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  1. Velmans's overfocused perspective on consciousness.Marcel Kinsbourne - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):682-683.
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  • Supervenience and explanation.Harold Kincaid - 1988 - Synthese 77 (November):251-81.
    This paper explores the explanatory adequacy of lower-level theories when their higher-level counterparts are irreducible. If some state or entity described by a high-level theory supervenes upon and is realized in events, entities, etc. described by the relevant lower-level theory, does the latter fully explain the higher-level event even if the higher-level theory is irreducible? While the autonomy of the special sciences and the success of various eliminativist programs depends in large part on how we answer this question, neither the (...)
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  • Common sense and adult theory of communication.Boaz Keysar - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):54-54.
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  • Parallelism and patterns of thought.R. W. Kentridge - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):670-671.
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  • Behavioral systems interpreted as autonomous agents and as coupled dynamical systems: A criticism.Fred A. Keijzer & Sacha Bem - 1996 - Philosophical Psychology 9 (3):323-46.
    Cognitive science's basic premises are under attack. In particular, its focus on internal cognitive processes is a target. Intelligence is increasingly interpreted, not as a matter of reclusive thought, but as successful agent-environment interaction. The critics claim that a major reorientation of the field is necessary. However, this will only occur when there is a distinct alternative conceptual framework to replace the old one. Whether or not a serious alternative is provided is not clear. Among the critics there is some (...)
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  • Consciousness, analogy and creativity.Mark T. Keane - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):682-682.
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  • Transforming a partially structured brain into a creative mind.Annette Karmiloff-Smith - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):732-745.
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  • Précis of Beyond modularity: A developmental perspective on cognitive science.Annette Karmiloff-Smith - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):693-707.
    Beyond modularityattempts a synthesis of Fodor's anticonstructivist nativism and Piaget's antinativist constructivism. Contra Fodor, I argue that: (1) the study of cognitive development is essential to cognitive science, (2) the module/central processing dichotomy is too rigid, and (3) the mind does not begin with prespecified modules; rather, development involves a gradual process of “modularization.” Contra Piaget, I argue that: (1) development rarely involves stagelike domain-general change and (2) domainspecific predispositions give development a small but significant kickstart by focusing the infant's (...)
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  • Keeping a happy face on exportation.Tomis Kapitan - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 70 (3):337 - 345.
    A familiar means of enhancing the descriptive power of attitudinal reports is the distinction between de re and de dicto readings of ascriptions or, alternatively, between internal and external occurrences of terms and phrases used in ascribing attitudes.i While there is little agreement about the philosophical significance or viability of these contrasts, supporters of cognitive theories of content -- those which take the that-clause of an ascription to express something to which the subject bears a psychological relation, viz., what he (...)
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  • Theory knitting: An integrative approach to theory development.David A. Kalmar & Robert J. Sternberg - 1988 - Philosophical Psychology 1 (2):153 – 170.
    A close scrutiny of the psychological literature reveals that many psychologists favor a 'segregative' approach to theory development. One theory is pitted against another, and the one that accounts for the data most successfully is deemed the theory of choice. However, an examination of the theoretical debates in which the segregative approach has been pursued reveals a variety of weaknesses to the approach, namely, masking an underlying theoretical indistinguishability of theoretical predictions, causing psychologists to focus unknowingly on different aspects of (...)
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  • Methodological Individualism and Marxism.Julius Sensat - 1988 - Economics and Philosophy 4 (2):189.
    Recent years have witnessed an increasing number of attempts to reconstruct Marxian theory in forms that can be assessed by reference to currently received standards in various disciplines. The work has even been said to establish a new paradigm: “analytical Marxism.” One doesn't have to endorse this claim to recognize a good deal of merit in the work. Through creative application of state-of-the-art methods to traditional Marxian issues, researchers have promoted productive cross-fertilization with non-Marxian programs and have revealed many problems (...)
