While the volume of material inspired by Rawls’s reinvigoration of the discipline back in 1971 has still not begun to subside, its significance has been in serious decline for quite some time. New and important work is appearing less and less frequently, while the scope of the work that is appearing is getting smaller and more internal and its practical applications more difficult to discern. The discipline has reached a point of intellectual stagnation, even as real-world events suggest that the (...) need for what political philosophy can provide could not be more critical. What follows then is a set of statements about how I believe that we, as political philosophers, should approach what we do. It contains my view as to what political philosophy should be about, how political philosophy should be done, and how courses in political philosophy should be taught, interlaced with commentary on the current state of the profession. (shrink)

In much theory there is a tendency to place thought above action, or the opposite, action over thought. The consequence of the first option is that philosophy or scientific evidence gains the upper hand in educational thinking. The consequence of the second view is that pragmatism and relativism become the dominant features. This article discusses how different branches of the Aristotelian tradition can mediate between these two views. I argue, contrary to some other Aristotelian approaches, that thinking and action are (...) both separated and yet prerequisites for each other and point to some educational consequences of this way of thinking. To build this argument I draw on selected aspects of the philosophy of Hanna Arendt, Leo Strauss and John Dewey. (shrink)

The German philosopher and intellectual historian Karl Löwith is known and discussed mainly in the English language via his major work on secularization – Meaning in History, first written and published in English – and the more recently translated essays that criticize Martin Heidegger. However, Löwith’s body of work is rarely considered for the original contribution that it offers to the discourse on the questions of modernity and modern life. This oversight is due much to the way in which Hans (...) Blumenberg and Jürgen Habermas have each ‘dealt’ with Löwith’s position; Löwith in each case becomes a flagstone in the path to their own theories. This article reappraises Löwith’s thought through an exploration of his major works, and discovers that the concepts and motivations behind the critical force of his intellectual histories suggest a more sensitive reading of the modern condition than his critics allow. His notions of nature, cosmos and eternity, and his steadfast skepticism, reveal Löwith to be a theorist of the limits of human finitude, and set him apart from his contemporaries and his former teacher Heidegger. It is these aspects of his work that will continue to be provocative for both defenders of freedom and defenders of nature. (shrink)

This essay examines the relationship between Eric Voegelin and Leo Strauss in order to show the central themes necessary to elucidate their philosophical positions. The essay reveals the centrality of the figure of Plato as a point of departure to understand the agreement and the disagreement concerning fundamental questions (such as the way of reading ancient texts, the importance of the historical perspective or the importance of the study of the past in order to orient the modern science) which revolves (...) around the issue of the relation between revelation and philosophy. The work concludes with an identification of the common core of both thinkers that allows us to understand their differences (homogeneity or heterogeneity of reality and the human) and, moreover, identifies both perspectives with a «foundational» (Voegelin) or «negative» (Strauss) interpretation of Plato’s thought. (shrink)

This paper focuses on Leo Strauss’s reading of the Republic. I argue that Strauss’s ironic interpretation of the dialogue must be understood in the context of a broader intellectual project which aims to criticize modern and contemporary political philosophy. Strauss’s understanding of Plato is strongly influenced by the hermeneutical principles he draws from his studies of medieval Jewish and Arab philosophy. Reading Plato through Alfarabi, Strauss pursues the idea of the conflict between philosophy and politics, which sheds light, also, on (...) the problem of persecution. Accordingly, he stresses the importance of a peculiar art of reading between the lines. In Strauss’s view, this art is the starting point for recovering the esoteric meaning of the Republic. I will argue that Strauss’s interpretation contradicts several dialogical elements because it does not take into account the broader historical framework of the text. Nevertheless, even with these limitations, Plato scholars should consider Straussian insights, because these offer an untraditional and a non-doctrinal reading of the dialogue. (shrink)

