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Moore and Wittgenstein on certainty

New York: Oxford University Press (1994)

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  1. Urbild, Paradigma, Regel.Herbert Hrachovec - 2020 - In Regelfolgen, Regelschaffen, Regeländern – die Herausforderung für Auto-Nomie und Universalismus durch Ludwig Wittgenstein, Martin Heidegger und Carl Schmitt. pp. 213-228.
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  • Hinges and Certainty. A Précis of Moore and Wittgenstein. Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense.Annalisa Coliva - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (1):1-12.
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  • On Coliva’s Judgmental Hinges.Danièle Moyal-Sharrock - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (1):13-25.
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  • Which Hinge Epistemology?Annalisa Coliva - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (2-3):79-96.
    _ Source: _Volume 6, Issue 2-3, pp 79 - 96 The paper explores the idea of a “hinge epistemology,” considered as a theory about justification which gives center-stage to Wittgenstein’s notion of _hinges_. First, some basic methodological considerations regarding the relationship between merely exegetical work on Wittgenstein’s texts and more theoretically committed work are put forward. Then, the main problems raised in _On Certainty_ and the most influential interpretative lines it has given rise to so far are presented and discussed. (...)
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  • The epistemological foundations of practical reason.Mark Colby - 1999 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 42 (1):25 – 47.
    One consequence of the later Wittgenstein's influential critique of epistemological foundationalism has been to convince many contemporary philosophers that the ideal of universal and necessary cognitive grounds for moral or political norms is illusory. Recent neo-Wittgensteinian accounts of practical reason attempt to formulate a conception of a post-foundational politics in which a political ethos can be legitimate, rational or just even if its informing practices and cognitive standards lack foundational justification. Against these appropriations of Wittgenstein, I argue that his account (...)
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  • G. E. Moore and Bad Faith.Anthony Coleman - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):347-365.
    Abstract: G. E. Moore claimed to know a variety of commonsense propositions. He is often accused of being dogmatic or of begging the question against philosophers who deny that he knows such things. In this paper, I argue that this accusation is mistaken. I argue that Moore is instead guilty of answering questions of the form ‘Do I know p?’ in bad faith.
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  • Wittgenstein y el método de análisis por tipos proposicionales en Sobre la Certeza.Víctor Hugo Chica Pérez - 2015 - Estudios de Filosofía (Universidad de Antioquia) 52.
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  • Cognitive goods, open futures and the epistemology of education.J. Adam Carter - forthcoming - In David Bakhurst (ed.), Ethics and Epistemology of Education. Wiley-Blackwell.
    What cognitive goods do children plausibly have a right to in an education? In attempting to answer this question, I begin with a puzzle centred around Feinberg’s observation that a denial of certain cognitive goods can violate a child’s right to an open future. I show that propositionalist, dispositionalist and objectualist characterisations of the kinds of cognitive goods children have a right to run in to problems. A promising alternative is then proposed and defended, one that is inspired in the (...)
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  • What We Talk about When We Talk about Truth: Dewey, Wittgenstein, and the Pragmatic Test.John Capps - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (2):159-180.
    Pragmatic theories of truth need to pass the pragmatic test: they need to make a difference. Unfortunately, defenders of the pragmatic theory have rarely applied this test. I argue that a Deweyan pragmatic account of truth passes the test by identifying the political and epistemic dangers of certain types of social networks that create a durable consensus around false beliefs. To better understand Dewey’s account of truth I propose an excursion through Wittgenstein’s later views on knowledge and certainty.
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  • Recognizing targets: Wittgenstein's exploration of a new kind of foundationalism in on certainty.Robert Greenleaf Brice - 2008 - Philosophical Investigations 32 (1):1-22.
    Bringing the views of Grayling, Moyal-Sharrock and Stroll together, I argue that in On Certainty, Wittgenstein explores the possibility of a new kind of foundationalism. Distinguishing propositional language-games from non-propositional, actional certainty, Wittgenstein investigates a foundationalism sui generis . Although he does not forthrightly state, defend, or endorse what I am characterizing as a "new kind of foundationalism," we must bear in mind that On Certainty was a collection of first draft notes written at the end of Wittgenstein's life. The (...)
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  • Mistakes and Mental Disturbances: Pleasants, Wittgenstein, and Basic Moral Certainty.Robert Greenleaf Brice - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (2):477-487.