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  • Nonconceptual Content: From Perceptual Experience to Subpersonal Computational States.José Luis Bermúdez - 1995 - Mind and Language 10 (4):333-369.
    Philosophers have often argued that ascriptions of content are appropriate only to the personal level states of folk psychology. Against this, this paper defends the view that the familiar propositional attitudes and states defined over them are part of a larger set of cognitive proceses that do not make constitutive reference to concept possession. It does this by showing that states with nonconceptual content exist both in perceptual experience and in subpersonal information-processing systems. What makes these states content-involving is their (...)
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  • “Good developmental sequence” and the paradoxes of children's skills.Brian D. Josephson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):53-54.
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  • Staving off catastrophe: A critical notice of Jerry Fodor's psychosemantics.Todd Jones - 1991 - Mind and Language 6 (1):58-82.
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  • Gopnik's invention of intentionality.Carl N. Johnson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):52-53.
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  • Genes, development, and the “innate” structure of the mind.Timothy D. Johnston - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):721-722.
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  • A long time ago in a computing lab far, far away….Jeffery L. Johnson, R. H. Ettinger & Timothy L. Hubbard - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):670-670.
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  • Wittgenstein and Folk Psychology.Yi Jiang - 2021 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 9 (4):38-47.
    Various writings by the later Wittgenstein on the philosophy of psychology, published posthumously, express his basic critical attitude toward certain concepts and issues in the philosophy of psychology. His attitude towards folk psychology is negative in principle, leaving him opposed to the foundation of current psychological research. This critique of folk psychology and of the philosophy of psychology in general is in accord with the general method of his later philosophy, that is, dealing with philosophical problems by dissolving them. However, (...)
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  • II. An unfavorable review oflanguage, sense and nonsense∗.James Bogen - 1985 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 28 (1-4):467-482.
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  • Epistemic logic for rule-based agents.Mark Jago - 2009 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 18 (1):131-158.
    The logical omniscience problem, whereby standard models of epistemic logic treat an agent as believing all consequences of its beliefs and knowing whatever follows from what else it knows, has received plenty of attention in the literature. But many attempted solutions focus on a fairly narrow specification of the problem: avoiding the closure of belief or knowledge, rather than showing how the proposed logic is of philosophical interest or of use in computer science or artificial intelligence. Sentential epistemic logics, as (...)
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  • Un moteur peut-il être sémantique?Pierre Jacob - 1993 - Dialogue 32 (3):527-.
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  • Stich againstde dicto‐de reambiguity.Dale Jacquette - 1989 - Philosophical Psychology 2 (2):223-230.
    Abstract Stephen P. Stich rejects the de dicto?de re belief state and ascription distinction. He proposes an analysis by which belief sentences imply univocal doxastic predicates expressing functionally similar states of belief subjects and counterfactual third person belief ascribers, concluding that the apparent opacity of de dicto belief sentences is better explained by the unsystematic contextually?sensitive similarity vaguenesses of belief ascriptions. But Stick's reduction appeals to contexts of background beliefs which themselves unavoidably exhibit ramified de dicto?de re ambiguity. The distinction (...)
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  • Qualia for propositional attitudes?Frank Jackson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):52-52.
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  • Fear and loathing (and other intentional states) in Searle's chinese room.Dale Jacquette - 1990 - Philosophical Psychology 3 (2 & 3):287-304.
    John R. Searle's problem of the Chinese Room poses an important philosophical challenge to the foundations of strong artificial intelligence, and functionalist, cognitivist, and computationalist theories of mind. Searle has recently responded to three categories of criticisms of the Chinese Room and the consequences he attempts to conclude from it, redescribing the essential features of the problem, and offering new arguments about the syntax-semantics gap it is intended to demonstrate. Despite Searle's defense, the Chinese Room remains ineffective as a counterexample, (...)
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  • Externalism revisited: Is there such a thing as narrow content?Pierre Jacob - 1990 - Philosophical Studies 60 (November):143-176.
