This paper draws upon contemporary feminist philosophy in order to consider the changing meaning of privacy and its relationship to identity, both online and offline. For example, privacy is now viewed by European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) as a right, which when breached can harm us by undermining our ability to maintain social relations. I briefly outline the meaning of privacy in common law and under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in order to show the relevance of (...) contemporary feminist thought, in particular the image of selfhood that stresses its relationality. I argue that the meaning of privacy is in the process of altering as a result of a number of contingent factors including both changes in technology, particularly computer mediated communication (CMC), and changes in the status of women. This latter point can be illustrated by the feminist critique of the traditional reluctance of the liberal state to interfere with violence and injustice within the “privacy” of the home. In asking the question: “how is the meaning of “privacy” changing?” I consider not only contemporary legal case law but also Thomas Nagel’s influential philosophical analysis of privacy. Nagel’s position is useful because of the detail with which he outlines what privacy used to mean, whilst bemoaning its passing. I agree with his view that its meaning is changing but am critical of his perspective. In particular, I challenge his claim regarding the traditional “neutrality of language” and consider it in the context of online identity. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that online echo chambers are in some cases and in some respects good. I do not attempt to refute arguments that they are harmful, but I argue that they are sometimes beneficial. In the first section, I argue that it is sometimes good to be insulated from views with which one disagrees. In the second section, I argue that the software-design principles that give rise to online echo chambers have a lot to recommend them. Further, (...) the opposing principle, serendipity, could give rise to serious harm, in light of the conclusion of the first section that sometimes we are better off being insulated from some content online. In the third section, I argue that polarization can be a useful tool for inculcating the appropriate attitudes in a person. (shrink)

Following the recent practice turn in privacy research, informational privacy is increasingly analyzed with regard to the “appropriate flow of information” within a given practice, which preserves the “contextual integrity” of that practice (Nissenbaum, 2010, p. 149; 2015). Such a practice-theoretical take on privacy emphasizes the normative structure of practices as well as its structural injustices and power asymmetries, rather than focusing on the intentions and moral considerations of individual or institutional actors. Since privacy norms are seen to be institutionalized (...) via the role obligations of the practice's participants, this approach can analyze structural and systematic privacy infringements in terms of “defective role performances and defective social relations” (Roessler & Mokrosinska, 2013, p. 780). -/- Unfortunately, it is still often somewhat unclear what this exactly means within the context of informational privacy, why these performances and relations are defective and for whom. This raises the common objection of a so-called “practice positivism” (Applbaum, 1999, p. 51), that is, the difficulty of practice–theoretical accounts to take a practice-independent standpoint, from which to normatively evaluate the existing practice norms themselves. For example, Nissenbaum herself initially argues for a “presumption in favor of the status quo” with respect to the appropriateness and flow of privacy norms within a practice (Nissenbaum, 2004, p. 127). Such a “practice conservatism” (Nissenbaum, 2010, p. 169) comes dangerously close to committing a naturalistic fallacy, if not undergirded by practice-external criteria (which is ultimately what she does). -/- Merely resorting to existing practice norms to assess what defective role performances amount to, only shifts the question from how to recognize an appropriate flow of information to the question of how to recognize those defective role performances and social relations. Against this backdrop, the central aim of this article is to shed light on this question without resorting to practice-independent first principles or far-reaching universalistic anthropological assumptions. For this, I will analyze the notion of “defective role performances and social relations” in terms of social pathologies.1 Doing so has two advantages: First of all, it can draw on already existing concepts and distinctions, which help to categorize the different levels of analysis that exist in informational privacy research and situate the notion of “defective role performances” within them (Section 1). Second, those concepts and distinctions can serve as a basis for establishing a typology of phenomena with regard to deficient practices of informational privacy (Section 4). (shrink)

In this article, we identify three key design dimensions along which cryptocurrencies differ -- privacy, censorship-resistance, and consensus procedure. Each raises important normative issues. Our discussion uncovers new ways to approach the question of whether Bitcoin or other cryptocurrencies should be used as money, and new avenues for developing a positive answer to that question. A guiding theme is that progress here requires a mixed approach that integrates philosophical tools with the purely technical results of disciplines like computer science and (...) economics. Note: this article is the second entry within a two-part sequence on the Philosophy, Politics, and Economics of Cryptocurrency. (shrink)