    In his article, “Wittgenstein and Basic Moral Certainty,” Nigel Pleasants argues that killing an innocent, non-threatening person is wrong. It is, he argues, “a basic moral certainty.” He believes our basic moral certainties play the “same kind of foundational role as [our] basic empirical certaint[ies] do.” I believe this is mistaken. There is not “simply one kind of foundational role” that certainty plays. While I think Pleasants is right to affiliate his proposition with a Wittgensteinian form of certainty, he exposes (...)
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  • Reading 'On Certainty' through the Lens of Cavell: Scepticism, Dogmatism and the 'Groundlessness of our Believing'.Chantal Bax - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (4):515 - 533.
    While Cavell is well known for his reinterpretation of the later Wittgenstein, he has never really engaged himself with post-Investigations writings like On Certainty. This collection may, however, seem to undermine the profoundly anti-dogmatic reading of Wittgenstein that Cavell has developed. In addition to apparently arguing against what Cavell calls ‘the truth of skepticism’ – a phrase contested by other Wittgensteinians – On Certainty may seem to justify the rejection of whoever dares to question one’s basic presuppositions. According to On (...)
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  • Context as Relevance-Driven Abduction and Charitable Satisficing.Salvatore Attardo - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
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  • Teaching Children to Ignore Alternatives is—Sometimes—Necessary: Indoctrination as a Dispensable Term.José María Ariso - 2018 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 38 (4):397-410.
    Literature on indoctrination has focused on imparting and revising beliefs, but it has hardly considered the way of teaching and acquiring certainties—in Wittgenstein’s sense. Therefore, the role played by rationality in the acquisition of our linguistic practices has been overestimated. Furthermore, analyses of the relationship between certainty and indoctrination contain major errors. In this paper, the clarification of the aforementioned issues leads me to suggest the avoidance of the term ‘indoctrination’ so as to avoid focusing on the suitability of the (...)
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  • Religious Certainty: Peculiarities and Pedagogical Considerations.José María Ariso - 2020 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 39 (6):657-669.
    This paper presents the concept of ‘religious certainty’ I have developed by drawing inspiration from Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘certainty’. After describing the particular traits of religious certainty, this paper addresses two difficulties derived from this concept. On the one hand, it explains why religious certainty functions as such even though all its consequences are far from being absolutely clear; on the other hand, it clarifies why, unlike the rest of certainties, the loss of religious certainty does not result in the (...)
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  • Learning to Believe: Challenges in Children’s Acquisition of a World-Picture in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty.José María Ariso - 2014 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 34 (3):311-325.
    Wittgenstein scholars have tended to interpret the acquisition of certainties, and by extension, of a world-picture, as the achievement of a state in which these certainties are assimilated in a seemingly unconscious way as one masters language-games. However, it has not been stressed that the attainment of this state often involves facing a series of challenges or difficulties which must be overcome for the development of the world-picture and therefore the socialization process to be achieved. After showing, on the one (...)
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  • Can a culture of error be really developed in the classroom without teaching students to distinguish between errors and anomalies?José María Ariso - 2018 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 51 (10):1030-1041.
    It is expected that children increasingly learn to identify errors throughout their schooling process and even before it. As a further step, however, some scholars have suggested how a culture of error should be implemented in the classroom for the student to be able not only to locate errors but also, and above all, to learn from them. Yet the various proposals aimed at generating a culture of error in the classroom keep regarding error as all those responses and reactions (...)
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  • Advantages and Paradoxes of Regarding Omniscience as Subjective Certainty in Wittgenstein’s Sense.José María Ariso - 2020 - Sophia 60 (2):431-440.
    In this paper, I try to facilitate the understanding of the concept of ‘omniscience’ by taking into account the terminology developed in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. Thus, I start by explaining why omniscience can be regarded neither as grounded knowledge nor as ungrounded or objective certainty. Instead, omniscience might be considered as subjective certainty, which has the advantage of leaving scope for a doubt that enables and strengthens religious faith. Lastly, I clarify how God’s omniscience would be enriched if He (...)
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  • Moderatism and Truth.Santiago Echeverri - 2023 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 53 (3):271-287.
    According to MODERATISM, perceptual justification requires that one independently takes for granted propositional hinges like <There is an external world>, <I am not a brain in a vat (BIV)>, and so on. This view faces the truth problem: to offer an account of truth for hinges that is not threatened by skepticism. Annalisa Coliva has tried to solve the truth problem by combining the claim that external world propositions have a substantive truth property like correspondence with the claim that hinges (...)
