The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 1, Page 16-18, January 2012.

Several quantitative surveys have been conducted internationally to gather empirical information about physicians’ general attitudes towards health care rationing. Are physicians ready to accept and implement rationing, or are they rather reluctant? Do they prefer implicit bedside rationing that allows the physician–patient relationship broad leeway in individual decisions? Or do physicians prefer strategies that apply explicit criteria and rules?

This chapter concerns the normativity of the concepts of paternalism and libertarian paternalism. The first concept is central in evaluating public health policy, but its meaning is controversial. The second concept is equally controversial and has received much attention recently. It may or may not shape the future evaluation of public health policy. In order to facilitate honest and fruitful debate, I consider three approaches to these concepts, in terms of their normativity. Concepts, I claim, may be considered nonnormative, normatively (...) charged, or normative in that they involve more complex relationships between values or duties. While the last approach is often best, other approaches may be appropriate depending on the context and purpose of discussion. The chapter’s conceptual investigation is illustrated by application to two public health policies: a tax on the consumption of fat and the encouragement of health-promoting food displays in restaurants and supermarkets. (shrink)

Systematic reviews, which were developed to improve policy-making and clinical decision-making, answer an empirical question based on a minimally biased appraisal of all the relevant empirical studies. A model is presented here for writing systematic reviews of argument-based literature: literature that uses arguments to address conceptual questions, such as whether abortion is morally permissible or whether research participants should be legally entitled to compensation for sustaining research-related injury. Such reviews aim to improve ethically relevant decisions in healthcare, research or policy. (...) They are better tools than informal reviews or samples of literature with respect to the identification of the reasons relevant to a conceptual question, and they enable the setting of agendas for conceptual and empirical research necessary for sound policy-making. This model comprises prescriptions for writing the systematic review's review question and eligibility criteria, the identification of the relevant literature, the type of data to extract on reasons and publications, and the derivation and presentation of results. This paper explains how to adapt the model to the review question, literature reviewed and intended readers, who may be decision-makers or academics. Obstacles to the model's application are described and addressed, and limitations of the model are identified. (shrink)

Most contributions to the current debate about the consideration and application of empirical information in ethics scholarship deal with epistemological issues such as the role and the meaning of empirical research in ethical reasoning. Despite the increased publication of empirical data in ethics literature we still lack systematic analyses and conceptual frameworks that would help us to understand the rarely discussed methodological and practical problems in appraising empirical research. This paper demonstrates the need for critical appraisal and its crucial methodological (...) role in the application of empirical information in ethical reasoning. Furthermore, it systematically examines the criteria and the appropriate appraisal of empirical research and the associated challenges by highlighting current problems in empirical ethics literature. These problems reveal the following challenges for a critical and responsible consideration of empirical information in ethical reasoning: (i) training in the basic skills of locating and communicating empirical data from the relevant studies; (ii) training in basic knowledge of how to critically appraise empirical (qualitative and quantitative) research and its results; (iii) determination of quality standards for empirical ethics research; (iv) adequate reporting of the methodology and results of empirical ethics research in scientific journals. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 7, July 2020, Page 77-80.

Background: Publications and discussions of survey research in empirical bioethics have steadily increased over the past two decades. However, findings often differ among studies with similar research questions. As a consequence, ethical reasoning that considers only parts of the existing literature and does not apply systematic reviews tends to be biased. To date, we lack a systematic review (SR) methodology that takes into account the specific conceptual and practical challenges of empirical bioethics. Methods: The steps of systematically reviewing empirical findings (...) in bioethics are presented and critically discussed. In particular, (a) the limitations of traditional SR methodologies in the field of empirical bioethics are critically discussed, and (b) conceptual and practical recommendations for SRs in empirical bioethics that are (c) based on the authors’ review experiences in healthcare ethics are presented. Results: A 7-step approach for SRs of empirical bioethics is proposed: (1) careful definition of review question; (2) selection of relevant databases; (3) application of ancillary search strategies; (4) development of search algorithms; (5) relevance assessment of the retrieved references; (6) quality assessment of included studies; and (7) data analysis and presentation. Conceptual and practical challenges arise because of various peculiarities in reviewing empirical bioethics literature and can lead to biased results if they are not taken into account. Conclusions: If suitably adapted to the peculiarities of the field, SRs of empirical bioethics provide transparent information for ethical reasoning and decision-making that is less biased than single studies. (shrink)