This article analyses proportionality as a potential element of a theory of morally justified surveillance, and sets out a teleological account. It draws on conceptions in criminal justice ethics and just war theory, defines teleological proportionality in the context of surveillance, and sketches some of the central values likely to go into the consideration. It then explores some of the ways in which deontologists might want to modify the account and illustrates the difficulties of doing so. Having set out the (...) account, however, it considers whether the proportionality condition is necessary to a theory of morally justified surveillance. The article concludes that we need and should apply only a necessity condition, but notes that proportionality considerations may retain some use in in practice, as a form of coarse‐grained filter applied before assessing necessity when deliberating the permissibility of potential forms of surveillance. (shrink)

This paper distinguishes between two main questions regarding the notion of privacy: “What is privacy?” and “Why do/should we value privacy?”. In developing a social-ontological recognitional model of privacy, it gives an answer to the first question. According to the SORM, Privacy is a second order quality of roles within social practices. It is a function of who is or should be recognized as a “standard authority”. Enjoying standard authority means to have the right to interpret and contest role behavior (...) and role obligations within a specific practice, as well as evaluate the normative structure, the fundamental practice norms as well as the roles and their status. The SORM utilizes the concept of standard authority to explicate privacy with regard to two categories that capture the relevant phenomena of privacy: decisional and informational privacy. Within a practice, an actor is said to have decisional privacy if she as a BCR does not recognize bearers of accidental roles as standard authorities. Vice versa, an actor is said to enjoy informational privacy if all other BCRs recognize her as a standard authority. Additionally, the requirement of mutual recognition by the practice participants as standard authorities introduces a “weak normativity” into the theory, which can be used to identify deficient privacy arrangements within practices. (shrink)

Revelations of personal matters often have negative consequences for social-media users. These consequences trigger frequent warnings, practical rather than moral in nature, that social-media users should consider carefully what they reveal about themselves since their revelations might cause them various difficulties in the future. I set aside such practical considerations and argue that social-media users have a moral obligation to maintain their own privacy that is rooted in the duty to self-censor. Although Anita L. Allen provides a paternalist justification of (...) the duty that supports my position that social-media users are obligated to self-censor what they reveal about themselves, I justify the obligation through considerations that are more palatable to liberals than is paternalism. I accomplish this by arguing that the failure to self-censor often creates for others undue burdens that individuals are obligated morally not to create. In particular, social-media revelations often create undue burdens for those, such as employers and university personnel, who are obligated morally to respect individuals’ privacy in their decision-making processes. I also demonstrate that this argument is not for a broad duty to self-censor, but, rather, for a narrow duty that applies to particular circumstances such as certain uses of social media. (shrink)

This paper seeks to identify the distinctive moral wrong of stalking and argues that this wrong is serious enough to criminalize. We draw on psychological literature about stalking, distinguishing types of stalkers, their pathologies, and victims. The victimology is the basis for claims about what is wrong with stalking. Close attention to the experiences of victims often reveals an obsessive preoccupation with the stalker and what he will do next. The kind of harm this does is best understood in relation (...) to the value of privacy and conventionally protected zones of privacy. We compare anti-stalking laws in different jurisdictions, claiming that they all fail in some way to capture the distinctive privacy violation that stalking involves. Further reflection on the seriousness of the invasion of privacy it represents suggests that it is a deeply personal wrong. Indeed, it is usually more serious than obtrusive surveillance by states, precisely because it is more personal. Where state surveillance genuinely is as intrusive as stalking, it tends to adopt the tactics of the stalker, imposing its presence on the activist victim at every turn. Power dynamics —whether rooted in the power of the state or the violence of a stalker —may exacerbate violations of privacy, but the wrong is distinct from violence, threats of violence and other aggression. Nor is stalking a simple expression of a difference in power between stalker and victim, such as a difference due to gender. (shrink)

Members of modern, digital societies experience a tremendous number and diversity of stimuli from sources such as computers, televisions, other electronic media, and various forms of advertising. In this paper, I argue that the presence of a wide range of stimulating items in modern societies poses a special risk to the welfare of members of modern societies. By considering the set of modern stimuli in a more comprehensive way than normative theorists have done so far—as part of a complex system (...) with which members of modern societies cannot reasonably avoid interacting—we can see why the perceptual and informational spaces in which modern life occurs can be sources of disvalue for members of modern societies. This seems true even though the technological innovations that produce these stimuli add great value to the lives of members of modern societies. (shrink)

It seems obvious that informational privacy has an epistemological component; privacy or lack of privacy concerns certain kinds of epistemic relations between a cogniser and sensitive pieces of information. One striking feature of the fairly substantial philosophical literature on informational privacy is that the nature of this epistemological component of privacy is only sparsely discussed. The main aim of this paper is to shed some light on the epistemological component of informational privacy.