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  • Wittgenstein on knowledge: a critique.Raquel Krempel - 2015 - Synthese 192 (3):723-734.
    My goal here is to assess whether Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophical conception of a descriptive philosophy is in accordance with his philosophical practice. I argue that Wittgenstein doesn’t really limit himself to description when he criticizes Moore’s use of the verb “to know”. In On Certainty, Wittgenstein argues that Moore’s claims of knowledge are at odds with the everyday use of the verb “to know”, because, among other things, they don’t allow the possibility of justification. That is, Wittgenstein considers that proper, everyday (...)
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  • Why Wittgenstein Doesn’t Refute Skepticism.Raquel Albieri Krempel - 2019 - Discurso 49 (2).
    In On Certainty, Wittgenstein formulates several criticisms against skepticism about our knowledge of the external world. My goal is to show that Wittgenstein does not here offer a convincing answer to the skeptical problem. First, I will present a strong version of the problem, understanding it as a paradoxical argument. In the second part, I will introduce and raise problems for two pragmatic responses against skepticism that appear in On Certainty. Finally, I will present some of Wittgenstein’s logical criticisms against (...)
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  • What We All Know: Community in Moore's "A Defence of Common Sense".Wim Vanrie - 2021 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 59 (4):629-651.
    I defend an account of Moore's conception of Common Sense—as it figures in "A Defence of Common Sense"—according to which it is based in a vision of the community of human beings as bound and unified by a settled common understanding of the meaning of our words and statements. This, for Moore, is our inalienable starting point in philosophy. When Moore invokes Common Sense against idealist (and skeptical) philosophers, he is reminding them that they too are bound by this common (...)
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  • Sextus and Wittgenstein on the End of Justification.Shaul Tor - 2014 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 4 (2):81-108.
    Following the lead of Duncan Pritchard’s “Wittgensteinian Pyrrhonism,” this paper takes a further, comparative and contrastive look at the problem of justification in Sextus Empiricus and in Wittgenstein’sOn Certainty. I argue both that Pritchard’s stimulating account is problematic in certain important respects and that his insights contain much interpretive potential still to be pursued. Diverging from Pritchard, I argue that it is a significant and self-conscious aspect of Sextus’ sceptical strategies to call into question large segments of our belief systemen (...)
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  • ‘Hinge Propositions’ and the ‘Logical’ Exclusion of Doubt.Genia Schönbaumsfeld - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (2-3):165-181.
    _ Source: _Volume 6, Issue 2-3, pp 165 - 181 Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘hinge propositions’—those propositions that stand fast for us and around which all empirical enquiry turns—remains controversial and elusive, and none of the recent attempts to make sense of it strike me as entirely satisfactory. The literature on this topic tends to divide into two camps: either a ‘quasi-epistemic’ reading is offered that seeks to downplay the radical nature of Wittgenstein’s proposal by assimilating his thought to more mainstream (...)
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  • Wittgensteinian Epistemology and Cartesian Skepticism.Nicola Claudio Salvatore - 2015 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 29 (2):53-80.
    In this paper, I present and criticize a number of influential anti-skeptical strategies inspired by Wittgenstein’s remarks on ‘hinges’. Furthermore, I argue that, following Wittgen- stein’s analogy between ‘hinges’ and ‘rules of grammar’, we should be able to get rid of Cartesian skeptical scenarios as nonsensical, even if apparently intelligible, combinations of signs.
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  • Presupposing, Believing, Having Faith.Carlos Miguel Gómez Rincón - 2019 - Sophia 60 (1):103-121.
    This paper traces the borders between presupposing, believing, and having faith. These three attitudes are often equated and confused in the contemporary image of the historically and culturally situated character of rationality. This confusion is problematic because, on the one hand, it prevents us from fully appreciating the way in which this image of rationality points towards a dissolving of the opposition between faith and reason; on the other hand, it leads to forms of fideism. After bringing this differentiation into (...)
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  • Wittgensteinian foundationalism.Duncan Richter - 2001 - Erkenntnis 55 (3):349–358.
    The idea that there is such a thing as Wittgensteinian foundationalism is a provocative one for two reasons. For one thing, Wittgenstein is widely regarded as an anti-foundationalist. For another, the very word `foundationalism' sounds like the name of a theory, and Wittgenstein famously opposed the advancing of theories and theses in philosophy. Nonetheless, in his book Moore and Wittgenstein on Certainty, Avrum Stroll has argued that Wittgenstein does indeed develop a foundationalist view in his final work, On Certainty. On (...)
