When an abortion is performed, someone dies. Are we killing a human person? Widespread disagreement exists. However, it is not necessary to establish personhood in order to establish the wrongness of abortion: a substantial chance of personhood is enough. We defend The Do Not Risk Homicide Argument: abortions are wrong after 10 weeks gestation because they substantially and unjustifiably risk homicide, the unjust killing of a human person. Why 10 weeks? Because the cumulative evidence establishes a substantial chance (a more (...) than one in five chance) that preborn human beings are persons after 10 weeks (if not before then). We submit evidence from our bad track record, widespread disagreement about personhood (after 10 weeks gestation), problems with theories of personhood, the similarity between preborn human beings and premature newborns, miscalculations of gestational age, and the common intuitive responses of women to their pregnancies and miscarriages. Our argument is cogent because it bypasses the stalemate over preborn personhood and rests on common ground rather than contentious metaphysics. It also strongly suggests that society must do more to protect preborn human beings. We briefly discuss its practical implications for fetal pain relief, social policy, and abortion law. (shrink)

Many moral theories incorporate the idea that when an action is wrong, it is wrong because that there was something else that the agent could and should have done instead. Most notable among these are consequentialist theories. According to consequentialism an action A is wrong if and only if there was another action B that the agent could have performed such that, if the agent had performed B instead of A, the consequences would have been better. Relatively little attention has (...) been given to the question of how to understand the meaning of ‘could have’ in this specific context. However, without an answer to this question, consequentialist theories fail to yield determinate verdicts about the deontic status of actions in real scenarios. It is here argued that the following conditional analysis provides the required answer and gives us the most plausible version of consequentialism: the agent could have done B instead of A if and only if, there is a decision such that had the agent made this decision, then she would have done B, and not A. Such a conditional analysis has been universally rejected as an analysis of the general meaning of ‘could have’, but we show that in the specific context of specifying the meaning of ‘could have’ in a consequentialist criterion of right and wrong action, all the standard objections to it fail. (shrink)

Many prominent ethicists, including Shelly Kagan, John Rawls, and Thomas Scanlon, accept a kind of epistemic modesty thesis concerning our capacity to carry out the project of ethical theorizing. But it is a thesis that has received surprisingly little explicit and focused attention, despite its widespread acceptance. After explaining why the thesis is true, I argue that it has several implications in metaethics, including, especially, implications that should lead us to rethink our understanding of Reductive Realism. In particular, the thesis (...) of epistemic modesty in ethics implies a kind of epistemic modesty about the metaphysical nature of ethics, if Reductive Realism about the metaphysical nature of ethics is true, and it implies that normative concepts are indispensable to practical deliberation in a way that answers an influential objection to Reductive Realism from Jonathan Dancy, David Enoch, William FitzPatrick, and Derek Parfit. (shrink)

