionalism, and psychology.Lawrence A. Shapiro - 1994 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 25 (2):191-209.
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  • Rorty's Mirrorless World.Michael Devitt - 1988 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1):157-177.
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  • Do explanatory desire attributions generate opaque contexts?Naomi Reshotko - 1996 - Ratio 9 (2):153-170.
    Many philosophers assert that psychological verbs generate opaque contexts and that the object of a psychological verb cannot be replaced with a co‐referring expression salva veritate as the objects of non‐psychological verbs can be. I argue that the logical and linguistic concerns which govern this assertion do not transfer to observational and experimental situations because the criteria that we use in order to verify that an observed subject has one hypothesized desire rather than another provide inconclusive evidence when we don't (...)
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  • New Inquiries into Truth and Meaning.Shaun Nichols - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (1):157-161.
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