In this paper I investigate the relation between physics and metaphysics in Plato’s participation theory. I show that the logic shoring up Plato’s metaphysics in paraconsistent, as had been suggested already by Graham Priest. The transformation of the paradoxical One-and-Many of the pre-Socratics into a paraconsistent Great-and-Small bridges the abyss between archaic rationality and the world of classical logic based ultimately on the principle of contradiction. Indeed, language is an organ of perception, not simply a means of communication. J. Jaynes, (...) Origin of Consciousness. (shrink)

Since the dawn of philosophy, the paradoxical interconnection between the continuous and the discrete plays a central rôle in attempts to understand the ontology of the world, while defying all attempts at consistent formulation. I investigate the relation between (classical) logic and concepts of “space” and “time” in physical and metaphysical theories, starting with the Greeks. An important part of my research consists in exploring the strong connections between paradoxes as they appear and are dealt with in ancient philosophy, and (...) their re-appearance in early modern natural philosophy, as well as in the foundations of contemporary science and mathematics. The way paradoxes are dealt with sheds light on a theory’s hidden metaphysical assumptions, especially with respect to matter, space, time and causation, it defines its ontological signature. This conclusion led me to the in-depth study of early modern natural philosophy, the origin of natural science, especially the influences ancient thinkers had on the new conceptions of space, time and causation developed by Newton, Huygens and Leibniz. (shrink)

It is important for the theory of knowledge to understand the factors involved in the generation of the capacities of knowledge. In the history of modern philosophy, knowledge is generally held to originate in either one or two sources, and the debates about these sources between philosophers have concerned their existence, or legitimacy. Furthermore, some philosophers have advocated scepticism about the human capacity to understand the origins of knowledge altogether. However, the developmental aspects of knowledge have received relatively little attention (...) both by past philosophers and in current philosophical discussions. This dissertation provides a historical approach to this developmental problem of knowledge by interpreting the developmental theories of knowledge of Maine de Biran (1766–1824) and Henri Bergson (18591941) from the perspective of a theory of the ‘generative factors of knowledge.’ It first studies the philosophies of Maine de Biran and Bergson separately and then brings together and compares the metaphilosophical aims drawn from these philosophers. The dissertation’s novel analysis, provided by its theory and structure, has far-reaching consequences. From a wide point of view, it fills in considerable scholarly gaps and provides great opportunities for future research in the study of the history of philosophy. From more specific points of view, it provides its most decisive contributions in such metaphysical and epistemological topics as the nature of causality, self-generated activity, the role of effort in knowing and learning, the complementary relationship between philosophy and science, and the non-conceptual basis of knowledge. (shrink)