    First, I argue that the narrow content of a thought cannot be identical with the linguistic meaning of the sentence used to express it. Secondly, I argue that the distinction between narrow content and linguistic meaning is not fatal to content-dualism. Thirdly I argue for the view that the proposition contributed by the clause prefixed by "that" is an interpretation of the believer's thought. Finally, I use this insight to provide an individualist account of Burge's thought-experiments such that recognition that (...)
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  • Externalism and the explanatory relevance of broad content.Pierre Jacob - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (1):131-156.
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  • Limits of preconscious processing.Albrecht Werner Inhoff - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):680-681.
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  • Folk psychological narratives and the case of autism.Daniel D. Hutto - 2003 - Philosophical Papers 32 (3):345-361.
    This paper builds on the insights of Jerome Bruner by underlining the central importance of narratives explaining actions in terms of reasons, arguing that by giving due attention to the central roles that they play in our everyday understanding of others provides a better way of explicating the nature and source of that activity than does simulation theory, theory-theory or some union of the two. However, although I promote Bruner's basic claims about the roles narratives play in this everyday enterprise, (...)
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  • Extensive enactivism: why keep it all in?Daniel D. Hutto, Michael D. Kirchhoff & Erik Myin - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8 (706):102178.
    Radical enactive and embodied approaches to cognitive science oppose the received view in the sciences of the mind in denying that cognition fundamentally involves contentful mental representation. This paper argues that the fate of representationalism in cognitive science matters significantly to how best to understand the extent of cognition. It seeks to establish that any move away from representationalism toward pure, empirical functionalism fails to provide a substantive “mark of the cognitive” and is bereft of other adequate means for individuating (...)
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  • The precision of content characterizations.Fabian Hundertmark - 2023 - Philosophical Psychology 36 (3):678-694.
    The contents of representations in non-human animals, human core cognition, and perception cannot precisely be characterized by sentences of a natural language. However, this fact does not stop us from giving imprecise characterizations of these contents through natural language. In this paper, I develop an account of the precision of content characterizations by appealing to possible-world semantics combined with set and measurement theory.
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  • Some memory, but no mind.Lawrence E. Hunter - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):37-38.
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  • Book reviews. [REVIEW]James M. Hughes, Erwin M. Segal, Donald Nute & Donald Gustafson - 1989 - Philosophical Psychology 2 (3):345-358.
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  • Kim on the Mind—Body Problem. [REVIEW]Terence Horgan - 1996 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (4):579-607.
    For three decades the writings of Jaegwon Kim have had a major influence in philosophy of mind and in metaphysics. Sixteen of his philosophical papers, together with several new postscripts, are collected in Kim [1993]. The publication of this collection prompts the present essay. After some preliminary remarks in the opening section, in Section 2 I will briefly describe Kim's philosophical 'big picture' about the relation between the mental and the physical. In Section 3 I will situate Kim's approach on (...)
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  • Putnam, Searle, and externalism.Amir Horowitz - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 81 (1):27-69.
    To sum up, then, both kinds of Putnam's arguments established externalism, though they suffer from several defects. Yet, I think Searle's discussion of these arguments contributes to our understanding of what makes externalism true, and forces us to accept a moderate version of externalism. Searle's own account of the TE story shows us, within a solipsistic outline, how two identical mental states can be directed towards different objects, and further, that the content-determination of indexical thoughts does not necessarily involve external (...)
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  • Phenomenology and psychophysics.Steven Horst - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (1):1-21.
    Recent philosophy of mind has tended to treat.
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  • Naturalisms in philosophy of mind.Steven Horst - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 4 (1):219-254.
    Most contemporary philosophers of mind claim to be in search of a 'naturalistic' theory. However, when we look more closely, we find that there are a number of different and even conflicting ideas of what would count as a 'naturalization' of the mind. This article attempts to show what various naturalistic philosophies of mind have in common, and also how they differ from one another. Additionally, it explores the differences between naturalistic philosophies of mind and naturalisms found in ethics, epistemology, (...)