Among those who reject the Epicurean claim that death is not bad for the one who dies, it is popularly held that death is bad for the one who dies, when it is bad for the one who dies, because it deprives the one who dies of the good things that otherwise would have fallen into her life. This view is known as the deprivation account of the value of death, and Fred Feldman is one of its most prominent defenders. (...) In this paper, I explain why I believe that Feldman’s argument for the occasional badness of death fails. While staying within an Epicurean framework, I offer an alternative that adequately accounts for a significant range of widely held intuitions about prudential value. My account implies that death is almost always good for the one who dies, yet often less good than not dying. Finally, I discuss some puzzles that remain for my account and hint at possible ways to address them. (shrink)

This essay outlines some fundamental differences between the evaluative and explanatory language of Aristotelian practical reason based on his empirical psychological theory of human development, on the one hand, and the late 20th and 21st century discourse of human rights based on a NeoKantian transcendent principle of universal human dignity on the other. To what extent are these two types of political discourse compatible in today’s globalizing world? To the extent that they are not compatible, which should be preferred? My (...) answer is that they are compatible and even complementary, but only if the Aristotelian framework is treated as more fundamental, and the rights-and-dignity perspective is understood as a potentially good political solution, for the time being, in the contemporary context of global politics. (shrink)

Głównym celem tego artykułu jest wyjaśnienie, na czym polega specyfika instytucji wymogu uzyskania terytorialnego rozłożenia głosów w wyborach prezydenckich, który funkcjonuje w trzech wieloetnicznych państwach (Nigerii od 1979 r., Kenii od 1992 r. i Indonezji od 2001 r.) oraz określenie panujących w tych państwach warunków politycznych, które przyczyniły się do jej wprowadzenia i trwania. W końcowej części artykułu, dzięki porównaniu trzech kazusów, zostały wskazane szczegółowe różnice występujące obecnie między nimi. W artykule zostały również zaprezentowane wnioski dotyczące dotychczasowych doświadczeń związanych z (...) funkcjonowaniem przedmiotowej instytucji. Pozwolą one wstępnie ocenić, czy uprawnione jest stwierdzenie, że jej zastosowanie wpływa na obniżenie konfliktowych zachowań w relacjach między grupami etnicznymi i na budowanie międzyetnicznego porozumienia. (shrink)

Lying is by no means a new phenomenon in human existence, nor in philosophy or political science. Only Arendt’s phenomenological analysis, however, clearly reveals the constant tension between truth and lie inherent in the political space, and the structural weakness of the former compared to the latter. Adopting this perspective helps to understand the temptation of the so-called “post-truth” that manifests today in the form of “fake news”, conspiracy theories, and populist propaganda. This article sheds light on the political and (...) social conditions underlying the emergence of post-truth and on what distinguishes it from the political lie Arendt encountered in the nineteen-sixties in the United States. The Arendtian concept of qualitative plurality is proposed as an antidote to the unworldliness of post-truth. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 25, Issue 1, pp 72 - 94 Politics has never been considered Martin Buber’s forte. This paper considers the range of Buber’s reception as a political thinker by considering it in the form of three “moments,” each from a different point in his career, and each through the eyes of a different figure who either read or worked with Buber politically: Theodor Herzl, Gustav Landauer, and Hans Kohn. The three moments are structured around a discussion of the (...) classic criticism that Buber’s politics are naïve or utopian; the paper seeks to respond, as Buber did, in a way that raises questions about the borders of politics itself. (shrink)

Schmitt and Strauss are often discussed in literature as if their conceptions of political had nothing in common. But, as the author shows, Heinrich Meier careful study of the relation between Schmitt and Strauss tells us that the three editions of Schmitt’s «Concept of political» and Strauss’s «Comments» on it may be seen as largely overlooked «hidden dialogue», in the course of which Strauss’s 1932 critique had significant if unacknowledged impact on Schmitt and political and theological foundations of his thought.

