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  1. Just simulating? Linguistic support for continuism about remembering and imagining.Kristina Liefke - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-37.
    Much recent work in philosophy of memory discusses the question whether episodic remembering is continuous with imagining. This paper contributes to the debate between continuists and discontinuists by considering a previously neglected source of evidence for continuism: the linguistic properties of overt memory and imagination reports (e.g. sentences of the form 'x remembers/imagines p'). I argue that the distribution and truth-conditional contribution of episodic uses of the English verb 'remember' is surprisingly similar to that of the verb 'imagine' – even (...)
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  • X-Phi and the challenge from ad hoc concepts.Michelle Liu - 2023 - Synthese 201 (5):1-25.
    Ad hoc concepts feature prominently in lexical pragmatics. A speaker can use a word or phrase to communicate an ad hoc concept that is different from the lexically encoded concept and the hearer can construct the intended ad hoc concept pragmatically during utterance comprehension. I argue that some philosophical concepts have origins as ad hoc concepts, and such concepts pose a challenge for experimental philosophy regarding these concepts. To illustrate this, I consider philosophers’ ‘what-it’s-like’-concepts and experimental philosophy of consciousness.
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  • Diachronicity Matters! How Semantics Supports Discontinuism About Remembering and Imagining.Kristina Liefke & Markus Werning - 2024 - Topoi 43 (4):1137-1159.
    Much work in philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience has argued for continuism about remembering and imagining (see, e.g., Addis J R Soc N Z 48(2–3):64–88, 2018). This view claims that episodic remembering is just a form of imagining, such that memory does not have a privileged status over other forms of episodic simulation (esp. imagination). Large parts of contemporary philosophy of memory support continuism. This even holds for work in semantics and the philosophy of language, which has pointed out substantial similarities (...)
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  • Introduction: The Semantics of Imagination.Kristina Liefke & Justin D’Ambrosio - 2024 - Topoi 43 (4):1087-1093.
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  • Paper on constructive simulations and pictorial representation.Kristina Liefke - manuscript
    This paper explores the striking conceptual parallel between contemporary accounts of episodic memory (see e.g. Addis, De Brigard, Michaelian) and picture semantics (Greenberg, Abusch, Maier). It argues that picture semantics captures many familiar distinctions from philosophy of memory, while providing some additional – highly useful – tools and concepts (e.g. a mechanism for representation-to-content conversion and a general notion of situation that is independent of a given perspective). The paper uses these tools to (re-)structure and advance debate in contemporary philosophy (...)
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  • Sich vorstellen (‘imagine’) as a Fiction Verb and as a Verb of Thinking.Frank Sode - 2024 - Topoi 43 (4):1095-1115.
    I argue that sich vorstellen (‘imagine’) in German, similar to English imagine, has a use as a fiction verb and a use as a verb of thinking. I follow Vendler (Rev Métaphys Morale 84(2):161–173, 1979) in assuming that the fiction verbs like vorstellen can be used to report acts of subjective imagination (imagined inner experiences) and acts of objective imagination (imagined outer experiences). For sich vorstellen as a verb of thinking we have to distinguish between a use on which it (...)
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  • How Much of Your Self Do You Need to Imagine Being Someone Else?Louis Rouillé - 2024 - Topoi 43 (4):1-11.
    Imagining being someone else from the inside is something relatively easy to do. In Williams (Imagination and the self, problems of the self: philosophical papers, p 26–45, 1973), for instance, one finds Williams’s famous imaginative scenario consisting in imagining being Napoleon from the inside at the battle of Austerlitz. However, providing an adequate analysis for imagination reports like “(1) Williams imagines being Napoleon (from the inside)” is no easy task, because the logical form of such imagination report is controversial. Following (...)
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  • Knowing What It Is Like.Yuri Cath - 2024 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    What kind of knowledge does one have when one knows what it is like to, say, fall in love, eat vegemite™, be a parent, or ride a bike? This Element addresses this question by exploring the tension between two plausible theses about this form of knowledge: (i) that to possess it one must have had the corresponding experience, and (ii) that to possess it one must know an answer to the 'what it is like' question. The Element shows how the (...)
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