The latest Omicron variant of the novel coronavirus has itself created a novel situation—bringing attention to the topic of healthcare rationing among hospitalized pediatric patients. This may be the first time that many pediatricians, nurses, parents, and public health officials have been compelled to engage in uncomfortable discussions about the allocation of medical care/resources. Simply put, finite budgets, resources, and a dwindling healthcare workforce do not permit all patients to receive unlimited medical care. Triage and bedside rationing decisions are happening (...) in a range of difficult everyday circumstances both implicitly and explicitly, but in ways not recognized by even the best ethically framed intentions. Clinicians and hospital administrators have largely been left on their own “to flatten the rationing curve” in hopes that resources never have to be explicitly rationed at their facility. Unfortunately, the downstream result is a misinformed and distrustful public (i.e. parents, guardians, and caregivers) filled with people who are already burdened with inflammatory pseudoscience narratives and deficits in health literacy. This paper aims to elevate a more thoughtful conversation about healthcare rationing by analyzing some existing ethical principles/framework developed for rationing decision making during previous emergency responses and drawing from the day-to-day clinical perspectives of a frontline pediatric acute care/hospitalist. (shrink)

Introduction Hundreds of thousands of premature neonates born in low-income countries are implicitly denied treatment each year. Studies from India show that treatment is rationed even for neonates born at 32 gestational age weeks (GAW), and multiple external factors influence treatment decisions. Is withholding of life-saving treatment for children born between 28 and 32 GAW acceptable from an ethical perspective? Method A seven-step impartial ethical analysis, including outcome analysis of four accepted priority criteria: severity of disease, treatment effect, cost effectiveness (...) and evidence for neonates born at 28 and 32 GAW. Results The ethical analysis sketches out two possibilities: (a) It is not ethically permissible to limit treatment to neonates below 32 GAW when assigning high weight to health maximisation and overall health equality. Neonates below 32 GAW score high on severity of disease and efficiency and cost-effectiveness of treatment if one gives full weight to early years of a newborn life. It is in the child's best interest to be treated. (b) It can be considered ethically permissible if high weight is assigned to reducing inequality of welfare and maximising overall welfare and/or not granting full weight to early years of newborns is considered acceptable. From an equity-motivated health and welfare perspective, we would not accept (b), as it relies on accepting the lack of proper welfare policies for the poor and disabled in India. Conclusion Explicit priority processes in India for financing neonatal care are needed. If premature neonates are perceived as worth less than other patient groups, the reasons should be explored among a broad range of stakeholders. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 7, July 2020, Page 80-82.

Trotz aller Rationalisierungsbemühungen werden sich Leistungseinschränkungen im deutschen Gesundheitswesen nicht vermeiden lassen. Zwar sollten diese so weit möglich oberhalb der individuellen Arzt-Patient-Beziehung erfolgen, aus pragmatischen Gründen wird es sich aber nicht vermeiden lassen, dass Ärzte auch im Einzelfall Verantwortung für die Kosten ihrer Entscheidungen übernehmen, wie es bereits heute häufig der Fall ist. Der vorliegende Beitrag widmet sich deshalb der Frage, wie Ärzte in einer medizinisch rationalen und ethisch vertretbaren Art und Weise Kostenerwägungen in ihren Entscheidungen berücksichtigen können. Vorgeschlagen wird (...) ein vierstufiges Modell eines „ethischen Kostenbewusstseins“: 1) Unterlassung ineffektiver Maßnahmen im Sinne einer evidenzbasierten Medizin; 2) konsequente Berücksichtigung individueller Patientenpräferenzen; 3) Minimierung des diagnostischen und therapeutischen Aufwands für die Erreichung eines bestimmten Therapieziels; und 4) Verzicht auf teure Maßnahmen mit einem geringen/fraglichen Nutzengewinn für den Patienten. Stufen (1–3) sind durch die Prinzipien Wohltun, Nichtschaden und Respekt der Autonomie ethisch begründet, Stufe (4) durch das Prinzip der Gerechtigkeit. Für Entscheidungen auf der vierten Stufe sollten nach Möglichkeit lokale explizite Vorgaben wie z. B. kostensensible Leitlinien erarbeitet werden. Prozedurale Mindeststandards sind zu berücksichtigen, regelmäßige Kosten-Fallbesprechungen oder klinische Ethikberatung sollten zur Entscheidungsunterstützung verfügbar sein. Abschließend wird ein ethischer Algorithmus zur Abklärung des Einsatzes einer kostspieligen medizinischen Maßnahme vorgestellt. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungTrotz aller Rationalisierungsbemühungen werden sich Leistungseinschränkungen im deutschen Gesundheitswesen nicht vermeiden lassen. Zwar sollten diese so weit möglich oberhalb der individuellen Arzt-Patient-Beziehung erfolgen, aus pragmatischen Gründen wird es sich aber nicht vermeiden lassen, dass Ärzte auch im Einzelfall Verantwortung für die Kosten ihrer Entscheidungen übernehmen, wie es bereits heute häufig der Fall ist. Der vorliegende Beitrag widmet sich deshalb der Frage, wie Ärzte in einer medizinisch rationalen und ethisch vertretbaren Art und Weise Kostenerwägungen in ihren Entscheidungen berücksichtigen können. Vorgeschlagen wird (...) ein vierstufiges Modell eines „ethischen Kostenbewusstseins“: 1) Unterlassung ineffektiver Maßnahmen im Sinne einer evidenzbasierten Medizin; 2) konsequente Berücksichtigung individueller Patientenpräferenzen; 3) Minimierung des diagnostischen und therapeutischen Aufwands für die Erreichung eines bestimmten Therapieziels; und 4) Verzicht auf teure Maßnahmen mit einem geringen/fraglichen Nutzengewinn für den Patienten. Stufen (1–3) sind durch die Prinzipien Wohltun, Nichtschaden und Respekt der Autonomie ethisch begründet, Stufe (4) durch das Prinzip der Gerechtigkeit. Für Entscheidungen auf der vierten Stufe sollten nach Möglichkeit lokale explizite Vorgaben wie z. B. kostensensible Leitlinien erarbeitet werden. Prozedurale Mindeststandards sind zu berücksichtigen, regelmäßige Kosten-Fallbesprechungen oder klinische Ethikberatung sollten zur Entscheidungsunterstützung verfügbar sein. Abschließend wird ein ethischer Algorithmus zur Abklärung des Einsatzes einer kostspieligen medizinischen Maßnahme vorgestellt. (shrink)