Much of Leo Strauss's scholarship focused on the possibilities of moral knowledge and the quality of rulers, and these interests guide his readings in the history of political philosophy. I suggest that this is a fruitful way of studying political thought. It will, however, be argued that Strauss's belief in objective morality should be discarded. Thus, our judgments on past thinkers may have to be reversed or modified. Strauss's belief that only objective values can lend a firm support to democracy (...) is also discussed and refuted. How this "inverted" Straussianism might be applied is briefly exemplified with the case of Hobbes. (shrink)

Strauss championed a philosophy of history according to which philosophers characteristically hide their actual beliefs when writing about ethics and politics. This paper begins by suggesting that an esoteric philosophy of history encourages a set of specific biases when writing histories of philosophy. Proponents of esotericism are liable to be far too ready to conclude that philosophers intended to hide their beliefs; they are likely to be insufficiently attuned to the varied contexts in which philosophers write; and they are likely (...) to be too ready to assimilate the beliefs of philosophers to a norm. Thereafter the paper considers the presence of these biases in Strauss's account of modernity. Strauss allows for waves of modernity but he defines these waves as part of a single, monolithic project that is defined in contrast to the esoteric character of ancient philosophy and that leads inexorably to nihilism. Once we correct for the biases mentioned above, however, modernity appears as a series of projects located in specific contexts and confronting particular dilemmas. Again, where Strauss presents our own era as one of crisis, this revised account of modernity suggests that we merely confront the more local issue of how to forge a community out of self-governing individuals. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes tells us that he wrote Leviathan to “absolve the divine laws” of the charge that they justify rebellion. This article interprets the argumentative strategy of the second half of Leviathan in light of this intention. Over the course of his three major political works, Hobbes develops a convergent argument to absolve God’s laws. This strategy of judicial rhetoric relies on using multiple independent claims in the hope that one’s audience finds at least one of them persuasive. This was (...) a risky strategy for Hobbes that angered his critics. The strategy also reveals something about what sort of philosopher Hobbes was and how we ought to approach his work. (shrink)

The political philosopher Leo Strauss is famous for contending that any synthesis of reason and revelation is impossible, since they are irreconcilable antagonists. Yet he is also famous for praising the secular regime of liberal democracy as the best regime for all human beings, even though he is well aware that modern philosophers such as Spinoza thought this regime must make use of biblical morality to promote good citizenship. Is democracy, then, both religious and secular? Strauss thought that Spinoza was (...) contradictory in teaching that reason and revelation should be separated from each other while also insisting that a secular democratic politics still requires the biblical morality of charity. The paradox that liberal democracy is both religious and secular, which is central to Spinoza, was dismissed by Strauss as a Machiavellian subterfuge or the cynical attempt to use religion for political purposes. In order to adhere to his dualistic separation of reason and revelation, Strauss turned to ancient Greek political philosophy, particularly the ideas of Plato and Aristotle, as the true ground of liberal democracy since this classical tradition was never exposed to biblical revelation. Yet, the illiberal and hierarchical implications of Greek political thought, which clash with Strauss’s modern views on human individuality and dignity, ultimately take him back to the biblically based philosophies of Spinoza and Kierkegaard, who teach the paradox that the Bible is the true foundation of human freedom. (shrink)

These twelve essays, together with the editor's introduction, examine the relationship of ideology to philosophy and politics. Part one deals with theoretical underpinnings of ideology: definitions are posited, and the relationship of ideology to thought itself, to use and abuse of theory, to social theory, to the epistemology of politics, to technology, and to political culture are discussed. Part two treats ideology in its historical context, dealing with the word as introduced by Destutt de Tracy in 1798 and looking both (...) forward and backward at such enquirers in the field as Aristotle, Bacon, Locke, Rousseau, Marx, Karl Mannheim, and Leo Strauss. The volume presents original and provocative insights into the meanings and uses of ideology, as well as into specific "ideologies." The essays will be of importance to students of philosophy and sociology of knowledge, political scientists, and historians. (shrink)

