In this paper, I will argue that there is a version of possibilism—inspired by the modal analogue of Kit Fine’s fragmentalism—that can be combined with a weakening of actualism. The reasons for analysing this view, which I call Modal Fragmentalism, are twofold. Firstly, it can enrich our understanding of the actualism/possibilism divide, by showing that, at least in principle, the adoption of possibilia does not correspond to an outright rejection of the actualist intuitions. Secondly, and more specifically, it can enrich (...) our understanding of concretism, by proving that, at least in principle, the idea that objects have properties in an absolute manner is compatible with transworld identity. (shrink)

El presente escrito discute la plausibilidad de la admisión de términos generales rígidos no naturales. Enunciados de identidad teórica que incluyen términos generales rígidos no naturales no expresan necesidad a posteriori: son enunciados analíticos, necesarios y a priori. Sólo los enunciados de identidad que incluyen términos generales rígidos naturales son enunciados necesarios a posteriori. Los problemas de la trivialización y sobre generalización suponen que la aplicación de la rigidez a los términos de clase no natural resta importancia a la rigidez (...) como diferenciador semántico – modal, pero eso solo es así si estos problemas exigen que cualquier término general rígido permita afirmar necesidad a posteriori, lo que es rechazado. Se propone la nominalización de un término general como una vía de solución a la trivialización y la sobregeneralización. Del mismo modo, se descarta una lectura predicativa restrictiva de los términos generales. Finalmente, se explicita el principal caso de términos generales no rígidos: términos descriptivos sintácticamente complejos. (shrink)

Philosophers interested in the fitting attitude analysis of final value have devoted a great deal of attention to the wrong kind of reasons problem. This paper offers an example of the reverse difficulty, the wrong kind of value problem. This problem creates deeper challenges for the fitting attitude analysis and provides independent grounds for rejecting it, or at least for doubting seriously its correctness.

Theories of partial reference have been developed in order to retrospectively interpret rather stubborn past scientific theories like Newtonian dynamics and the phlogiston theory in a realist way, i.e., as approximately true. This is done by allowing for a term to refer to more than one entity at the same time and by providing semantic structures that determine the truth values of sentences containing partially referring terms. Two versions of theories of partial reference will be presented, a conjunctive (by Hartry (...) Field, 1973) and a disjunctive one (by Christina McLeish, 2006). In this paper, I will analyze them with regard to modal and epistemic aspects of those theories. It will be argued that a) theories of partial reference are (surprisingly) compatible with the rigidity of natural kind terms but face a weaker form of the so called “no-failures-of-reference-problem” and b) that the disjunctive account of partial reference suffers from a serious weakness: the impossibility of discriminating between descriptions that fix the reference of a term and those merely associated with it leads to the unacceptable result that past scientific theories containing such partially referring terms will come out as epistemically necessary, i.e., as a priori true. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Jahrgang: 13 Heft: 2 Seiten: 116-127.

According to possibilism, or non-actualism, fictional characters are possible individuals. Possibilist accounts of fiction do not only assign the intuitively correct truth-conditions to sentences in a fiction, but has the potential to provide powerful explanatory models for a wide range of phenomena associated with fiction (though these two aspects of possibilism are, I argue, crucially distinct). Apart from the classic defense by David Lewis the idea of modeling fiction in terms of possible worlds have been widely criticized. In this article, (...) I provide a defense of a possibilist account against some lines of criticism. To do so, I assume that names for fictional characters are directly referential and a possible-worlds model that accommodates transworld identity. On this background, I argue, it is possible to construct an elegant model of fictional discourse using familiar models of information exchange in ordinary discourse, and I sketch how this model can be used to i) make a natural distinction between fictional and counterfactual discourse, ii) account for creativity, and iii) sustain a natural definition of truth-in-fiction that avoids certain familiar objections to possibilism. Though I set aside questions about the metaphysical commitments of a possible-world interpretation here, there is accordingly reason to think that the battle over possibilist treatments of fiction will have to be fought over metaphysical foundations rather than technical shortcomings. (shrink)

The relationship between “character” and an “actor” appears to be quite straightforward: an actor acts as/plays character [x]. But let us be more specific and reword this formulation: actor [y] acts as/plays Hamlet. Or – for the time of the play – actor [y] is Hamlet. And it is this last statement that is paradoxically utterly true and utterly false. It is in the name of a theatrical character that the tension between actor and character arises. Asking, for example, who (...) is Hamlet? yields an answer where both actor and character have legitimate exclusive rights to being “Hamlet.” In short, to whom/what does the name of a theatrical character refer? By first arguing that theatre works as a reverse-“beetle” language-game, whereby I posit that theatre allows for private rule-making, I am able to turn to the idea of reference. It is by examining the name of theatrical characters and what these names refer to that I suggest that – following Hegel – theatrical names refer dialectically. Understanding theatrical characters as such, interpretation hinges not only on the output of theatre (i.e., the meaning), but also the input (i.e., the truth value). (shrink)

The paper is aimed to show that directly referring terms have to be rigid designators. Since directly referring expressions refer to something on the basis of semantic conventions alone and since the conventions are independent of possible worlds, there cannot be a directly referring expression with shifting reference across possible worlds. Although this claim seems to be indubitable and widely recognized, it was questioned recently. Drawing on D. Lewis’ ontology of counterparts, G. Martí has shown that a directly referring expression (...) is capable to refer to different objects in different possible worlds. A directly referring term designating an object in our world is supposed to designate its counterparts in other possible world. The paper tries to show that the purported directly referring terms assumed by Martí’s argument are not, in fact, directly referring.U ovome članku nastoji se pokazati da izravno referirajući termini moraju biti kruti označitelji. Budući da izravno referirajući izrazi referiraju na nešto samo na osnovi semantičkih konvencija i budući da su konvencije neovisne o mogućim svjetovima, ne može postojati izravno referirajući izraz s referencijom koja se pomiče duž mogućih svjetova. Iako se ta tvrdnja čini neprijepornom i široko prihvaćenom, u novije je vrijeme dovedena u pitanje. Oslanjajući se na Lewisovu ontologiju parnjakâ, G. Martí je pokazala da izravno referirajući izraz može referirati na različite predmete u različitim mogućim svjetovima. Izravno referirajući termin koji označava predmet u našem svijetu trebao bi označavati svoje parnjake u drugome mogućem svijetu. U članku se pokušava pokazati da navodno izravno referirajući termini koji su pretpostavljeni Martínim argumentom zapravo nisu izravno referirajući. (shrink)