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  1. Moral Responsibility for Concepts, Continued: Concepts as Abstract Objects.Rachel Fredericks - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (4):1029-1043.
    In Fredericks (2018b), I argued that we can be morally responsible for our concepts if they are mental representations. Here, I make a complementary argument for the claim that even if concepts are abstract objects, we can be morally responsible for coming to grasp and for thinking (or not thinking) in terms of them. As before, I take for granted Angela Smith's (2005) rational relations account of moral responsibility, though I think the same conclusion follows from various other accounts. My (...)
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  • Racism as Civic Vice.Jeremy Fischer - 2021 - Ethics 131 (3):539-570.
    I argue that racism is essentially a civic character trait: to be a racist is to have a character that rationally reflects racial supremacist sociopolitical values. As with moral vice accounts of racism, character is my account’s primary evaluative focus: character is directly evaluated as racist, and all other racist things are racist insofar as, and because, they cause, are caused by, express or are otherwise suitably related to racist character. Yet as with political accounts of racism, sociopolitical considerations provide (...)
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  • A Data-Driven Argument in Bioethics: Why Theologically Grounded Concepts May Not Provide the Necessary Intellectual Resources to Discuss Inequality and Injustice in Healthcare Contexts.Tomasz Żuradzki & Karolina Wiśniowska - 2020 - American Journal of Bioethics 20 (12):25-28.
    In this paper, we use an innovative, empirical, and–as yet–rarely applied method in bioethics, namely corpus analysis, which is commonly used in literature studies, linguistics (Bake...
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