Vào ngày 19/4/2024 vừa qua, Tuyên bố New York về Ý thức của Động vật đã được công bố tại một hội nghị "Khoa học Mới nổi về Ý thức của Động vật" được tổ chức tại Đại học New York. Tuyên bố New York là một nỗ lực để thể hiện sự đồng thuận của giới khoa học về sự tồn tại trải nghiệm ý thức ở tất cả các loài có xương sống (bao gồm tất cả các loài (...) bò sát, lưỡng cư và cá) và nhiều loài không xương sống (bao gồm, ít nhất là, các loài mực ống, giáp xác mười chân và côn trùng). Về mặt khoa học, Tuyên bố New York là một bước tiến bộ lớn cho nhân loại, nhưng nó cũng sẽ khiến cho nhiều người có ý thức hơn về các thách thức đạo đức liên quan đến động vật có trải nghiệm ý thức. Bài viết này sẽ bàn về các cách tiếp cận triết học đối với vấn đề đạo đức của việc giết các sinh vật có tri giác để từ đó chỉ ra nan đề đạo đức đang hiện hữu trong xã hội loài người: Để duy trì sự tồn tại của con người, loài được xem là có đạo đức, thì chúng ta lại vi phạm đạo đức của chính chúng ta, là sát sinh các loài có giá trị nội tại, ý thức, hay tri giác khác. Nan đề đạo đức này đã tồn tại trong xã hội loài người từ rất lâu trước đây. Nhiều giải pháp đã được đề xuất và ứng dụng vào thực tế nhầm giải quyết nan đề này, như cách tiếp cận bất bạo lực và ăn chay của Phật giáo, việc áp dụng luật Hồi giáo và các nghi lễ thiêng liêng đối với động vật trong Hồi giáo, các phòng trào đòi quyền cho động vật và thực hiện tuyệt chủng tự nguyện ở các nước phương Tây, hay chế biến thịt sử dụng tế bào động vật. Tuy nhiên, dù cách nào đi nữa thì hiện nay chúng ta vẫn chưa thể hoàn toàn giải quyết được nan đề đạo đức, đó là các sinh vật có tri giác vẫn tiếp tục bị giết vì sự sinh tồn của con người. Chúng tôi cho rằng giải pháp khả thi nhất hiện nay đó là thay đổi văn hóa tiêu dùng thực phẩm ở hiện tại, xây dựng các giá trị văn hóa thặng dư sinh thái, và thúc đẩy các giải pháp hòa bình. (shrink)

The dead donor rule (DDR) prohibits retrieval protocols that would be lethal to the donor. Some argue that compliance with it can be maintained by satisfying the requirements of double‐effect reasoning (DER). If successful, one could support organ donation without reference to the definition of death while being faithful to an ethic that prohibits intentionally killing innocent human life. On the contrary, I argue that DER cannot make lethal organ donation compatible with the DDR, because there are plausible ways it (...) fails DER's requirements. A key takeaway is that the theories of intention and proportionality assumed in DER matter for its plausibility as a constraint on practical reasoning. (shrink)

In engaging with the repugnant conclusion many contemporary philosophers, economists and social scientists make claims about what a minimally good life is like. For example, some claim that such a life is quite good by contemporary standards, and use this to defend classical utilitarianism, whereas others claim that it is not, and use this to uphold the challenge that the repugnant conclusion poses to classical utilitarianism. I argue that many of these claims—by both sides—are not well-founded. We have no sufficiently (...) clear sense of what a minimally good life is like. It is a result of this that the repugnant conclusion doesn’t license us in drawing any interesting conclusions. (shrink)

The interest in "social sustainability" has recently increased in the field of urban development. We want societies, cities, and neighborhoods to be economically and environmentally sustainable, but we also want urban areas that are safe, diverse, walkable, and relaxing, just to mention a few examples. Strikingly, however, there is no consensus regarding what definition of "social sustainability" should be employed. Additionally, some people are skeptical about the prospect of finding a useful definition at all and claim it is impossible to (...) satisfactorily define the concept for various reasons, such as its complexity. A potential first step towards navigating this conceptual maze is to provide desiderata for a definition of social sustainability. We defend a list of nine desiderata and thereby create a theoretical framework for analyzing and constructing a definition of "social sustainability". We also examine the skeptical arguments and find that it is premature to conclude that the goal of finding a useful definition is hopeless. With the criteria in place, the future debate can proceed by assessing definitions of "social sustainability" in a more structured and transparent manner. This activity is of upmost importance if we want to create just cities. Keywords: Social Sustainability, Definition, Purposes and Aims, Conditions of Adequacy. (shrink)

The article provides answers to comments in this journal on my recent book, Setting Health-Care Priorities. What Ethical Theories Tell Us. Did I address all of the relevant theories? Yes, I did. Was my argument underdeveloped in any respects? Yes, at least in one as I should perhaps have discussed contractual ethical thinking more carefully. I do so in this response. Moreover, the critical comments raised have helped me to clarify my argument in many ways, for which I thank my (...) critics. (shrink)