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Daniel Stoljar
Australian National University
  1. Physicalism.Daniel Stoljar - 2010 - Routledge.
    Physicalism, the thesis that everything is physical, is one of the most controversial problems in philosophy. Its adherents argue that there is no more important doctrine in philosophy, whilst its opponents claim that its role is greatly exaggerated. In this superb introduction to the problem Daniel Stoljar focuses on three fundamental questions: the interpretation, truth and philosophical significance of physicalism. In answering these questions he covers the following key topics: -/- (i)A brief history of physicalism and its definitions, (ii)what a (...)
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  2. Panpsychism and Non-Standard Materialism: Some Comparative Remarks.Daniel Stoljar - 2020 - In William Seager (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism. New York, NY, USA:
    Much of contemporary philosophy of mind is marked by a dissatisfaction with the two main positions in the field, standard materialism and standard dualism, and hence with the search for alternatives. My concern in this paper is with two such alternatives. The first, which I will call non-standard materialism, is a position I have defended in a number of places, and which may take various forms. The second, panpsychism, has been defended and explored by a number of recent writers. My (...)
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  3. Does the Exclusion Argument Put Any Pressure on Dualism?Daniel Stoljar & Christian List - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (1):96-108.
    The exclusion argument is widely thought to put considerable pressure on dualism if not to refute it outright. We argue to the contrary that, whether or not their position is ultimately true, dualists have a plausible response. The response focuses on the notion of ‘distinctness’ as it occurs in the argument: if 'distinctness' is understood one way, the exclusion principle on which the argument is founded can be denied by the dualist; if it is understood another way, the argument is (...)
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  4.  38
    Russellian Monism or Nagelian Monism?Daniel Stoljar - 2015 - In Torin Alter & Yujin Nagasawa (eds.), Consciousness in the Physical World: Perspectives on Russellian Monism. New York, NY, USA:
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  5.  67
    The Knowledge Argument and Two Interpretations of 'Knowing What It's Like'.Daniel Stoljar - 2018 - In Dale Jacquette (ed.), The Bloomsbury Companion to the Philosophy of Consciousness. London, UK:
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  6.  21
    Knowledge of Perception.Daniel Stoljar - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. New York, NY, USA:
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  7.  9
    Perception.Daniel Stoljar - 2009 - In John Shand (ed.), Central Issues of Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  8.  40
    Two Notions of Resemblance and the Semantics of 'What It's Like'.Justin D'Ambrosio & Daniel Stoljar - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    According to the resemblance account of 'what it's like' and similar constructions, a sentence such as 'there is something it’s like to have a toothache' means 'there is something having a toothache resembles'. This account has proved controversial in the literature; some writers endorse it, many reject it. We show that this conflict is illusory. Drawing on the semantics of intensional transitive verbs, we show that there are two versions of the resemblance account, depending on whether 'resembles' is construed notionally (...)
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  9.  85
    A Euthyphro Dilemma for Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness.Daniel Stoljar - forthcoming - In Gabriel Rabin (ed.), Grounding and Consciousness.
    Abstract: According to a higher-order theory of consciousness, you are in a conscious (psychological) state if and only if you are conscious of being in that state. This paper develops and discusses a Euthyphro dilemma for theories of this sort; that is, a dilemma which asks whether the state is conscious because you are conscious of being in it, or, alternatively, whether you are conscious of being in it because it is conscious. I focus on two different versions of the (...)
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  10.  53
    Armstrong's Just-so Story About Consciousness.Daniel Stoljar - forthcoming - In Peter Anstey & David Braddon-Mitchell (eds.), A Materialist Theory of the Mind: 50 Years On.
    Abstract: In chapter 15 of A Materialist Theory of the Mind, D.M.Armstrong offers an account of what he calls “the biological value of introspection”, namely, that “without information…about the current state of our minds, purposive trains mental activity would be impossible.” This paper examines and assesses Armstrong’s “Just-so story about introspective consciousness”—as W.G.Lycan later called it. One moral will be that appreciating this aspect of Armstrong’s view blurs the difference between his own perceptual model of introspection, and the anti-perceptual models (...)
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  11.  42
    Hempel’s Dilemma.Daniel Stoljar - 2009 - In Heather Dyke (ed.), From Truth to Reality: New Essays in Logic and Metaphysics. New York, NY, USA:
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  12.  46
    In Praise of Poise.Daniel Stoljar - 2019 - In Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block's Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness. Cambridge, MA, USA:
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  13.  53
    Is There Progress in Philosophy? A Brief Case for Optimism.Daniel Stoljar - 2017 - In Russell Blackford & Damien Broderick (eds.), Philosophy's Future: The Problem of Philosophical Progress. New Jersey, USA:
    This chapter sets out an optimistic view of philosophical progress.The key idea is that the historical record speaks in favor of there being progress at least if we are clear about what philosophical problems are, and what it takes to solve them. I end by asking why so many people tend toward a pessimistic view of philosophical progress.
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  14.  43
    Lewis on Materialism and Experience.Daniel Stoljar - 2015 - In Barry Loewer & Jonathan Schaffer (eds.), A Companion to David Lewis. Oxford, UK:
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  15. Philosophy as Synchronic History.Daniel Stoljar - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association.
    Abstract: Bernard Williams argues that philosophy is in some deep way akin to history. This paper is a novel exploration and defence of the Williams thesis (as I call it)—though in a way anathema to Williams himself. The key idea is to apply a central moral from what is sometimes called ‘the analytic philosophy of history’ of the 1960s to the philosophy of philosophy of today, namely, the separation of explanation and laws. I suggest that an account of causal explanation (...)
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  16.  45
    Philosophy of Mind: Consciousness, Intentionality and Ignorance.Daniel Stoljar - 2013 - In Barry Dainton & Howard Robinson (eds.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Philosophy. London, UK:
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  17. The Epistemic Approach to the Problem of Consciousness.Daniel Stoljar - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford, UK:
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