This paper defends an interpretation of Fanon's theory of recognition as revolving around his claim that we have a basic right to demand human behaviour from the other. Developing key Hegelian ideas in a novel direction, I argue that Fanon's theory of recognition employs a concretely universal concept of humanity as a normative orientation for establishing what he calls a ‘world of reciprocal recognitions’, which he equates with the creation of a ‘human reality’. In the first section, I take up (...) the three passages from Hegel'sPhenomenology of Spiritcited by Fanon inBlack Skin, White Masksto outline three key features of Fanon's theory of recognition. In section two, I argue that there are three senses of ‘universal humanity’ operative in Fanon's work: a false universal, an abstract universal, and a concrete universal. Whereas the first two are critical, pejorative uses, the third provides the normative orientation for his account of recognition and social struggle. In the third section, I show how Fanon combines features of Hegel's concrete universal with features of Sartre's existential humanism in order to avoid an essentialist or ahistorical approach to human nature. Specifically, I argue that the ideas of self-transcendence and a universal human condition shed light on what Fanon refers to as the right of reciprocal recognition to demand human behaviour from the other, and our one human duty to not renounce our freedom. (shrink)

This article discusses the relation between colonialism and the sovereignty of peoples through a dialogue between Hegel and the thought of the French Revolution. These two sides are relevant to each other not only because of their historical proximity, but also because of the connections that can be established when we approach the topic of colonialism through these two manifestations. Hegel is explicit that his philosophy of history and his philosophy of right are supposed to be philosophies of freedom. Yet (...) despite the importance that he lends to freedom, Hegel also explicitly defends, in the very same text, colonial domination when he deals with the relation between peoples. A similar problem had arisen in the course of the French Revolution. Following the declarations of war, France is confronted on various occasions with the question of how to deal with other peoples and countries. With the foundation of the Republic in 1792, the relation with other peoples becomes central in the revolutionary debates. The topic of colonialism is part of the constituting debates, and not only because of the uprisings in then Saint Domingue leading to the Haitian Revolution. This article is a part of a larger research project that attempts to reassess the relations between Hegel and the French Revolution, and deals with the question of how we can re-read Hegel's interpretation of the French Revolution based on the evolving historiography of the Revolution. After an introduction of both sides of this dialogue, the paper discusses how Hegel's political philosophy can be applied to understand the debates about the emancipation of colonies that take place during the French Revolution. The next part further analyses some issues, such as the notion of sovereignty and, in the concluding remarks, I summarize my discussion and point to some avenues for further research. (shrink)

The absence of Islam from recent scholarship on Hegel's account of world religions is puzzling. In the first part of the article, we argue that Hegel's neglect of Islam in his systematic account of religious phenomena is not accidental and that he did not think of Islam as a determinate religion. Its size and believers aside, we suggest that it is not possible to assign any determinacy to Islam as a world-historical phenomenon under Hegel's rubric, because such determinacy that applies (...) to other religions would be in conflict with what Hegel takes to be Islam's emphasis on the negative moment of truth, its revolutionary tendencies, and its lack of any novel conceptual content as a response to Christianity. In the second part of the article, we point out how one could respond to Hegel's characterization of Islam when it is mentioned in relation to other religious traditions. First, we argue that Hegel overemphasizes the significance of Islam qua religion in explaining the history of Muslim peoples. More than that, Hegel does not see that the history of Islamic philosophy and science can be characterized by sublation and that it can be integrated into conceptual developments in the West on these terms. However, our critique of Hegel's Eurocentrism does not remain at this level, for in the third part of the article we argue for the significance of considering the response of Muslim philosophers to Hegel. In particular, we look at the responses by Mohammed al-Khosht and Mahmoud Haider, respectively. We conclude that Hegel's exclusion of Islam from any involvement in the history of the Concept indicates an undialectical commitment on his part and that to this extent being Hegelian today requires that we rectify this oversight. (shrink)

Hegel's lord-bondsman dialectic has been of especially great interest to progressive and radical Hegelians—broadly speaking, politically left-leaning interpreters of Hegel who object to certain social hierarchies and demand their abolition. They read Hegel as giving an account of how ‘lordship’ over others is an inherently unstable and unsatisfying social formation, even for its supposed beneficiaries. Marxists, feminists and post-colonial theorists have all found inspiration in Hegel's analysis of the lord and bondsman by applying it to concrete relations of oppression, such (...) as capitalism, patriarchy, or racism. In contrast, recent scholarship on Hegel's views on race and colonialism has cast doubt on whether his systematic political philosophy and philosophy of history can be of similar use to progressives. Hegel was undeniably a Eurocentric thinker, but philosophers like Robert Bernasconi and Alison Stone have convincingly shown that he was also a racist and a defender of colonialism. Crucially, however, few of the scholars who write on Hegel's pro-colonialism have analysed this feature of Hegel's thought in connection with the lord-bondsman dialectic. In this article, I argue for two connected theses. First, I argue that contrary to the hopes of some progressive defenders of Hegel, we cannot easily separate the lord-bondsman dialectic from Hegel's pro-colonialism. This is because Hegel himself appealed to the lord-bondsman dialectic to argue that colonial slavery educated its victims, and could therefore be temporarily justified. Second, I argue that this pro-colonial reading of the dialectic, though largely ignored by contemporary interpreters, was in fact recognized and embraced by a group of Hegelians in North America known as the St Louis Hegelians. They used the lord-bondsman dialectic as a basis for a qualified defence of pre-Civil War American slavery. (shrink)

