- Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts: Bringing Ontology and Philosophy of Mind Together.John Henry Taylor - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (4):1283-1297.details
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Did Rorty’s Pragmatism Have Foundations?James Tartaglia - 2010 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (5):607-627.details
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Is Universal Consciousness Fit for Ground?Miri Albahari - 2024 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind Vol 4. Oxford University Press.details
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An Argument for Micropsychism: If There is a Conscious Whole, There Must be Conscious Parts.Arjen Rookmaaker - 2024 - Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy 38 (1-2):57-90.details
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The Binding Problem for Strong Experiential Monism.Santtu Heikkinen - 2022 - Sophia 61 (4):795-809.details
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The necessity of conceivability.Sophie R. Allen & Javier Cumpa - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-18.details
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(1 other version)Challenging the identity theory of properties.Vassilis Livanios - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):5079-5105.details
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Dispositionality, categoricity, and where to find them.Lorenzo Azzano - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2949-2976.details
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Powerful Qualities Beyond Identity Theory.Vassilis Livanios - 2020 - Metaphysica 21 (2):279-295.details
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Grounding theories of powers.Matthew Tugby - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11187-11216.details
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How to Be a Pluralist in Substance Ontology.Travis Dumsday - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):995-1022.details
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New Foundations of Dispositionalism - introduction.Andrea Raimondi & Lorenzo Azzano - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-26.details
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(1 other version)Challenging the identity theory of properties.Vassilis Livanios - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):5079-5105.details
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The dual nature of properties: the powerful qualities view reconsidered.Joaquim Giannotti - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Glasgowdetails
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Conceivability Arguments, Properties, and Powers: A New Defense of Dispositionalism.Robert Schroer - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (3):352-370.details
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Fizykalistyczny panpsychizm.Galen Strawson - 2018 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 66 (1):181-205.details
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The Silence of Physics.Barry Dainton - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (5):2207-2241.details
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Panpsychism, Emergentism and the Metaphysics of Causation.Pat Lewtas - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.details
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(1 other version)Identity Metaphysics.Galen Strawson - 2021 - The Monist 104 (1):60-90.details
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(1 other version)Identity Metaphysics.Galen Strawson - 2021 - The Monist 104 (1):30-60.details
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(1 other version)Can a Single Property Be Both Dispositional and Categorical? The “Partial Consideration Strategy”, Partially Considered.Robert Schroer - 2013 - Metaphysica 14 (1):63-77.details
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The Subject of Experience.Galen Strawson - 2017 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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When is a Concrete Property Basic?Pat Lewtas - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (5-6):607-622.details
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The question of realism for powers.Lorenzo Azzano - 2019 - Synthese 196 (1):329-354.details
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Intrinsic naturalism: a type-F monist account of phenomenal consciousness.Luke Alexander Gordon Palmer - unknowndetails
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