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  • Child rearing: Passivity and being able to go on. Wittgenstein on shared practices and seeing aspects.Stefan Ramaekers & Paul Smeyers - 2008 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 40 (5):638-651.
    It is not uncommon to hear parents say in discussions they have with their children 'Look at it this way'. And called upon for their advice, counsellors too say something to adults with the significance of 'Try to see it like this'. The change of someone's perspective in the context of child rearing is the focus of this paper. Our interest in this lies not so much in giving an answer to the practical problems that are at stake, but at (...)
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  • Resurrecting the Moorean response to the sceptic.Duncan Pritchard - 2002 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10 (3):283 – 307.
    G. E. Moore famously offered a strikingly straightforward response to the radical sceptic which simply consisted of the claim that one could know, on the basis of one's knowledge that one has hands, that there exists an external world. In general, the Moorean response to scepticism maintains that we can know the denials of sceptical hypotheses on the basis of our knowledge of everyday propositions. In the recent literature two proposals have been put forward to try to accommodate, to varying (...)
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  • Situating Cornerstone Propositions.Patrice Philie - 2012 - Open Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):260-267.
    Ostensibly, Wittgenstein’s last remarks published in 1969 under the title On Certainty are about epistemology, more precisely about the problem of scepticism. This is the standard interpretation of On Certainty. But I contend, in this paper, that we will get closer to Wittgenstein’s intentions and perhaps find new and illuminating ways to interpret his late contribution if we keep in mind that his primary goal was not to provide an answer to scepticism. In fact, I think that the standard reading (...)
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  • A certeza fulcral de Wittgenstein.Danièle Moyal-Sharrock - 2015 - Dissertatio 41 (S1):3-30.
    O desenvolvimento do presente texto parte do pressuposto inicial segundo o qual grande parte do Da Certeza é dedicada a expor a distinção entre ‘certeza’ e ‘conhecimento’. Nossas certezas básicas – ou ‘fulcrais’ ou, ainda, ‘dobradiças’ [hinges] – formam a nossa imagem de mundo e sustentam o nosso conhecimento, não sendo elas mesmas, porém, de natureza epistêmica. As deliberações de Wittgenstein levamno a compreender que as nossas certezas básicas compartilham as seguintes características conceituais; elas são todas: não epistêmicas, indubitáveis, não (...)
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  • Assessing the Epistemological Status of Certainty in Wittgenstein through the Lens of Critical Rationalism.Abdolhamid Mohammadi & Ali Paya - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Investigations 16 (38):670-705.
    "Certainty" occupies an important place in Wittgenstein’s epistemology: it does not belong to the category of knowledge but constitutes its foundation. In his view, knowledge boils down to language games, and language games are based on indubitable certainties. According to Wittgenstein, scepticism is meaningless, and if there is no certainty, then even doubt would be meaningless. Wittgesntein maintains that [relative] doubt and knowledge are epistemic categories, whereas absolute doubt and certainty are non-epistemic categories. Epistemic categories are meaningful and when expressed (...)
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  • Creencia no evidencial y certeza vital.Rafael Miranda Rojas - 2016 - Estudios de Filosofía (Universidad de Antioquia) 53.
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  • Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations and moral particularism.Shidan Lotfi - 2009 - Theoria 75 (2):100-116.
    Moral particularists have seen Wittgenstein as a close ally. One of the main reasons for this is that particularists such as Jonathan Dancy and John McDowell have argued that Wittgenstein's so-called "rule-following considerations" (RFCs) provide support for their skepticism about the existence and/or role of rules and principles in ethics. In this paper, I show that while Wittgenstein's RFCs challenge the notion that competence with language, i.e., the ability to apply concepts properly, is like mechanically following a rule, he does (...)
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  • Disagreement, Certainties, Relativism.Martin Kusch - 2018 - Topoi 40 (5):1097-1105.
    This paper seeks to widen the dialogue between the “epistemology of peer disagreement” and the epistemology informed by Wittgenstein’s last notebooks, later edited as On Certainty. The paper defends the following theses: not all certainties are groundless; many of them are beliefs; and they do not have a common essence. An epistemic peer need not share all of my certainties. Which response to a disagreement over a certainty is called for, depends on the type of certainty in question. Sometimes a (...)