Although most theorists of healthcare rationing argue that rationing, including rationing that takes place in the physician–patient relationship (“bedside rationing”) is unavoidable, some health professionals strongly disagree. In a recent essay, Vegard Bruun Wyller argues that bedside rationing is immoral and thoroughly at odds with a sound view of the physician–patient relationship. We take Wyller to be an articulate exponent of the reluctance to participate in rationing found among some clinicians. Our essay attempts to refute the five crucial premises of (...) his argument yet build on his genuine insights. In our analysis, Wyller’s critique of bedside rationing is instructive both for harbouring some very common misconceptions that must be exposed and refuted, but also for offering important words of caution. In particular, bedside rationing must be performed in ways that do not harm the physician–patient relationship. Read irenically, Wyller’s critique is a reminder of what must not be lost in our painful endeavour to update the ethics of medicine to encompass the unavoidability of rationing. (shrink)

Critical-care decision making is highly complex, given the need for health care providers and organizations to consider, and constructively respond to, the diverse interests and perspectives of a variety of legitimate stakeholders. Insights derived from an identified set of ethics-related considerations have the potential to meaningfully inform inclusive and deliberative policy development that aims to optimally balance the competing obligations that arise in this challenging, clinical decision-making domain. A potential, constructive outcome of such policy engagement is the collaborative development of (...) an as-fair-as-possible dispute resolution process that incorporates an appropriated-justified, defensible critical-care obligation threshold. (shrink)

Critical-care decision making is highly complex, given the need for health care providers and organizations to consider, and constructively respond to, the diverse interests and perspectives of a variety of legitimate stakeholders. Insights derived from an identified set of ethics-related considerations have the potential to meaningfully inform inclusive and deliberative policy development that aims to optimally balance the competing obligations that arise in this challenging, clinical decision-making domain. A potential, constructive outcome of such policy engagement is the collaborative development of (...) an as-fair-as-possible dispute resolution process that incorporates an appropriated-justified, defensible critical-care obligation threshold. (shrink)

Scheduling surgical procedures among operating rooms is mistakenly regarded as merely a tedious administrative task. However, the growing demand for surgical care and finite hours in a day qualify OR time as a limited resource. Accordingly, the objective of this manuscript is to reframe the process of OR scheduling as an ethical dilemma of allocating scarce medical resources. Recommendations for ethical allocation of OR time—based on both familiar and novel ethical values—are provided for healthcare institutions and individual surgeons.

According to the widely accepted principles of beneficence and distributive justice, I argue that healthcare providers and facilities have an ethical duty to reduce the ecological footprint of the services they provide. I also address the question of whether the reductions in footprint need or should be patient-facing. I review Andrew Jameton and Jessica Pierce’s claim that achieving ecological sustainability in the healthcare sector requires rationing the treatment options offered to patients. I present a number of reasons to think that (...) we should not ration health care to achieve sufficient reductions in a society’s overall consumption of ecological goods. Moreover, given the complexities of ecological rationing, I argue that there are good reasons to think that the ethical duty to reduce the ecological footprint of health care should focus on only nonpatient-facing changes. I review a number of case studies of hospitals who have successfully retrofitted facilities to make them more efficient and reduced their resource and waste streams. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 1, Page 18-20, January 2012.