The notion of Bildung comes to prominence in the second half of the eighteenth century. It was originally conceived to capture the cultural conditions by which an individual becomes a moral agent. In Hegel’s thought, it develops a much more expansive role; it is at the heart of his socio-historical project. Bildung is Hegel’s theory of culture, but for Hegel, is not just the way in which individuals are cultivated, the process by which individuals internalise the norms of their society, (...) or develop their autonomy. This paper argues that Bildung is key to understanding normative change and has a critical and underappreciated role in the development of world history. It is also at the heart of Hegel’s challenge to the dualism of nature and culture. (shrink)

This article argues for epistemic decolonization by developing a relational model of knowledge, which we locate within indigenous knowledges. We live in a time of ongoing global, epistemic coloniality, embedded in and shaped by colonial ideas and practices. Epistemological decolonization requires taking nondominant knowledges and their epistemes seriously to open up the possibility of interrogating and dismantling the hegemony of the Western knowledge tradition. We here ask two related questions: What are the decolonial affordances of indigenous knowledges? And how do (...) these compare to other contemporary critiques of epistemic coloniality, specifically those mounted by posthumanism? In answer, we develop three definitional senses of relational with reference to indigenous knowledges. First, we define indigenous knowledges in relation to Western knowledge, with which they share a dialectical origin at the moment of colonial contact. Second, indigenous knowledges are relational in their ontological and axiological orientations. Third, relationality in indigenous knowledge suggests a trialectic space, rather than a dialectic space. We argue for the necessity of an anticolonial framework, which assigns priority to indigenous people’s perceptions and ways of knowing for theorizing recurring colonial relations and their (imperialistic) manifestations in producing and reproducing knowledge. (shrink)

In this article, I defend the pragmatic relevance of race in history. Kant and Hegel's racist development thesis assumes that nonwhite, non-European racial groups are defective practical agents. In response, philosophers have opted to drop race from a theory of history and progress. They posit that denying its pragmatic relevance amounts to anti-racist egalitarianism. I dub this tactic “colorblind cosmopolitanism” and offer grounds for its rejection. Following Du Bois, I ascribe, instead, a pragmatic role to race in history. Namely, Du (...) Bois argues that race is an “instrument of progress” that advances emancipatory struggle. He appeals to the writing of history—or historiography—to cultivate group consciousness of historical memory in order to strengthen intragroup bonds among the racially oppressed, especially black Americans, and create intergroup bonds that reconstruct the republic on the basis of universal ideals. I detail Du Bois's defense of the black struggle for freedom in the wake of the U.S. Civil War to provide a concrete illustration of “spirit” in American history. (shrink)

The discussion of migrants’ education focuses generally on whether and how host countries should educate their migrant populations, examining the goals and moral principles underlying educational services for immigrants. While apparently innocuous, such formulations of the issue stipulate a framework with clear roles: host countries are posited as providers and immigrants as recipients of services. Host countries are, thus, placed in a hierarchical position of ‘granting’ belonging, ‘granting’ services, ‘granting’ education, as benefactors, whether for the purposes of duty, utility, or (...) justice. In this paper, I challenge this unidirectional order of beneficence. I propose that the inclusion of migrants in public institutions should more properly be viewed (also) as providing a necessary good/service for the host communities. The encounter with the alien, the foreign, the migrant, in oneself and in one’s world, forces individuals and communities to reflect on what and who they are as well as what and who they want to be – their identity and their future development. I argue that migrant populations with diverse linguistic traditions and customs are uniquely situated to bring to consciousness and help denaturalize the given traditions and culture of their host communities and thus make possible a more self-aware, informed, and freer path of development for their host countries. (shrink)

