The two concepts of probability used in physics are analyzed from the formal and the material points of view. The standard theory corresponds toprob 1 (probability of the coexistence of two properties). A general logicomathematical theory ofprob 2 (probability of transition between states) is presented in axiomatic form. The underlying state algebra is neither Boolean nor Birkhoff-von Neumann but partial Boolean. In the Boolean subalgebras,prob 1 theory holds. The theory presented contains the logicomathematical foundations of quantum mechanics and, as degenerate (...) cases, the theories of stochastic games and of Markov chains. (shrink)

Given a belief function ? on the set of all subsets of prizes, how should ? values be understood as a decision alternative? This paper presents and characterizes an induced-measure interpretation of belief functions.

An integrated view concerning the probabilistic organization of quantum mechanics is obtained by systematic confrontation of the Kolmogorov formulation of the abstract theory of probabilities, with the quantum mechanical representationand its factual counterparts. Because these factual counterparts possess a peculiar spacetime structure stemming from the operations by which the observer produces the studied states (operations of state preparation) and the qualifications of these (operations of measurement), the approach brings forth “probability trees,” complex constructs with treelike spacetime support.Though it is strictly (...) entailed by confrontation with the abstract theory of probabilities as it now stands, the construct of a quantum mechanical probability treetransgresses this theory. It indicates the possibility of an extended abstract theory of probabilities including explicit representations of the cognitive operations involved in the probabilistic descriptions. So quantum mechanics appears to be neither a “normal” probabilistic theory nor an “abnormal” one, but a pioneering particular realization of afuture extended abstract theory of probabilities.The consequences of the integrated perception of the probabilistic organization of quantum mechanics are developed constructively. The current identifications of spectral decompositions, with superpositions of states, are removed. Then: (a) Inside the frontiers of the purely operational-observational orthodox formalism, operators of state preparation and the calculus with these are defined consistently with the definition and the calculus of quantum mechanical operators representing measurable dynamical quantities. This permits to grasp the physical meaning of superselection rules. Furthermore, a complement to the quantum theory of measurements is obtained. These prolongations of the orthodox formalism bring forth a “probabilistic incompleteness” of the quantum theory. (b) Beyond quantum mechanics as it now stands, a model is outlined that removes this probabilistic incompleteness, “the [particle + medium] individual model,”microscopic by certain aspects andcosmic by others.Globally, the approach draws attention upon the possibility and the interest of a general representation of the descriptions of any kind founded upon the explicit specification of the epistemic operations—with their spacetime features—by which the observer, who always is involved, produces the objects to be qualified and the qualifications of these. (shrink)

It is argued that a reformulation of classical measure theory is necessary if the theory is to accurately describe measurements of physical phenomena. The postulates of a generalized measure theory are given and the fundamentals of this theory are developed, and the reader is introduced to some open questions and possible applications. Specifically, generalized measure spaces and integration theory are considered, the partial order structure is studied, and applications to hidden variables and the logic of quantum mechanics are given.

The aim of this paper is to present and discuss a probabilistic framework that is adequate for the formulation of quantum theory and faithful to its applications. Contrary to claims, which are examined and rebutted, that quantum theory employs a nonclassical probability theory based on a nonclassical "logic," the probabilistic framework set out here is entirely classical and the "logic" used is Boolean. The framework consists of a set of states and a set of quantities that are interrelated in a (...) specified manner. Each state induces a classical probability space on the values of each quantity. The quantities, so considered, become statistical variables (not random variables). Such variables need not have a "joint distribution." For the quantum theoretic application, there is a uniform procedure that defines and determines the existence of such "joint distributions" for statistical variables. A general rule is provided and it is shown to lead to the usual compatibility-commutivity requirements of quantum theory. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of interference and the misunderstandings that are involved in the false move from interference to nonclassical probability. (shrink)

One implication of Bell’s theorem is that there cannot in general be hidden variable models for quantum mechanics that both are noncontextual and retain the structure of a classical probability space. Thus, some hidden variable programs aim to retain noncontextuality at the cost of using a generalization of the Kolmogorov probability axioms. We generalize a theorem of Feintzeig to show that such programs are committed to the existence of a finite null cover for some quantum mechanical experiments, i.e., a finite (...) collection of probability zero events whose disjunction exhausts the space of experimental possibilities. (shrink)

This article takes up a suggestion that the reason we cannot find certain hidden variable theories for quantum mechanics, as in Bell’s theorem, is that we require them to assign joint probability distributions on incompatible observables. These joint distributions are problematic because they are empirically meaningless on one standard interpretation of quantum mechanics. Some have proposed getting around this problem by using generalized probability spaces. I present a theorem to show a sense in which generalized probability spaces can’t serve as (...) hidden variable theories for quantum mechanics, so the proposal for getting around Bell’s theorem fails. 1 Introduction2 Bell’s Theorem and Classical Probability Spaces2.1 Bell’s derivation of the Bell inequalities2.2 Pitowsky’s derivation of the Bell inequalities3 Incompatible Observables4 Generalized Probability Spaces5 A ‘No-Go’ Theorem6 Conclusions. (shrink)

In this paper we show that, when analyzed with contemporary tools in logic—such as Dunn-style semantics, Reichenbach’s three-valued logic exhibits many interesting features, and even new responses to some of the old objections to it can be attempted. Also, we establish some connections between Reichenbach’s three-valued logic and some contra-classical logics.

The total and the sharp character of orthodox quantum logic has been put in question in different contexts. This paper presents the basic ideas for a unified approach to partial and unsharp forms of quantum logic. We prove a completeness theorem for some partial logics based on orthoalgebras and orthomodular posets. We introduce the notion of unsharp orthoalgebra and of generalized MV algebra. The class of all effects of any Hilbert space gives rise to particular examples of these structures. Finally, (...) we investigate the relationship between unsharp orthoalgebras, generalized MV algebras, and orthomodular lattices. (shrink)

The status and justification of quantum logic are reviewed. On the basis of several independent arguments it is concluded that it cannot be a logic in the philosophical sense of a general theory concerning the structure of valid inferences. Taken as a calculus for combining quantum mechanical propositions, it leaves a number of significant aspects of quantum physics unaccounted for. It is shown, moreover, that quantum logic, far from being more general than Boolean logic, forms a subset of a slight (...) and natural extension of Boolean logic, a subset which corresponds to incomplete statements. The philosophical background of this unsatisfactory state of affairs is briefly explored. (shrink)

The paper sketches an argument against modal monism, more specifically against the reduction of physical possibility to metaphysical possibility. The argument is based on the non-categoricity of quantum logic.