Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Political Liberalism's Skeptical Problem and the Burden of Total Experience.Caleb Althorpe - 2025 - Episteme:1-23.
    Many accounts of political liberalism contend that reasonable citizens ought to refrain from invoking their disputed comprehensive beliefs in public deliberation about constitutional essentials. Critics maintain that this ‘refraining condition’ puts pressure on citizens to entertain skepticism about their own basic beliefs, and that accounts of political liberalism committed to it are resultantly committed to a position – skepticism about conceptions of the good – that is itself subject to reasonable disagreement. Discussions in the epistemology of disagreement have tended to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Whose public reason? Which reasonableness?Collis Tahzib - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Rawlsian public reason liberalism holds that laws must be justified in terms of reasons that all reasonable citizens can accept. But who counts as a “reasonable” citizen? Rawlsians typically answer that reasonableness is conditional on acceptance of liberal values. But they do not typically defend this answer by explaining why the Rawlsian definition is superior to alternative possible definitions of reasonableness—for instance, libertarian reasonableness, perfectionist reasonableness, communitarian reasonableness, and so on. Once this full range of possibilities is set out in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Learning from diversity: Public reason and the benefits of pluralism.Laura Siscoe - 2024 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 23 (4):385-408.
    The New Diversity Theory (NDT) represents a novel approach to public reason liberalism, providing an alternative to the traditional, Rawlsian public reason paradigm. One of the NDT's distinctive features is its emphasis on the potential advantages of a diverse society, with a particularly strong focus on the epistemic benefits of diversity. In this paper, I call into question whether societal diversity has the epistemic benefits that New Diversity theorists claim. I highlight a number of pernicious epistemic phenomena that tend to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • An epistemic alternative to the public justification requirement.Henrik Friberg-Fernros & Johan Karlsson Schaffer - 2024 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 50 (6):948-970.
    How should the state justify its coercive rules? Public reason liberalism endorses a public justification requirement: Justifications offered for authoritative regulations must be acceptable to all members of the relevant public. However, as a criterion of legitimacy, the public justification requirement is epistemically unreliable: It prioritizes neither the exclusion of false beliefs nor the inclusion of true beliefs in justifications of political rules. This article presents an epistemic alternative to the public justification requirement. Employing epistemological theories of argumentation, we demonstrate (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark