La théologie naturelle faisait partie de la tradition philosophique occidentale jusqu’à ce que Hume et Kant affirment qu’il y a des limites fondamentales à l’intelligibilité, ou au moins au savoir possible, de ce qui dépasse l’expérience ; et donc qu’il ne peut exister d’arguments solides partant du monde naturel et concluant à l’existence de Dieu. Je défends que, bien que nos concepts doivent en effet être dérivés de notre expérience, ils peuvent avoir une application bien au-delà de notre expérience ; (...) et que la science moderne nous a montré comment des théories à propos de choses au-delà de notre expérience pouvaient être rendues probables par les données de l’expérience. Un point important dans les arguments de Hume et de Kant est que le concept de ‘cause’ n’a d’application que pour les successions régulières d’événements observables. J’argumente contre eux en montrant que, puisque nous dérivons originairement ce concept de notre propre expérience quand nous sommes cause d’événements, son application n’est en aucun cas limitée aux successions régulières d’événements observables. J’en conclus que les arguments de Hume et Kant n’ont pas du tout de force pour montrer l’impossibilité d’une théologie naturelle solide. (shrink)

El presente artículo introduce el lector a la filosofía analítica de la religión desde un punto de vista histórico y haciendo énfasis en su evolución. El objetivo es doble: primero dar a conocer una nueva disciplina que se ha desarrollado de manera notoria dentro del habla inglesa pero que ha sido ignorada dentro de la filosofía de habla hispana; segundo, comprender su nacimiento y algunas de sus principales características.

Guthrie contends that religion can best be understood as systematic anthropomorphism - the attribution of human characteristics to nonhuman things and events. Religion, he says, consists of seeing the world as human like. He offers a fascinating array of examples to show how this strategy pervades secular life and how it characterizes religious experience.

A Crítica de Hume ao Argumento do Desígnio José Oscar de Almeida Marques Dep. de Filosofia – UNICAMP -/- RESUMO: É comum considerar que o chamado “argumento do desígnio” (o argumento a posteriori para provar a existência de Deus a partir da ordem e funcionalidade do mundo) teria sido refutado ou seriamente abalado por Hume. Mas a natureza e o alcance dessa alegada refutação são problemáticos, pois Hume muitas vezes expressou suas críticas através de seus personagens e evitou assumi-las diretamente (...) enquanto autor. Em vez de supor que Hume procedeu dessa forma apenas para disfarçar suas verdadeiras convicções e evitar um conflito com as autoridades eclesiásticas, proponho que sua posição nesse assunto não é tão categórica como às vezes se supõe, e que os famosos argumentos de Filo nos Diálogos mostram apenas que é possível que a ordem e funcionalidade do mundo tenham surgido sem a intervenção de um desígnio consciente, mas não podem por si sós dar a essa hipótese o mínimo grau de plausibilidade necessário para torná-la digna de uma séria consideração. De fato, antes da revolução explicativa operada por Darwin um século depois, ninguém estava realmente em condições de vislumbrar uma alternativa plausível à atuação de algum tipo de inteligência na geração da ordem e funcionalidade do mundo. ------------ Some Remarks on Hume’s Critique of the Argument from Design José Oscar of Almeida Marques Dep. of Philosophy - UNICAMP -/- ABSTRACT: The so-called “argument from design” (the a posteriori argument to prove the existence of God from the order and functionality of the world) is commonly considered to have been refuted or seriously impaired by Hume. But the nature and scope of this alleged refutation is problematic because Hume often expressed his critics through other characters’ mouth and avoided to assume them directly as author. Contrarily to the supposition that Hume proceeded in this way only to disguise his true convictions and to avoid a confrontation with the ecclesiastical authorities, I propose that his stance on the matter is not, in fact, as clear-cut as it is sometimes supposed, and that Philo’s famous arguments in the Dialogues show only that it is possible for the order and functionality of the world to have arisen without the intervention of an intelligent design, but cannot by themselves lend to this hypothesis the least degree of plausibility needed to make it worthy of serious consideration. In fact, before the explanatory revolution inaugurated by Darwin a century later, nobody was in position to envisage a plausible alternative to the operation of some sort or other of intelligence in the generation of the order and functionality of the world. (shrink)

The doctrine of the Intelligent Design offers an intuitive explanation of why the ordering in the Universe is authored by an intentional agency. Due to its appeal to common-sense perception, this doctrine is endorsed even by scientifically literate circles despite of its obvious contradiction with the discoveries of science. In this article, an attempt to apply the tools of the cognitive science of religion to the appraisal of the methodological and epistemic status of the ID doctrine is presented. It is (...) concluded that the ID doctrine may serve as means of the real-time metaphorical reassurance of the creative power of God while it cannot give grounds to any literal inferences on the nature of the Divine action. (shrink)

Rousseau’s stance on natural religion, revealed religion and their relation are outlined, and then his agreements and disagreements with Samuel Clarke. After a survey of Joseph Butler's critique of deism, Rousseau’s arguments emerge as capable of supplying a counter-critique sufficient to show that deism could claim to have survived the eighteenth-century undefeated. If the attempted refutation of theistic arguments on the parts of David Hume and of Immanuel Kant was inconclusive, then the survival of deism up to the present turns (...) out to represent a serious metaphysical option. (shrink)