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  • Molecules and mereology.Rom Harré & Jean-Pierre Llored - 2013 - Foundations of Chemistry 15 (2):127-144.
    This paper widens the scope of our previous paper (Harré and Llored in Found Chem 13:63–76, 2011) by scrutinizing how whole/parts relations are involved in the study of molecules. In doing so, we point out two mereological fallacies which endanger both philosophical and chemical inferences. We also further explore how the concept of affordance is related to our mereological investigation. We then refer to quantum chemistry in order to pave the way for a new mereological approach for chemistry.
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  • Wittgenstein e Moore: sobre a certeza.Arturo Fatturi - 2014 - Revista de Filosofia Aurora 26 (39):671.
    Neste ensaio será analisada a resposta fornecida por George Edward Moore ao questionamento do filósofo cético quanto à existência de objetos exteriores a nós. Num primeiro momento analisar-se-á a resposta oferecida por Moore e sua estrutura. Num segundo momento se faz a análise da efetividade que as respostas de Moore apresentam como soluções à dúvida cética. Após essas análises, passamos a considerar criticamente a empreitada de Moore segundo o ponto de vista da filosofia de Ludwig Wittgenstein exposta em sua obra (...)
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  • An ecological approach to hinge propositions.Eros Carvalho - 2022 - Sképsis (25):1-16.
    In this paper, I argue that hinge propositions are ways of acting that constitute abilities or skills. My starting point is Moyal-Sharrock's account of hinge propositions. However, Moyal-Sharrock's account leaves gaps to be filled, as it does not offer a unified explanation of the origin of our ungrounded grounds. Her account also lacks resources to respond to the issue of demarcation, since it does not provide a criterion for distinguishing ways of acting that can legitimately fulfill the role of ungrounded (...)
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  • Juicio no-racionalizado dentro del pensamiento racional.Mª Dolores García-Arnaldos - 2018 - Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio 12 (2):70-82.
    In this article, we consider Wittgenstein’s approach to non-inferential knowledge, its relation to special propositions, and the nature of the justification of these propositions. According to Wittgenstein, there is a kind of non-inferential knowledge whose rational status is not the result of basic beliefs (in a foundational sense) that justify it. In Wittgenstein’s rule-following analysis, Frege’s theory is criticized. This theory is based on the idea that having a conceptual repertoire prior to the understanding of any rule, requires having grasped (...)
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  • The Concept of Testimony.Nicola Mößner - 2011 - In Christoph Jäger & Winfried Löffler (eds.), Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement, Papers of the 34. International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 207-209.
    Many contributors of the debate about knowledge by testimony concentrate on the problem of justification. In my paper I will stress a different point – the concept of testimony itself. As a starting point I will use the definitional proposal of Jennifer Lackey. She holds that the concept of testimony should be regarded as entailing two aspects – one corresponding to the speaker, the other one to the hearer. I will adopt the assumption that we need to deal with both (...)
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  • David Hume als therapeutischer Philosoph. Eine Auflösung der Induktionsproblematik mit wittgensteinianischer Methode.Friederike Schmitz - 2013 - Dissertation, Universität Heidelberg
    Ziel der Arbeit ist zu zeigen, dass sich in der theoretischen Philosophie David Humes Ansätze zu einer therapeutischen Methode finden, wie sie von Ludwig Wittgenstein angewandt und beschrieben wurde. Im ersten Teil wird Wittgensteins Konzeption der Philosophie und ihre Anwendung anhand einer genauen Textexegese dargestellt. Der zweite Teil untersucht primär die Humeschen Überlegungen zu Kausalität und Induktion, seine methodologischen Aussagen sowie seine Perzeptionstheorie und argumentiert für die These, dass Hume ebenfalls, wenn auch mit Einschränkungen, Elemente einer therapeutischen Methode und eine (...)
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  • The skeptic's dogmatism: a constructive response to the skeptical problem.Kaplan Levent Hasanoglu - 2011 - Dissertation,
    The problem of philosophical skepticism relates to the difficulty involved in underwriting the claim that we know anything of spatio-temporal reality. It is often claimed, in fact, that proper philosophical scrutiny reveals quite the opposite from what common sense suggests. Knowledge of external reality is thought to be even quite obviously denied to us as a result of the alleged fact that we all fail to know that certain skeptical scenarios do not obtain. A skeptical scenario is one in which (...)
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