Rationing in healthcare remains very much a taboo topic. Before COVID-19, it rarely received public attention, even when it occurred in everyday practices, mainly in the form of implicit rationing, as it continues to do today. There are different definitions, types and levels of healthcare rationing, according to different perspectives. With the aim of contributing to a more coherent debate on such a highly emotional healthcare issue as rationing, here are provided a number of reflections from a patient advocate perspective (...) which are specifically focused on bedside rationing, the most troublesome level, both for patients and clinicians, particularly in regard to cancer care. Oncology, with its numerous expensive therapies and increasing number of patients, is undeniably one of the main areas contributing to the increase in healthcare costs. However, the fixed budgets of today's publicly financed health systems cannot allow unlimited access to the potentially beneficial treatments to all patients. Bedside rationing constitutes the last phase of many decision-making processes occurring at different interrelated levels (macro-levels), both inside and outside healthcare systems, which implicitly and inevitably result in a bottleneck determined by the upstream decisions themselves. Shifting from implicit to explicit bedside rationing essentially means moving from a paternalistic to a citizen-before-patient approach; this implies, first of all, a cultural change. Practical bedside rationing is an ethically complex topic, but one that needs to be urgently addressed in a transparent and open debate. In this scenario, the oncological community – patients, patient advocates and clinicians – can and should play an important role. (shrink)

ObjectiveTo increase knowledge of how doctors perceive futile treatments and scarcity of resources at the end of life. In particular, their perceptions about whether and how resource limitations influence end-of-life decision making. This study builds on previous work that found some doctors include resource limitations in their understanding of the concept of futility.SettingThree tertiary hospitals in metropolitan Brisbane, Australia.DesignQualitative study using in-depth, semistructured, face-to-face interviews. Ninety-six doctors were interviewed in 11 medical specialties. Transcripts of the interviews were analysed using thematic (...) analysis.ResultsDoctors’ perceptions of whether resource limitations were relevant to their practice varied, and doctors were more comfortable with explicit rather than implicit rationing. Several doctors incorporated resource limitations into their definition of futility. For some, availability of resources was one factor of many in assessing futility, secondary to patient considerations, but a few doctors indicated that the concept of futility concealed rationing. Doctors experienced moral distress due to the resource implications of providing futile treatment and the lack of administrative supports for bedside rationing.ConclusionsDoctors’ ability to distinguish between futility and rationing would be enhanced through regulatory support for explicit rationing and strategies to support doctors’ role in rationing at the bedside. Medical policies should address the distinction between resource limitations and futility to promote legitimacy in end-of-life decision making. (shrink)

Libertarian views on rights tend to rule out coercive redistribution for purposes of public health care guarantees, whereas liberal conceptions support coercive funding of potentially unlimited access to medical services in the name of medical needs. Taking the “priority of liberty” seriously as supreme political value, a plausible prudential argument can avoid these extremes by providing systematic reasons for both delivering and limiting publicly financed guarantees. Given impending demographic change and rapid technical progress in medicine, only a two-tier system with (...) explicitly limited public guarantees and optional privately financed health services seems acceptable. (shrink)

The global COVID-19 pandemic has brought the issue of rationing finite healthcare resources to the fore. There has been much academic debate, media attention, and conversation in the homes of everyday individuals about the allocation of medical resources, diagnostic testing kits, ventilators, and personal protective equipment. Yet decisions to prioritize treatment for some individuals over others occur implicitly and explicitly in everyday practices. The pandemic has propelled the socially taboo and unavoidably prickly issue of healthcare rationing into the public spotlight—and (...) as such, healthcare rationing demands ongoing public attention and transparent discussion. This article concludes that in the aftermath of COVID-19, policymakers should work towards normalizing rationing discussions by engaging in transparent and honest debate in the wider community and public domain. Further, injecting greater openness and objectivity into rationing decisions might go some way towards dismantling the societal taboo surrounding rationing in healthcare. (shrink)

This chapter examines how social- scientific research on public preferences bears on the ethical question of how those resources should in fact be allocated, and explain how social-scientific researchers might find an understanding of work in ethics useful as they design mechanisms for data collection and analysis. I proceed by first distinguishing the methodologies of social science and ethics. I then provide an overview of different approaches to the ethics of allocating scarce medical interventions, including an approach—the complete lives system—which (...) I have previously defended, and a brief recap of social-scientific research on the allocation of scarce medical resources. Following these overviews, I examine different ways in which public preferences could matter to the ethics of allocation. Last, I suggest some ways in which social scientists could learn from ethics as they conduct research into public preferences regarding the allocation of scarce medical resources. (shrink)