The argument from design stands as one of the most intuitively compelling arguments for the existence of a divine Creator. Yet, for many scientists and philosophers, Hume's critique and Darwin's theory of natural selection have definitely undermined the idea that we can draw any analogy from design in artifacts to design in nature. Here, we examine empirical studies from developmental and experimental psychology to investigate the cognitive basis of the design argument. From this it becomes clear that humans spontaneously discern (...) purpose in nature. When constructed theologically and philosophically correctly, the design argument is not presented as conclusive evidence for God's existence but rather as an abductive, probabilistic argument. We examine the cognitive basis of probabilistic judgments in relationship to natural theology. Placing emphasis on how people assess improbable events, we clarify the intuitive appeal of Paley's watch analogy. We conclude that the reason why some scientists find the design argument compelling and others do not lies not in any intrinsic differences in assessing design in nature but rather in the prior probability they place on complexity being produced by chance events or by a Creator. This difference provides atheists and theists with a rational basis for disagreement. (shrink)

Theism, which means the existence of a transcendent being beyond the material world and accepting its sanctity, often defend the idea that God has an eternal, conscious, universe-knowing and strong personality. In this paper, I outline and discuss how theism is treated and assessed by English Philosopher Frederick Robert Tennant (1866-1957) and which differences and superiority it can provide against other philosophical movements. In addition, it will be emphasized how Tennant attempts to harmonize positive sciences with philosophy and theology.

In this article I expound some of the main criticisms by David Hume and Immanuel Kant against the legitimacy of natural theology, the philosophical activity of presenting arguments for or against the existence of God. The aim is not to contribute to the scholarship in history of philosophy, but as a starting point for describing the main lines of Richard Swinburne’s approach to natural theology in terms of inductive probabilistic arguments. His proposal has been part of a current philosophical movement (...) of re-establishing the argumentative debate on the existence and nature of God, an area that has been growing in quantity and quality since the 1970’s. (shrink)

The aim of this dissertation is to create a naturalistic philosophical picture of creative capacities that are specific to our species, focusing on artistic ability, religious reflection, and scientific study. By integrating data from diverse domains within a philosophical anthropological framework, I have presented a cognitive and evolutionary approach to the question of why humans, but not other animals engage in such activities. Through an application of cognitive and evolutionary perspectives to the study of these behaviors, I have sought to (...) provide a more solid footing for philosophical anthropological discussions of uniquely human behavior. In particular, I have argued that art, religion and science, which are usually seen as achievements that are quite remote from ordinary modes of reasoning, are subserved by evolved cognitive processes that serve functions in everyday cognitive tasks, that arise early and spontaneously in cognitive development, that are shared cross-culturally, and that have evolved in response to selective pressures in our ancestral past. These mundane cognitive processes provide a measuring rod with which we can assess a diversity of cultural phenomena; they form a unified explanatory framework to approach human culture. I have argued that we can explain uncommon thoughts in terms of interactions between common minds. This dissertation is subdivided into four parts. Part I outlines the problem of human uniqueness, examining theories on how humans conceptualize the world, and what their mental tool box looks like. Part II discusses the evolutionary and cognitive origins of human artistic behavior. Part III focuses on the cognitive science of religion, especially on how it can be applied to the reasoning of theologians and philosophers of religion. Part IV considers the cognitive basis of scientific practice. (shrink)

Richard Swinburne is one of the best-known names in the international philosophical scene. His apologetic project is considered one of the largest and most impactful and profound of the last century. The interview conducted here explores many biographical and theoretical issues (Omniscience, Eternity, God’s existence, Free will, Analogy, Relational ontology and Powers ontology, Soul-Body relation, Trinity, Evil) and it aims to trace a broad (albeit necessarily partial) path through his numerous works. The interview took place in 2016, in Oxford, at (...) Swinburne’s home. Today, Swinburne’s thought is discussed in monographs and doctoral theses, witnessing to an influence that will undoubtedly be lasting. (shrink)

Richard Swinburne has given a defense of arguments for the existence of God (and in particular of teleological arguments) in his book "The Existence of God" (1979/1991). This paper argues that such theistic arguments fail, and poses some general problems for theistic arguments. Swinburne's use of a principle of simplicity is not given adequate justification and, if justified, works against theism. There are adequate rebuttals to Swinburne's arguments that depend upon there being few particles of basic physics, universal laws of (...) nature, cogent cosmological argument, and temporal order in the universe. Theistic arguments falter on malleability, on going well beyond evidence, on anthropomorphism, on treating consistency as if it were evidence or explanation, on selective and inconsistent use of principles, and on a lack of any serious attempt to disprove hypotheses. All of this serves to support the conclusion suggested by Hume's posthumous theological writings that theistic arguments are so malleable, profligate, overreaching, equivocal, anthropomorphic, selective, inconsistent, and uncritical as to be inept. (shrink)

The argument from design is one of the most widely debated arguments for the existence of God. There has been much written in support of and in criticism of the argument's basic structure and conclusion. I shall attempt to clarify these positions, and to argue that the theistic account provides a more rationally justified explanation of human life on earth than the atheistic account. Many philosophers think that any proof for the existence of God is mere "metaphysical speculation." Many times (...) these philosophers use the criteria of scientific empiricism as the standard for an "acceptable" scientific theory, regardless of the subject matter. I shall formulate the argument from design as an empirical scientific theory according to the school of scientific falsificationism as stated by Karl Popper. The principal literature to be investigated in this study will be the most recent articles and texts which discuss relevant scientific data, and their philosophical implications for the argument from design. The results of this investigation demonstrate that it is possible to formulate an argument for the existence of God which meets all of the criteria of the falsificationists school of scientific empiricism. (shrink)