With the advent of social networking websites, privacy concerns have reached a new high. One particularly problematic concern entails employers requesting login credentials to popular social media platforms. While many people may consider this request unethical, they may not agree on the reasons it is unethical. One reason may be to blame the behavior on egoism. Egoism, however, comes in multiple flavors, not all of which would agree that violating privacy is acceptable. In this paper, we articulate how one egoist (...) perspective provides a defense of privacy in the face of unjust information access requests. Objectivism, the philosophy of Ayn Rand, offers an egoist approach to ethics that values individual privacy on rational, self-interested grounds. By applying Objectivist principles to a business context, we observe that businesspeople should not violate other people’s privacy for short-term gains. Furthermore, we observe that privacy can be protected without distinct right to privacy. Rather, Objectivism’s conception of rational self-interest suggests that long-term flourishing is the proper end of individuals and businesses, predicated on, among other things, respecting privacy and enforcing individual rights. (shrink)

This article examines some of the most relevant issues concerning P2P systems so as to take sides in today's strongly polarized debate. The idea is to integrate a context-based perspective with an ontological representation of informational norms; thanks to a procedural outlook which is presented in terms of burden of proof More particularly, we examine three ''roads." First, the topological approach to complex social networks allows us to comprehend the laws according to which information is distributed through P2P systems and (...) how a "short route" has joined, and sometimes replaced, the traditional "long route" between creator, business, and the public. The second road is the context-based perspective elaborated by Helen Nissenbaum, and developed by Francis Grodzinsky and Herman Tavani: The goal is to determine the norms that govern such an informational flow as norms of appropriateness and distribution. The final road is the informational viewpoint on ethics proposed by Luciano Floridi with the idea that standard ethical theories cannot easily be adapted to deal with the new informational issues emerging with digital technology. While empirical evidence on the impact of P2P systems is still quite controversial, it is crucial to determine on whom the burden of proof falls in a given context, on censors or advocates, by singling out both the default norms and exceptions in the use and development of P2P software. (shrink)

Este artículo explora las consideraciones éticas que rodean el uso de la Inteligencia Artificial (IA) en la academia. Se establecen principios éticos generales para la IA en este ámbito, como la transparencia, la equidad, la responsabilidad, la privacidad y la integridad académica. En cuanto a la educación asistida por IA, se enfatiza la importancia de la accesibilidad, la no discriminación y la evaluación crítica de los resultados. Se recomienda que la IA se use para complementar y no para reemplazar la (...) enseñanza tradicional. En cuanto al ámbito de la investigación, se hace énfasis en la necesidad de garantizar la calidad y la veracidad de los datos utilizados, así como la transparencia en los métodos y resultados. Se deben considerar los posibles sesgos y riesgos de la IA en la investigación. El artículo concluye que la adopción responsable de la IA en la academia requiere una reflexión crítica sobre sus implicaciones éticas. Se recomienda la creación de marcos éticos específicos para cada contexto y la participación de diversos actores en la toma de decisiones. (shrink)

This essay critically analyzes Luciano Floridi’s ontological theory of informational privacy. Organized into two main parts, Part I examines some key foundational components of Floridi’s privacy theory and it considers some of the ways in which his framework purports to be superior to alternative theories of informational privacy. Part II poses two specific challenges for Floridi’s theory of informational privacy, arguing that an adequate privacy theory should be able to: (i) differentiate informational privacy from other kinds of privacy, including psychological (...) privacy; and (ii) distinguish between descriptive and normative aspects of informational privacy in a way that differentiates a (mere) loss of privacy from a violation of privacy. I argue that Floridi’s privacy theory, in its present form, does not explicitly address either challenge. However, I also argue that his ontological theory provides us with a novel way of analyzing the impact that digital technologies have had for informational privacy. I conclude by suggesting that Floridi’s privacy framework can be interpreted as containing the elements of a “personality theory of privacy,” which would be useful to examine in a separate study. (shrink)

This study seeks to understand and critique the growing online trend of “revenge porn,” or the intentional embarrassment of identifiable individuals through the posting of nude images online. This posting of intimate pictures, often done out of motives of revenge for perceived relational scorn, is enhanced by the varying levels of online anonymity. Using the theoretical framework of John Dewey's pragmatism, this study both analyzes this understudied but complex new problem precipitated by the conditions of the online self and establishes (...) the groundwork for the use of pragmatist ethics in other areas of communication ethics. (shrink)

