This paper compares the theories of Hervaeus Natalis and Franz Brentano on intentionality. It considers three questions: the status of the intentional object, the question of the definition of the intentional relation, and the identification of the mark of the mental. Throughout the study, the analysis of Aristotle’s works serves as a tertium comparationis between the two authors. Although the comparison reveals some similar approaches to the matter, it shows distinct strategies regarding the distinction between what is mental and what (...) is not. (shrink)

This paper aims to address a problem faced by any philosopher who treats universals as intentional objects: in defending this thesis, aren't they committed to the view that each of us thinks an individuated universal, since each of us, when thinking of a universal, must have our own intentional object? This problem, which is mentioned by Brentano at the turn of the twentieth century, originated in the Middle Ages in debates initiated by Averroes about the nature of the intellect. It (...) shows up in the later Aquinas, due to his theory of the verbum, which might be interpreted as a sort of intentional object, but it is solved without too much difficulty. It is later found in Hervaeus Natalis, who does accept intentional objects; in contrast to Aquinas, it is not clear that Hervaeus has a good solution to the problem. After first presenting the problem, this paper then turns to its medieval origins by analyzing its occurrence in Aquinas's criticism of Averroes. It then explains why Hervaeus has more difficulties than Aquinas in solving the problem. It concludes with a systematic reflection on the various possible solutions to the problem. (shrink)