This article aims to shed light on Hegel's conception of colonialism and its implications for the postcolonial reception of Hegel. Drawing on the abundant literature on the topic, it begins by engaging with Hegel's understanding of colonialism through a close reading of relevant passages of his works, in particular the Heidelberg Vorlesungen über Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft (1817–18), the Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (1821), the Vorlesungen über die Philosophie des Rechts (1819/20, 1821/22, 1822/23, 1824/25) and the Vorlesungen über die Philosophie (...) der Weltgeschichte (1822/23, 1830). Having mapped and reconstructed Hegel's conception of colonialism through his writings and lectures, the article argues that his account of Europe's modern colonial expansion is based primarily on economic considerations, rather than on civilizational assumptions proclaiming the spiritual superiority of European peoples—to which Hegel nevertheless subscribes. The conclusion explores distinct and divergent postcolonial perspectives for engaging with the contemporary legacy of Hegelianism. It addresses, on the one hand, Tibebu's critical reading of Hegel's philosophical enterprise as ‘the coldest rationalisation of genocidal murder and carnage’ based on ‘paradigmatic apartheid’ and, on the other, Brennan's redemptive reading of Hegel, which values his theoretical contribution to the shaping of 20th century anticolonial thought. After contrasting these two interpretations, the article argues in favour of postcolonial strategies for critical reappropriation and sabotage of the legacy of Hegel's philosophy. (shrink)

Hegel's Eurocentrism has become something of an elephant in the room, too obvious to merit discussion. The secondary literature on Hegel often concedes that many of Hegel's comments about the Orient are misguided and uninformed, and then declares that such remarks are of no consequence to his philosophy. However, recently, some scholars have contended that Hegel's view of freedom is fundamentally connected to his negative vision of the Orient and Africa. For example, Alison Stone asserts that Hegel's idea of freedom (...) is premised on his Eurocentrism and colonialism. Drawing on Peter Sahota's essay on Hegel and Hinduism, she argues that Hegel's idea of freedom as liberation from nature tends to exclude non-Western conceptions of freedom. If Stone's contention is true, there would be no way to, as she puts it, save Hegel from himself. I argue that we can move some way towards rescuing Hegel by noting how scholars from modern Asia incorporated some of Hegel's ideas to struggle against Eurocentrism. This essay will read Hegel's comments on the Orient in light of his larger philosophy and then examine how Japanese scholars, specifically Okakura Tenshin (1863–1913) construct what could be called a Hegel-inspired defense of the concept of Asia or the Orient. I claim that if one understands the excesses of Western life to be linked to a vision of freedom based merely on self-interest and pleasure, when scholars and activists from Asia question Western culture, they actually follow Hegel's insights. Okakura, who studied Hegel in college, rethought Asia as overcoming the abstract individualist freedom of the West and replacing it a more holistic, and partially, Hegelian form of freedom. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that Hegel's treatment of Amerindian peoples is rooted in an exclusionary perspective of Reason, which establishes a particular form of life as its defining standard-bearer. This stance results in a distinct form of epistemic misrecognition and injustice that disregards the potential contributions of Amerindian resources and worldviews to the lexicon stablished throughout the modernity. To present an alternative viewpoint, I examine the insights of Yanomami shaman Davi Kopenawa, whose pluriversal conception of reason and history challenges (...) one-sided portrayals of rationality. My aim is not to ‘fit’ Amerindian concepts into our familiar modern philosophical vocabulary. Instead, I wish to consider Hegel's philosophy through the lens of encounters and epistemic recognition with those who have been denied it. In particular, the application of an ‘ethnographic pact’ as a mode of translation constitutes a valuable contribution to ongoing decolonial discussions. I assert that this approach calls into question Hegel's notions of progress and universal reason, suggesting that his philosophy of history might have taken a divergent path if it had not been entangled in a self-centric epistemic framework. While these considerations remain subject to further development, they offer a fresh perspective for comprehending Hegel's argument beyond his own epistemic limitations. (shrink)

This article interprets Hegel's hierarchical theory of race as an application of his general views about the metaphysics of classification and explanation. We begin by offering a reconstruction of Hegel's hierarchical theory of race based on the critical edition of relevant lecture transcripts: we argue that Hegel's position on race is appropriately classified as racist, that it postulates innate mental deficits of some races, and that it turns racism from an anthropological into a metaphysical doctrine by claiming that the division (...) of humankind into races (at least in the Old World) is not a brute fact, but follows a ‘higher necessity’. We then summarize our interpretation of the relevant metaphysical background to this theory. On our reading, Hegel postulates an essentialist form of explanation that explains given kinds as stages in a teleological, non-temporal process through which the nature of a superordinate kind is realized. We argue that Hegel's views about a hierarchical and necessary division of humankind into races are an application of this model to the case of human diversity, motivated by explanatory considerations and subject to confirmation bias. By way of conclusion, we address two possible attempts to ‘save’ Hegelian philosophy from its racist baggage. (shrink)