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  • Functional role and intentionality.Amir Horowitz - 1992 - Theoria 58 (2-3):197-218.
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  • Eliminativism and the ambiguity of `belief'.Steven Horst - 1995 - Synthese 104 (1):123-45.
    It has recently been claimed (1) that mental states such as beliefs are theoretical entities and (2) that they are therefore, in principle, subject to theoretical elimination if intentional psychology were to be supplanted by a psychology not employing mentalistic notions. Debate over these two issues is seriously hampered by the fact that the key terms 'theoretical' and 'belief' are ambiguous. This article argues that there is only one sense of 'theoretical' that is of use to the eliminativist, and in (...)
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  • Contents just are in the head.Amir Horowitz - 2001 - Erkenntnis 54 (3):321-344.
    The purpose of the paper is to show that semanticexternalism – the thesis that contents are notdetermined by ``individualistic'' features of mentalstates – is mistaken. Externalist thinking, it isargued, rests on two mistaken assumptions: theassumption that if there is an externalist wayof describing a situation the situation exemplifiesexternalism, and the assumption that cases in which adifference in the environment of an intentional stateentails a difference in the state's intentional objectare cases in which environmental factors determine thestate's content. Exposing these mistakes (...)
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  • Computation, external factors, and cognitive explanations.Amir Horowitz - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):65-80.
    Computational properties, it is standardly assumed, are to be sharply distinguished from semantic properties. Specifically, while it is standardly assumed that the semantic properties of a cognitive system are externally or non-individualistically individuated, computational properties are supposed to be individualistic and internal. Yet some philosophers (e.g., Tyler Burge) argue that content impacts computation, and further, that environmental factors impact computation. Oron Shagrir has recently argued for these theses in a novel way, and gave them novel interpretations. In this paper I (...)
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  • Analytic functionalism without representational functionalism.Terence Horgan - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):51-51.
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  • Common sense and conceptual halos.Douglas R. Hofstadter - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):35-37.
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  • Selecting for the con in consciousness.Deborah Hodgkin & Alasdair I. Houston - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):668-669.
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  • When does ‘Folk Psychology’ Count as Folk Psychological?Eric Hochstein - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (4):1125-1147.
    It has commonly been argued that certain types of mental descriptions, specifically those characterized in terms of propositional attitudes, are part of a folk psychological understanding of the mind. Recently, however, it has also been argued that this is the case even when such descriptions are employed as part of scientific theories in domains like social psychology and comparative psychology. In this paper, I argue that there is no plausible way to understand the distinction between folk and scientific psychology that (...)
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  • Intentional Models as Essential Scientific Tools.Eric Hochstein - 2013 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (2):199-217.
    In this article, I argue that the use of scientific models that attribute intentional content to complex systems bears a striking similarity to the way in which statistical descriptions are used. To demonstrate this, I compare and contrast an intentional model with a statistical model, and argue that key similarities between the two give us compelling reasons to consider both as a type of phenomenological model. I then demonstrate how intentional descriptions play an important role in scientific methodology as a (...)
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  • Categorizing the Mental.Eric Hochstein - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):745-759.
    A common view in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of psychology is that there is an ideally correct way of categorizing the structures and operations of the mind, and that the goal of neuroscience and psychology is to find this correct categorizational scheme. Categories which cannot find a place within this correct framework ought to be eliminated from scientific practice. In this paper, I argue that this general idea runs counter to productive scientific practices. Such a view ignores the (...)
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  • Qualitative characteristics, type materialism and the circularity of analytic functionalism.Christopher S. Hill - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):50-51.
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  • Penrose's Platonism.James Higginbotham - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):667-668.
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  • Unraveling introspection.John Heil - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):49-50.
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  • Mentality and causality.John Heil - 1992 - Topoi 11 (1):103-110.
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