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Science Without Induction

In John Earman & John D. Norton (eds.), The Cosmos of Science: Essays of Exploration. University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 386--429 (1997)

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  1. The structure of a scientific paper.Frederick Suppe - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (3):381-405.
    Scientific articles exemplify standard functional units constraining argumentative structures. Severe space limitations demand every paragraph and illustration contribute to establishing the paper's claims. Philosophical testing and confirmation models should take into account each paragraph, table, and illustration. Hypothetico-Deductive, Bayesian Inductive, and Inference-to-the-Best-Explanation models do not, garbling the logic of papers. Micro-analysis of the fundamental paper in plate tectonics reveals an argumentative structure commonplace in science but ignored by standard philosophical accounts that cannot be dismissed as mere rhetorical embellishment. Papers with (...)
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  • Peirce-suit of truth – why inference to the best explanation and abduction ought not to be confused.Gerhard Minnameier - 2004 - Erkenntnis 60 (1):75-105.
    It is well known that the process of scientific inquiry, according to Peirce, is drivenby three types of inference, namely abduction, deduction, and induction. What isbehind these labels is, however, not so clear. In particular, the common identificationof abduction with Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) begs the question,since IBE appears to be covered by Peirce's concept of induction, not that of abduction.Consequently, abduction ought to be distinguished from IBE, at least on Peirce's account. The main aim of the paper, (...)
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  • Coherence of Inferences.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    It is usually accepted that deductions are non-informative and monotonic, inductions are informative and nonmonotonic, abductions create hypotheses but are epistemically irrelevant, and both deductions and inductions can’t provide new insights. In this article, I attempt to provide a more cohesive view of the subject with the following hypotheses: (1) the paradigmatic examples of deductions, such as modus ponens and hypothetical syllogism, are not inferential forms, but coherence requirements for inferences; (2) since any reasoner aims to be coherent, any inference (...)
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  • Epistemology in Japan: 2000-2005.Tomohisa Furuta - 2007 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 15 (2):53-79.
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  • Understanding Scientific Theories: An Assessment of Developments, 1969–1998.Frederick Suppe - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):115.
    The positivistic Received View construed scientific theories syntactically as axiomatic calculi where theoretical terms were given a partial semantic interpretation via correspondence rules connecting them to observation statements. This paper assesses what, with hindsight, seem the most important defects in the Received View; surveys the main proposed successor analyses to the Received View--various Semantic Conception versions and the Structuralist Analysis; evaluates how well they avoid those defects; examines what new problems they face and where the most promising require further development (...)
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  • The Semantic Approach, After 50 Years.Bas C. Van Fraassen - 2024 - In Claus Beisbart & Michael Frauchiger (eds.), Scientific Theories and Philosophical Stances: Themes from van Fraassen. De Gruyter. pp. 23-86.
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  • Scientific Theories and Philosophical Stances: Themes from van Fraassen.Claus Beisbart & Michael Frauchiger (eds.) - 2024 - De Gruyter.
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