Leo Strauss's readings of historical figures in the philosophical tradition have been justly well explored; however, his relation to contemporary thinkers has not enjoyed the same coverage. In Leo Strauss and Contemporary Thought, an international group of scholars examines the possible conversations between Strauss and figures such as Walter Benjamin, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Charles Taylor, and Hans Blumenberg. The contributors examine topics including religious liberty, the political function of comedy, law, and the relation between the Ancients and the Moderns, (...) and bring Strauss into many new and original discussions that will be of use to those interested in the thought of Strauss, the history of philosophy and political theory, and contemporary continental thought"--Back cover. (shrink)

When questioning whether political deception can be ethically warranted, two competing intuitions jump to the fore. First, political deception is a fact of human life, used in the realpolitik of governance. Second, the ethical warrant of truth asserts itself as inexorably and indefatigably preferable to falsehood. Unfortunately, a cursory examination of the history of philosophy reveals a paucity of models to marry these basic intuitions. Some thinkers (e.g., Augustine, Aquinas, Grotius, Kant, Mill, and Rawls) privilege the truth by neglecting the (...) realpolitik, i.e., the truth is inviolate. Others (e.g., Machiavelli, Bentham, and the often infamous caché of 20th century dictators) focus upon the realpolitik to the exclusion of the primacy of the truth. A third group of critical thinkers (e.g., Arendt and Bok) examine the topic but offer no positive, systematic treatment of deception. Lacking are theories which simultaneously recognize that political untruth is often necessary, but that untruth is only justified when a) truth is politically impossible, b) the necessity of untruth is demonstrable, and c) the truth can be replaced with a minimally injurious untruth. Plato offers one such account in the Republic, arguing that deceit must be applied medicinally to the city. However, his account is problematic in detail. One of Plato’s inheritors, the 10th century thinker al-Fārābī, advanced Plato’s theoretical account, arguing that political governance requires restrained political deception. This deception, the expression of philosophical truths through the symbols of religion, meets the criteria mentioned above, being necessary, demonstrably necessary, and minimally injurious. But while al-Fārābī provides a valuable model for what justified political deception could look like, the lengths to which he must go in order to create a viable model for political deception reveals the untenability of the notion of justified political deception writ large. One must orchestrate an entire cosmos around the notion, notably a cosmos that does not match our own. One must adopt very specific conceptions of human nature, association, and happiness, as well as a particular metaphysics and epistemology. For, while al-Fārābī shows that political deception can be justifiable, he also reveals its unjustifiability outside an idealized setting. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 23, Issue 2, pp 161 - 195 The Greek tradition of political philosophy, with its prominent focus on the forms of government, should be distinguished from the discourse typical of many rabbinic sources, with its concern for collective goals. This discourse commonly deploys broad, mid-level goals to mediate between abstract theology and practical law. Among these goals, yishuv medinah focuses on the economic and social development of a region or district, articulating the character of local needs. This (...) is compared to related goals—the settling of the world and the ordering of the world —and contrasted with Aristotle’s approach, which in many ways typifies the Greek tradition. (shrink)

In the last decade, we have witnessed the return of one of the most controversial terms in the political lexicon: totalitarianism. What are we talking about when we define a totalitarian political and social situation? When did we start using the word as both adjective and noun? And, what totalitarian ghosts haunt the present? Philosopher Simona Forti seeks to answer these questions by reconstructing not only the genealogy of the concept, but also by clarifying its motives, misunderstandings, and the controversies (...) that have animated its current resurgence. Taking into account political theories and historical discussions, Totalitarianism especially focuses on philosophical reflections, from the question of totalitarian biopolitics to the alleged totalitarian drifts of neoliberalism. The work invites the relentless formulation of a radical question about democratic age: the possibilities it has opened up, the voids it leaves behind, the mechanisms it activates, and the "voluntary servitude" it produces. Forti argues that totalitarianism cannot be considered an external threat to democracy, but rather, one of the possible answers to those questions posed by modernity which democracies have not been able to solve. Her investigation of the uses and abuses of totalitarianism as one of the fundamental categories of 20th and 21st centuries promises to provoke much-needed discussion and debate among those in philosophy, politics, ethics, and beyond. (shrink)