To integrate social robots in real-life contexts, it is crucial that they are accepted by the users. Acceptance is not only related to the functionality of the robot but also strongly depends on how the user experiences the interaction. Established design principles from usability and user experience research can be applied to the realm of human–robot interaction, to design robot behavior for the comfort and well-being of the user. Focusing the design on these aspects alone, however, comes with certain ethical (...) challenges, especially regarding the user’s privacy and autonomy. Based on an example scenario of human–robot interaction in elder care, this paper discusses how established design principles can be used in social robotic design. It then juxtaposes these with ethical considerations such as privacy and user autonomy. Combining user experience and ethical perspectives, we propose adjustments to the original design principles and canvass our own design recommendations for a positive and ethically acceptable social human–robot interaction design. In doing so, we show that positive user experience and ethical design may be sometimes at odds, but can be reconciled in many cases, if designers are willing to adjust and amend time-tested design principles. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 64 Heft: 6 Seiten: 925-946.

PurposeThis paper aims to argue that traditional ethical theories used in disaster response may be inadequate and particularly strained by the emergence of new technologies and social media, particularly with regard to privacy. The paper suggests incorporation of care ethics into the disaster ethics nexus to better include the perspectives of disaster affected communities.Design/methodology/approachThis paper presents a theoretical examination of privacy and care ethics in the context of social media/digitally enhanced disaster response.FindingsThe paper proposes an ethics of care can fruitfully (...) by used by public and private agents in disaster management. Its relational ontology restores the priority of fostering good relationships between stakeholders, thus giving central importance to values such as transparency and trust and the situated knowledge of disaster-affected communities.Research limitations/implicationsThis paper presents theoretical research and is limited by the availability of empirical data. There is opportunity for future research to evaluate the impact of a conscious adoption of an ethics of care by disaster management agents.Practical implicationsAn ethos of care ethics needs to be mainstreamed into disaster management organisations and digital initiatives.Social implicationsThis paper argues that power asymmetry in disaster response renders the public vulnerable to abuse, and that the adoption of care ethics can support disaster management agents in recognising this power imbalance and wielding power responsibly.Originality/valueThis paper examines the applicability of an alternative ethical framework to novel circumstances. (shrink)

This article presents a conceptual investigation into the value impacts and relations of algorithms in the domain of justice and security. As a conceptual investigation, it represents one step in a value sensitive design based methodology. Here, we explicate and analyse the expression of values of accuracy, privacy, fairness and equality, property and ownership, and accountability and transparency in this context. We find that values are sensitive to disvalue if algorithms are designed, implemented or deployed inappropriately or without sufficient consideration (...) for their value impacts, potentially resulting in problems including discrimination and constrained autonomy. Furthermore, we outline a framework of conceptual relations of values indicated by our analysis, and potential value tensions in their implementation and deployment with a view towards supporting future research, and supporting the value sensitive design of algorithms in justice and security. (shrink)

Due to the technology of machine learning, new breakthroughs are currently being achieved with constant regularity. By using machine learning techniques, computer applications can be developed and used to solve tasks that have hitherto been assumed not to be solvable by computers. If these achievements consider applications that collect and process personal data, this is typically perceived as a threat to information privacy. This paper aims to discuss applications from both fields of personality and image analysis. These applications are often (...) criticized by reference to the protection of privacy. This paper critically questions this approach. Instead of solely using the concept of privacy to address the risks of machine learning, it is increasingly necessary to consider and implement ethical anti-discrimination concepts, too. In many ways, informational privacy requires individual information control. However, not least because of machine learning technologies, information control has become obsolete. Hence, societies need stronger anti-discrimination tenets to counteract the risks of machine learning. (shrink)

