I argue that we are sometimes morally responsible for having and using (or not using) our concepts, despite the fact that we generally do not choose to have them or have full or direct voluntary control over how we use them. I do so by extending an argument of Angela Smith's; the same features that she says make us morally responsible for some of our attitudes also make us morally responsible for some of our concepts. Specifically, like attitudes, concepts can (...) be (a) conceptually and rationally connected to our evaluative judgments, (b) in principle subject to rational revision (reasons‐responsive), and (c) the basis for actual and potential moral assessments of people that we have good reasons to endorse. Thus, we are open to moral appraisal on the basis of having and using (or not using) our concepts when they reflect our evaluative judgments, though even then it is not always appropriate to praise or blame us on that basis. (shrink)

Sanford Goldberg argues for Content Externalism by drawing our attention to the extent to which an individual’s concepts depend on the concepts of others. More specifically, he focuses on cases that involve knowledge transmission between experts and non-experts to make his point. In this paper, I argue that the content internalist cannot only plausibly respond to his argument but that Content Internalism offers a more plausible account of intentional content with regard to knowledge transmission than does Content Externalism.

This article presents a conceptual analysis of the contemporary understanding of NURSING in Australia and proposes strategies for decolonisation. Through historical reflection and the lens of cultural safety and critical race theory, it examines some conditions which make up this concept, including “Florence Nightingale‐influenced practices,” “intellectual practitioners,” and “whiteness in nursing.” This analysis aims to identify conditions which we take to be necessary for the folk concept of NURSING to be satisfied and which result in negative outcomes. The article explores (...) why these conditions are plausibly included in this concept and possible objections to their inclusion. These conditions, and subsequently the concept of NURSING, are then critiqued. In this conceptual analysis of NURSING in Australia, we explore three conditions. By critically examining these conditions through the lens of cultural safety and employing decolonising methodologies, the article sheds light on the complex interplay of historical legacies, contemporary practices and potential negative outcomes within the nursing profession. The conclusions drawn propose a shift toward decolonisation, advocating for a cultural safety framework to address historical injustices and highlights possible ways in which one might amend the concept of nursing to be more inclusive of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. The need for this change is emphasised by the acknowledgement of historical conditions that perpetuated racism and hindered equitable healthcare. Ultimately, the article advocates for a comprehensive decolonisation of the concept of NURSING in Australia, urging the nursing profession to implement cultural safety for the overall well‐being of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. The authors of this article would like to acknowledge the people of the Dharawal and Dharug language group, who are the custodians of the unceded land we have worked on throughout this project. We would also like to acknowledge Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island people nationwide and warn them that some traumatic aspects of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander history are mentioned throughout this article. Always was, always will be, Aboriginal land. Two authors on this article identify as Aboriginal, while three do not. Two authors are registered nurses, one is an anthropologist, one is a philosopher and one is a historian. (shrink)

Although much ink has been spilled on different aspects of legal concepts, the approach based on the developments of cognitive science is a still neglected area of study. The “mental” and cognitive aspect of these concepts, i.e., their features as mental constructs and cognitive tools, especially in the light of the developments of the cognitive sciences, is discussed quite rarely. The argument made by this paper is that legal concepts are best understood as mental representations. The piece explains what mental (...) representations are and why this view matters. The explanation of legal concepts, understood as mental representations is one of three levels of explanation within legal philosophy, but—as will be argued—it is the most fundamental level. This paper analyzes the consequences of such understanding of concepts used in the field of legal philosophy. Special emphasis is put on the current debate on the analogical or amodal nature of concepts. (shrink)

My aim is to motivate and develop a view of what senses are. Senses, as I conceive of them, avoid a number of the problems that plague a broadly Fregean approach to the semantics of belief ascriptions, as I hope to show. The chief innovation of my view that enables these solutions is that beliefs are taken to have multiple, truth-conditionally equivalent contents. In traditional Fregean terminology, a belief does not involve a relation to a single thought, but to many (...) thoughts, some of which are very fine-grained, and some of which are rather coarse-grained. Each thought is a structured entity ultimately composed of unstructured senses that themselves vary in their level of grain. It is no part of my attempted vindication of senses that senses are closely related to the meanings of words, phrases, and sentences; this feature of historical Fregeanism I disavow. I endorse rather the equally traditional claim that senses are concepts or, if truth-evaluable, the propositional contents of belief. (shrink)