This article discusses consumer activism not as an ethical, but as a political phenomenon. A political concept of consumer activism implies, first, that consumers sometimes express support or opposition to products and services or consumer and business practices at least partly in order to advance nonmarket agendas, and, second, that consumer activism in the economic sphere occasionally has palpable impact on the organization of social life. Early contributors to the debate were optimistic that political consumer activism might be able to (...) extend democracy into the economic sphere. In recent years, however, scholars have increasingly voiced misgivings about this, arguing that political consumer activism may suffer from a democratic deficit: it may amount to an impermissible form of vigilantism or facilitate the illegitimate conversion of market power into political power. This article systematizes and reassesses these concerns, focusing in particular on arguments that dispute the compatibility of political consumer activism with liberal democracy as a procedural ideal. I conclude that political consumer activism does not face problems to do with legitimacy in this regard, most importantly because money does not play a more important role in market-based politics than in official democratic processes. Political consumer activism takes many forms, yet it is hardly ever about voting with the pocketbook. (shrink)

A faulty understanding of the relationship between morality and politics encumbers many contemporary debates on human enhancement. As a result, some ethical reflections on enhancement undervalue its social dimensions, while some social approaches to the topic lack normative import. In this essay, I use my own conception of the relationship between ethics and politics, which I call “political minimalism,” in order to support and strengthen the existing social perspectives on human-enhancement technologies.

In this paper I examine two theories of democracy that can be found in contemporary French philosophy. Both Cornelius Castoriadis and Jacques Rancière offer a critique of modern democracy with the purpose of refounding it. The ‘refoundation narratives’ they propose are both based on an account of the origins of democracy in ancient Greece. According to Castoriadis, ancient democracy is grounded in a ‘magma’ of ‘social imaginary significations’ in which ‘autonomy’ is considered the correct response to Being defined as an (...) insurmountable ‘Chaos’. On the contrary, modern democracy defines Being as a determinacy and consequently fails to grasp the notion of autonomy. According to Rancière, the origins of democracy are to be found in the invasion of the public space by ‘those without a part’ who consequently have no title to govern. The problem with the ‘domesticated’ modern democracy is that it denies the existence of Otherness; that is, of non-citizens excluded from the public space. Therefore it appears incapable of letting the ‘dis-agreement’ manifest itself and consequently incapable of transforming the ‘police’ order. After examining the meaning of both theories, I attempt to elucidate the difficulties encountered by each author in the attainment of his goal, which is that of refounding modern democracy. (shrink)

This paper closely examines Strauss’ conception of “Medieval Enlightenment”. It focuses on the central role that Arab philosophy has played in the development of Strauss’s thought and discusses the validity of the uses he makes of it. It also emphasizes the interest of Strauss’s analyses as regards Arab philosophy while drawing attention to the tensions they create. It claims that Strauss’ involvement in the quarrel between Ancients and Moderns aims at showing that medieval philosophy cannot be reduced simply to the (...) effort to reconcile philosophy and religion. The ideas of some Arab philosophers cropped up throughout Strauss’s philosophical development and determined his interpretation of Maimonides and Plato as well as his stance in opposition to the moderns. However Strauss’s idea of the “medieval Enlightenment” remains fundamentally ambiguous. Is that Enlightenment supposed to be an argument for the preservation of faith alongside reason or does it rather express a kind of atheism or disguised materialism? (shrink)

Normal 0 21 false false false ES-CO X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Tabla normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; line-height:115%; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;} This essay presents a reading of modern liberalism from Leo Strauss´thought. Starting with his analysis of Carl Schmitt’s Concept of the Political and its critique of liberal “neutralization and depolitization”, Strauss posits an affirmation of the (...) problem of natural right, for which it is a fundamental first step to study the political philosophy of Hobbes. In contrast with Schmitt and Hobbes, Strauss´ thought points towards a consideration of classical natural right as a riposte to the political nihilism or apolitical cosmopolitanism of late-modernity, both products of radical historicism as well as methodological positivism. Strauss considers the search of natural right qua representation of the idea of justice a distinct alternative to the affirmation of the will through sovereign power. Normal 0 21 false false false ES-CO X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4. (shrink)

