Wittgensteinian Epistemology and Cartesian Skepticism

Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 29 (2):53-80 (2015)
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Abstract
In this paper, I present and criticize a number of influential anti-skeptical strategies inspired by Wittgenstein’s remarks on ‘hinges’. Furthermore, I argue that, following Wittgen- stein’s analogy between ‘hinges’ and ‘rules of grammar’, we should be able to get rid of Cartesian skeptical scenarios as nonsensical, even if apparently intelligible, combinations of signs.
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2014, 2015
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SALWEA-4
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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2015-11-03

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