This article argues that military conditioning (MC) systematically violates the human dignity of soldiers. The argument relies on an absolute deontologist account of human dignity understood as a claim-right to live in self-respect, which is a right to decide on one’s own behalf about, and to be in control of, essential aspects of one’s own life. The article claims that MC violates soldiers’ dignity so understood because the largely automatic physical killing reflex that MC instills aims to remove their freedom (...) of choice to kill or not to kill, while the MC practices that rationalize the killing of opponents aim to subvert soldiers’ moral deliberation in relation to this behavior. MC thus aims to take away soldiers’ control over a very essential aspect of human life: the decision whether to take life in war. Thereby, MC systematically violates their human dignity. The article concludes with a proposal for an amendment to international law that would allow legal institutions to do more justice to soldiers’ dignity. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to discuss the criminalization of conduct based on human dignity arguments. It proposes a modest version of integrating human dignity into discussions about criminalization. After a critical examination of both the notion of “human dignity as an objective value” and the assumption that the meaning of human dignity can be explained by referring to Kant’s moral philosophy, human dignity violations are characterized as severe humiliations.

In der Medizinethik haben sich moralische Gründe, die die Würde des Patienten betreffen, gerade auch in Fragen am Lebensende als wichtige Grundlage praktischen Überlegens neben solchen des Wohlergehens und der Autonomie fest etabliert. Dabei hat es sich eingebürgert, zwischen Gesichtspunkten zu unterscheiden, die die kontingente Würde einer Person in den Blick nehmen, und solchen, die sich auf eine nicht-kontingente Würde ihrer Träger beziehen. In diesem Aufsatz möchte ich auf eine weitere Grundlage aufmerksam machen, die von Überlegungen, die von der Menschenwürde (...) der Betroffenen in beiderlei Art ihren Ausgangspunkt nehmen, verdeckt zu werden drohen: Moralische Gründe, die sich der Bewahrung oder Vermehrung des Sinns verschrieben haben, den Menschen in ihrem Leben sehen oder vermissen. Diese Sinn-Gründe, so mein Argument, weisen einige strukturelle Gemeinsamkeiten zu Würde-Überlegungen auf, die auf eine gemeinsame ontologische Grundlage und überlappende Gehalte beider zurückzuführen sind. Dessen unbeschadet haben beide Arten von Gründen eigenständige Funktionen beim Nachdenken über medizinethische Probleme; tatsächlich haben Gründe des Sinns im Falle moralischer Herausforderungen am Lebensende oftmals sogar den Primat in dem Sinne, dass sie konstitutiv in Würde-Gründe eingehen können und auch unabhängig davon auf moralisch relevante Gesichtspunkte verweisen. (shrink)

Human dignity is one of the key concepts of our ethical evaluations, in politics, in biomedicine, as well as in everyday life. In moral philosophy, however, human dignity is a source of intractable trouble. It has a number of characteristic features which apparently do not fit into one coherent ethical concept. Hence, philosophers tend to ignore or circumvent the concept. There is hope for a philosophically attractive conception of human dignity, however, given that one takes three crucial turns. The negative (...) turn: to start the inquiry with violations of human dignity. The inductive turn: to consider the whole range of applications of the concept of human dignity in different areas of ethics. And finally, the historical turn: to take into account the historical bonds between human dignity and traditional conceptions of dignity. Taken together they point in the direction of an understanding of human dignity as universal nobility. (shrink)

Several recent analyses of torture focus on the humiliation torture inflicts on the victim as the principal evil inherent in torture. This paper challenges this focus by arguing that the connection between torture and humiliation is not a necessary one. Though it is true that most contemporary usages of torture humiliate, it is shown that this is dependent on both the context of the torture and the specific means of torture applied. It is demonstrated that, in certain circumstances, torture is (...) feasible without inflicting the humiliation contemporary accounts of torture identify. At a theoretical level, it may even be possible to use torture as a way of explicitly expressing respect. The paper, therefore, warns against hinging the entire case against torture on humiliation and argues that we should scrutinize other ways in which torture may violate dignity, too. (shrink)