When we talk about things like the 'lost art of letter-writing' or the 'digital communications revolution,' what do we mean? What do we lose and what do we gain as we move towards digital ways of being in the world? Critically engaging with many of the canonical writers in the philosophy of technology , and following what has been termed the 'empirical turn' in that discipline, this thesis answers such questions by means of a philosophical, comparative study of epistolary technics (...) and praxis in the early nineteenth and 21st centuries, making use of Romantic era archival letters and related materials to compare and contrast our own, Internet-enabled experience of communicating over distance. In so doing, it seeks to contribute towards our understanding of the ways in which information and communication technologies influence humanity by taking a long-view of many of the more radical claims for the ways in which the Internet effects change in culture, society and self. The thesis is structured thematically, with chapters examining the experience of distance and presence in these two periods, the potential for meaningful engagements by way of communicative media, the technological reconfiguration of social networks, and shifts in the public/private distinction. In its conclusions it is broadly sympathetic to the somewhat pessimistic positions of Heidegger and Borgmann, finding evidence and supplying argument to support the notion that the Internet does in some circumstances serve to diminish our meaningful involvements with the world and each other. It is, however, critical of many of the more extreme arguments for the substantive impact of the Internet, which very often lean too heavily towards naive technological determinism, neglect the social shaping of technology, overemphasise the radical novelty of the Internet, or simply deny or downplay many of its undoubted benefits. (shrink)

In this paper I will take the right to privacy as an example when discussing the question of the prospects of global value consensus or value conflicts. The question whether privacy is a contextual value will be discussed in the remaining part of my paper and I will take the views of the Japanese ICT-ethicists Yohko Orito and Kiyosho Murata as my point of departure. In “Privacy protection in Japan: cultural influence on the universal value” (2005), they argue against the (...) view that the right to privacy is a universal value. Their argument is straightforward and clear, hence their article is a valuable contribution to the discussion. However, I will object to their argument. I will defend the view that privacy is a universal value, although there are contextual differences concerning what kind of information is considered as privacy sensitive. (shrink)

This essay expands upon an earlier work in which we analyzed the implications of the Verizon v RIAA case for P2P Networks vis-à-vis concerns affecting personal privacy and intellectual property. In the present essay we revisit some of the concerns surrounding this case by analyzing the intellectual property and privacy issues that emerged in the MGM Studios v. Grokster case. These two cases illustrate some of the key tensions that exist between privacy and property interests in cyberspace. In our analysis, (...) we contrast Digital Rights Management and Interoperability and we examine some newer distribution models of sharing over P2P networks. We also analyze some privacy implications in the two cases in light of the theory of privacy as contextual integrity. (shrink)

The concept of privacy by design is becoming increasingly popular among regulators of information and communications technologies. This paper aims at analysing and discussing the ethical implications of this concept for personal health monitoring. I assume a privacy theory of restricted access and limited control. On the basis of this theory, I suggest a version of the concept of privacy by design that constitutes a middle road between what I call broad privacy by design and narrow privacy by design. The (...) key feature of this approach is that it attempts to balance automated privacy protection and autonomously chosen privacy protection in a way that is context-sensitive. In personal health monitoring, this approach implies that in some contexts like medication assistance and monitoring of specific health parameters one single automatic option is legitimate, while in some other contexts, for example monitoring in which relatives are receivers of health-relevant information rather than health care professionals, a multi-choice approach stressing autonomy is warranted. (shrink)

The present essay is organized into five main sections. We begin with a few preliminary remarks about "cloud computing," which are developed more fully in a later section. This is followed by a brief overview of the evolution of Helen Nissenbaum's framework of "privacy as contextual integrity." In particular, we examine Nissenbaum's "Decision Heuristic" model, described in her most recent work on privacy, to see how it enables the contextual-integrity framework to respond to privacy challenges posed by new and emerging (...) technologies. We then apply that heuristic device to questions surrounding one aspect of cloud computing -- viz., "cloud storage" technology. In particular, we focus on current practices affecting Google Docs as an instance of a cloud-storage system. (shrink)

The development of “smart stadia”, i.e. the use of “smart technologies” in the way sports stadia are designed and managed, promises to enhance the experience of attending a live match through innovative and improved services for the audience, as well as for the players, vendors and other stadium stakeholders. These developments offer us a timely opportunity to reflect on the ethical implications of the use of smart technologies and the emerging Internet of Things. The IoT has the potential to radically (...) transform society and is representative of the ways that novel technologies will alter human life. We use Dublin’s Croke Park stadium smart project as a case study for examining the development of smart stadia. (shrink)