This article problematizes the extended diagnosis regarding the relation between truth and politics, or politics and lies, mobilized by the term post-truth. First, it puts into question the presumed historical novelty that the term signals to, reminding us how Western political philosophy has always been marked by the anxiety towards the threathening force of an orphan and erratic discourse with no consciousness and no referent. Second, it indicates the limitations of the reproach against the presumed withdrawal of rationality and veracity (...) from politics, insofar as it fails to take into account the extent to which there is operative nowadays, in a hegemonic tecno-scientific discourse, a production of a certain truth of the social. In order to attend to this other angle of the relation between truth and politics one needs to displace the view from the field of electoral politics, to the field of techniques of government. Third, the article argues that there is a structural coherence between the hyper-truth in which these government techniques operate, and the inescrupulous strategic interest in the realpolitik of electoral politics, a coherence that is anchored in the ontological and epistemological premises of the modern conception of the political. Finally, the article underlines the critical potency that the theoretical legacy of post-structuralism offers to us, facing this landscape. (shrink)

Liberal democracy is today under unprecedented attack from both the left and the right. Offering a fresh and penetrating examination of how Leo Strauss understood the emergence of liberal democracy and what is necessary to sustain and elevate it, Leo Strauss on Modern Democracy, Technology, and Liberal Education explores Strauss' view of the intimate (and troubling) relation between the philosophic promotion of liberal democracy and the turn to the modern scientific-technological project of the 'conquest of nature'. Timothy W. Burns explicates (...) the political reasoning behind Strauss' recommendation of reminders of genuine political greatness within democracy over and against the failure of nihilistic youth to recognize it. Elucidating what Strauss envisaged by a liberally-educated sub-political or cultural-level aristocracy--one that could elevate and sustain liberal democracy--and the roles that both philosophy and divine-law traditions should have in that education, Burns also lays out Strauss' frequent (though often tacit) engagement with the thought of Heidegger on these issues." -- Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

The aim of this research is to reconstruct a metaphysical interpretation of the philosophy of history with regard to the spirit of historical thinking. The spirit of historical thinking is to emphasize the relation between what happened in the past and historical thinking about the past in the present. However, current philosophies of history, which are largely epistemologically oriented, have not adequately explored this relation. In order to investigate the relation between past and present, I refer to an Aristotelian philosophy (...) of practice and politics, and adapt it to the domain of the philosophy of history, and argue the case for a metaphysical science of history. A metaphysical science of history contains two primary parts. They are the part on physis and the part on technê/phronēsis. With regard to physis that metaphysically investigates the natural generating progress of entities, I argue that the existence of historical events can be understood as a natural developing progress in which the events are ordered in a chronological sequence. Such chronological sequence is essentially the physis of history in the metaphysical sense. For the part on technê/phronēsis, I demonstrate that Aristotelian knowing is for itself an action of knowing, which is located beyond a given temporal position in the past to both the past and the thinking present, and indicates the fundamental Beingness of history. Finally I conclude that the historical eudaimonia, namely the pursuing of the completeness of historical knowledge, is the final presentation of actualizing Geschehenszeit, as it bridges the past and the present in accordance to the spirit of historical thinking. (shrink)

Extols the virtue of small liberal arts colleges and the liberal arts tradition.

Este artículo estudia la aplicación de la ley de la naturaleza en el estado de naturaleza. En este sentido, se analizará la definición abstracta de libertad, su correspondencia con el concepto práctico de libertad natural y la oposición de este último con la esclavitud que supone nacer sometido a un gobierno despótico. Posteriormente, se considerará la potestad de infringir castigos bajo pena capital y su derivación, a través de la guerra justa, en la figura de esclavitud legítima. De este modo, (...) se plantearán las tensiones que surgen al contrastar la crítica del absolutismo y la conquista con la legitimación de un poder privado despótico. (shrink)