Freud (and later commentators) have failed to explain how the origins of psychoanalytical theory began with a positivist investment without recognizing a dual epistemological commitment: simply, Freud engaged positivism because he believed it generally equated with empiricism, which he valued, and he rejected ‘philosophy’, and, more specifically, Kantianism, because of the associated transcendental qualities of its epistemology. But this simple dismissal belies a deep investment in Kant’s formulation of human reason, in which rationality escapes natural cause and thereby bestows humans (...) with cognitive and moral autonomy. Freud also segregated human rationality: he divided the mind between (1) an unconscious grounded in the biological and thus subject to its own laws, and (2) a faculty of autonomous reason, lodged in consciousness and free of natural forces to become the repository of interpretation and free will. Psychoanalysis thus rests upon a basic Kantian construction, whereby reason, through the aid of analytic techniques, provides a detached scrutiny of the natural world, i.e. the unconscious mental domain. Further, sovereign reason becomes the instrument of self-knowing in the pursuit of human perfection. Herein lies the philosophical foundation of psychoanalytic theory, a beguiling paradox in which natural cause and autonomous reason — determinism and freedom — are conjoined despite their apparent logical exclusion. (shrink)

En 2002, le paléontologue américain Stephen Jay Gould a rendu un surprenant hommage à l’évolutionnisme de Nietzsche. J’explique ici leur proximité critique, déjà annoncée par Daniel Dennett en 1995, de trois façons différentes. Je montre d’abord qu’elle permet à Gould de se départir du partage dualiste entre sciences de la nature et sciences humaines et sociales, dans lequel Dennett essaie de l’enfermer. Je montre ensuite qu’elle ouvre, loin de toute tentation d’instaurer de nouveaux «crochets célestes», des voies fécondes et inattendues (...) pour repenser l’hypothèse de la volonté de puissance. Je soutiens enfin qu’elle apporte des gages solides à l’ensemble de la critique nietzschéenne du darwinisme.In 2002, American paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould paid a surprising tribute to Nietzsche’s evolutionism. I explain this critical affinity, which Daniel Dennett had already pointed out in 1995, focusing on three aspects. First, I show how it allows Gould to dispense with the dualistic separation between natural sciences and humanities and social sciences, in which Dennett tries to confine him. Second, I explain how it allows for promising and unsuspected ways to re-examine Nietzsche’s Will to Power hypothesis. Finally, I argue that it provides solid grounds for Nietzsche’s criticism of Darwinism. (shrink)

The ArgumentTwo research traditions in immunology, supposedly centered on the same issue of immune identification, have followed different theoretical goals and originated form competing phillosophical foundations. these may be labelled modernist and postmodernist, respectively, thereby applying cultural and philosophical categories to immunology in order to articulate potential scientific resonances with the broader culture. To accept that exercise and important caveat is imposed, namely, this translation is most appropriately discussed at the level of metaphor. In other words, I will structure my (...) treatment of these issues as expressed in the metaphorical language of the disipline, and thus the bulk of this discussion will focus on how the language and modeling of the science draws from the culture-at-large. Scientists seek images from their eveir everyday lives to describe phenomena that may be poorly articulated in their technical discourse; such is the utility and importance of metaphors generally, and thus it is not surprising that we might discern echoes of a postmodernist sentiment in the metaphors borrowed from post–World War II culture. I Will also discuss, to a more limited extent, how postmodernists have sought support for their own ideological arguments in immunology. This last topic server only to illustrate the bidirectionality of scientific discourse with the society in which it is embedded. (shrink)

In The Problem of Christianity, in a chapter of an altogether semiotic and hermeneutic character, Josiah Royce pays immediately his debt to Charles Sanders Peirce, and declares that he is nothing but summarizing, in his own way, “some still neglected opinions which were first set forth, in outline, more than forty years ago by our American logician, Mr Charles Peirce, in papers which have been little read, but which, to my mind, remain of very high value as guides of inquiry, (...) both in Logic an... (shrink)