In the decades around 1800, genealogical imaginaries, or the social, political, economic and cultural meanings of descent and kinship, underwent far-reaching change. Hegel was deeply concerned with these transformations in various respects and in different parts of his philosophy. By engaging with the issues of kinship and family, with the disputes over racial diversity as well as with the scientific debates about life, reproduction and the meaning of sexual difference, Hegel contributed to a philosophical re-articulation of genealogical relations, or to (...) the shaping of a new vocabulary through which the political, social, cultural and epistemic transformations of the period were rendered intelligible in distinctive ways. Although Hegel did not draw explicit connections between his reflections on kinship, race and reproduction, my aim is to explore the semantic interrelations among his reflections on these issues. (shrink)

Scholars have paid limited attention to the crucial relationship between Hegel's racism, his support for colonialism and his views on religion. This essay offers a critical reconstruction of how race and coloniality shape the question of religion (and vice versa) throughout Hegel's attempts to critique and ultimately vindicate European modernity. Paying special attention to the seminal role of ‘fetishism’ in his works, I argue that Hegel's intellectual concerns are racialized from the inception of his project. I conclude by suggesting an (...) alternative philosophical approach to the concept of the ‘fetish’ and ‘fetishism’ to resist Hegel's racist and pro-colonial tendencies. (shrink)

Hegel's Philosophy of History can be characterized as Eurocentric and one finds in it many problematic passages, and even racist statements, as well as a legitimization of colonialism which is presented as a means of education (Bildung). Nevertheless, this article argues that it is possible to reject such judgements and at the same time hold on to the basic intention of Hegel's theories of freedom and Bildung. While the concept of freedom as self-determination is certainly applied in a Eurocentric manner (...) by Hegel in his Philosophy of History, this concept is not Eurocentric at its core. To understand this ‘core’, one has to go back to Hegel's logic of the concept, which finally leads me to a concept of ‘concrete Bildung’. The struggles for self-determination of the colonized peoples must be understood in terms of a further development of the realization of the concept of freedom. If one wants to think Hegel's Philosophy of History meaningfully beyond Hegel's own time, one is inevitably led to the necessity of a liberation of the colonized, for there is a need for a further extension of the consciousness of freedom that actually is inclusive. This demand is contained in Hegel's thought itself, but it still remains abstract with him and must therefore be developed beyond him. (shrink)

This study aims to investigate whether some of the Eurocentric and colonialist contents of Hegel's thought are open to criticism with elements of his own philosophy. First, I intend to show that some of these contents can be organized around the connection between ‘spirit’ and ‘progress’. I then construct an interpretation of Hegel's notion of spirit, based upon which I discuss its possibly pro-colonialist tendencies, arguing that disconnected from the philosophy of history it establishes a connection of autonomy and critique (...) crucial even for anti-colonialist thought. Furthermore, following Adorno's criticism of Hegel, I investigate the possibility of finding in the ‘progress in the consciousness of freedom’ an experiential dimension capable of capturing its regressive moments. This analysis then leads to a discussion of colonization in the reconstruction of capitalist society presented in the Philosophy of Right, which reveals an important discrepancy, so I argue, concerning the Eurocentrism of the Philosophy of History. Finally, I propose a comparison of Hegel's discussion of colonization with Marx's theory of ‘primitive accumulation’, and evaluate thereby the pertinence of Hegel's connection between imperialism and the critique of capitalism. (shrink)

Contrary to the widespread view that Hegel excluded Africa from what he called world history proper, the specifically African element of Egypt was indispensable to his account of the pivotal dialectical moment that saw spirit's release from its immersion in nature. Hegel's racist caricature of Africans in the early part of the lectures was not gratuitous, something that commentators can leave to one side. It was integral to his dialectical account of world history because it served to generate the contradiction (...) that saw the Persian Empire give way to Greece. This understanding is confirmed by the newly completed four-volume edition of Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of World History in the Gesammelte Werke. These new volumes also enable us to gain critical insight into how the editors of the first two published versions of the lectures, Eduard Gans and Karl Hegel, sought in their different ways to shape the reception of Hegel's lectures. (shrink)

In this article I suggest that we should understand symbolic art not as some kind of wonderous prequel to classical art, but as a theory of the advent of spiritual self-reflection on a collective scale. Symbolic art is the first form of what Hegel calls ‘absolute spirit’. I understand absolute spirit as the realm of reflective social practices through which humans discuss and reflect on what it is to be human. Symbolic art is thus the first form in which spirit (...) generates genuine self-knowledge. I argue that symbolic art should be understood as the unprecedented beginning of asking what it is to be human, without having a picture of what it is to be human preceding it. The advantage of understanding Hegel's symbolic art in this way is that we are able to go beyond the narrow conception of symbolic art as existing only in the oriental world and arrive at an understanding of symbolic art which includes social practices from the deep history of our species. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.