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Miri Albahari
University of Western Australia
  1. Analytical Buddhism: The Two-Tiered Illusion of Self.Miri Albahari - 2006 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
    We spend our lives protecting an elusive self - but does the self actually exist? Drawing on literature from Western philosophy, neuroscience and Buddhism (interpreted), the author argues that there is no self. The self - as unified owner and thinker of thoughts - is an illusion created by two tiers. A tier of naturally unified consciousness (notably absent in standard bundle-theory accounts) merges with a tier of desire-driven thoughts and emotions to yield the impression of a self. So while (...)
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  2. Perennial Idealism: A Mystical Solution to the Mind-Body Problem.Miri Albahari - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.
    Each well-known proposed solution to the mind-body problem encounters an impasse. These take the form of an explanatory gap, such as the one between mental and physical, or between micro-subjects and macro-subject. The dialectical pressure to bridge these gaps is generating positions in which consciousness is becoming increasingly foundational. The most recent of these, cosmopsychism, typically casts the entire cosmos as a perspectival subject whose mind grounds those of more limited subjects like ourselves. I review the dialectic from materialism and (...)
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  3. Panpsychism and the Inner-Outer Gap Problem.Miri Albahari - 2022 - The Monist 105 (1):25-42.
    Panpsychism is viewed by its advocates as resolving the main sticking points for materialism and dualism. While sympathetic to this approach, I locate two prevalent assumptions within modern panpsychism which I think are problematic: first, that fundamental consciousness belongs to a perspectival subject and second, that the physical world, despite being backed by conscious subject, is observer-independent. I re-introduce an argument I’d made elsewhere against the first assumption: that it lies behind the well-known combination and decombination problems. I then propose (...)
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  4.  61
    Nirvana and Ownerless consciousness.Miri Albahari - 2010 - In Mark Siderits, Evan Thompson & Dan Zahavi (eds.), Self, No Self?: Perspectives From Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions. Oxford University Press.
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  5. Witness-Consciousness: Its Definition, Appearance and Reality.Miri Albahari - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (1):62-84.
    G.E. Moore alludes to a notion of consciousness that is diaphanous, elusive to attention, yet detectable. Such a notion, I suggest, approximates what Bina Gupta has called `witness-consciousness'--in particular, the aspect of mode-neutral awareness with intrinsic phenomenal character. This paper offers a detailed definition and defence of the appearance and reality of witness-consciousness. While I claim that witness- consciousness captures the essence of subjectivity, and so must be accounted for in the `hard problem' of consciousness, it is not to be (...)
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  6. Insight Knowledge of No Self in Buddhism: An Epistemic Analysis.Miri Albahari - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14.
    Imagine a character, Mary Analogue, who has a complete theoretical knowledge of her subject matter: the illusory nature of self. Suppose that when presenting her paper on no self at a conference she suffers stage-fright – a reaction that implies she is under an illusion of the very self whose existence she denies. Might there be something defective about her knowledge of no self? The Buddhist tradition would claim that Mary Analogue, despite her theoretical omniscience, lacks deep ‘insight knowledge’ into (...)
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  7. Alief or belief? A contextual approach to belief ascription.Miri Albahari - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):701-720.
    There has been a surge of interest over cases where a subject sincerely endorses P while displaying discordant strains of not-P in her behaviour and emotion. Cases like this are telling because they bear directly upon conditions under which belief should be ascribed. Are beliefs to be aligned with what we sincerely endorse or with what we do and feel? If belief doesn’t explain the discordant strains, what does? T.S. Gendler has recently attempted to explain all the discordances by introducing (...)
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  8. Against No-Ātman Theories of Anattā.Miri Albahari - 2002 - Asian Philosophy 12 (1):5-20.
    Suppose we were to randomly pick out a book on Buddhism or Eastern Philosophy and turn to the section on 'no-self' (anatt?). On this central teaching, we would most likely learn that the Buddha rejected the Upanisadic notion of Self (?tman), maintaining that a person is no more than a bundle of impermanent, conditioned psycho-physical aggregates (khandhas). The rejection of ?tman is seen by many to separate the metaphysically 'extravagant' claims of Hinduism from the austere tenets of Buddhism. The status (...)
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