In this paper, we employ Extended Cognition as a background for a series of thought experiments about privacy and common used information technology devices. Laptops and smart phones are now widely used devices, but current privacy standards do not adequately address the relationship between the owners of these devices and the information stored on them. Law enforcement treats laptops and smart phones are potential sources of information about criminal activity, but this treatment ignores the use of smart devices as extensions (...) of users’ cognitive capability. In Philosophy of Mind, Extended Cognition is a metaphysical theory about the relationship between consciousness or cognitive activity and various external tools or aids that agents employ in the service of cognition. Supporters of Extended Cognition argue that mental activity must be understood as taking place both within the brain and by way of tools such as a logician’s pen and paper, a mathematician’s calculator, or a writer’s word processing program. While Extended Cognition does not have universal support among philosophers of mind, the theory nevertheless describes how agents interact with their “smart devices.” We explore the the implications of taking Extended Cognition seriously with regard to privacy concerns by way of a series of thought experiments. By comparing the differences in expectations of privacy between a citizen and the government, between an employee of a corporate firm, and between citizens alone, we show that expectations of privacy and injury are significantly affected by taking the cognitive role of smart devices into account. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 9, Page 51-53, September 2012.

The findings of our experiments showed that social network sites such as Google Plus, Facebook, and Twitter, have the ability to acquire knowledge about their users’ movements not only within SNSs but also beyond SNS boundaries, particularly among websites that embedded SNS widgets such as Google’s Plus One button, Facebook’s Like button, and Twitter’s Tweet button. In this paper, we analysed the privacy implication of such a practice from a moral perspective by applying Helen Nissenbaum’s decision heuristic derived from her (...) contextual integrity framework in order to answer the question of whether or not an online user’s privacy is being violated by this practice. (shrink)

The starting point of this article is that employees’ chances of securing reasonable expectations of privacy at work must be better protected. A dependency asymmetry between employer and job-applicant implies that prospective employees are in a disadvantaged position vis à vis the employer regarding the chances of defending their reasonable interests. Since an increased usage of work related surveillance will, to a larger extent, require of job-applicants that they negotiate their privacy interests in employment contracting, it is important to consider (...) means of strengthening employees’ negotiating power. This article emphasizes the importance of contextualizing consent for contractual agreements to be ethically acceptable. (shrink)

The paper examines today’s debate on the new responsibilities of Internet service providers in connection with legal problems concerning jurisdiction, data processing, people’s privacy and education. The focus is foremost on the default rules and safe harbour clauses for ISPs liability, set up by the US and European legal systems. This framework is deepened in light of the different functions of the services provided on the Internet so as to highlight multiple levels of control over information and, correspondingly, different types (...) of liability. The new responsibilities of ISPs concern the original “end-to-end” architecture of the medium and policies on design rather than responsibility for user content and individual messages. (shrink)

PurposeThe paper aims to examine the profound transformations engendered by the information revolution in order to determine aspects of what should be visible or invisible in human affairs. It seeks to explore the meaning of invisibility via an interdisciplinary approach, including computer science, law, and ethics.Design/methodology/approachThe method draws on both theoretical and empirical material so as to scrutinise the ways in which today's information revolution is recasting the boundaries between visibility and invisibility.FindingsThe degrees of exposure to public notice can be (...) understood as a matter of balance between access and control over information in a specific context, as well as a function of the ontological friction in a given region of the environment.Originality/valueThe originality of the case study on a new kind of recommender system is enhanced because of the procedural approach which is suggested to further develop the distinction between “good” and “evil” as anything that enriches, or damages, the informational complexity of the environment. (shrink)

In this paper I investigate the web-rhetoric of companies offering home-based personal health monitoring to patients and elderly people. Two main rhetorical methods are found, namely a reference to practical benefits and a use of prestige words like “quality of life” and “independence”. I interpret the practical benefits in terms of instrumental values and the prestige words in terms of final values. I also reconstruct the arguments on the websites in terms of six different types of argument. Finally, I articulate (...) a general critique of the arguments, namely that the websites neglect the context of use of personal health monitoring technologies. Whether or not a technology is good depends on the use of the technology by a particular individual in a particular context. The technology is not good–or bad–in itself. I support this critique with a number of more specific arguments such as the risk for reduced personal contact. For some elderly people social contact with care providers is more valuable than the independent living made possible by remote monitoring, for others independence is more important. (shrink)

Purpose – This paper has three purposes: to identify and discuss values that should be promoted and respected in personal health monitoring, to formulate an ethical checklist that can be used by stakeholders, and to construct an ethical matrix that can be used for identifying values, among those in the ethical checklist, that are particularly important to various stakeholders. Design/methodology/approach – On the basis of values that empirical studies have found important to various stakeholders in personal health monitoring, the author (...) constructs an ethical checklist and an ethical matrix. The author carries out a brief conceptual analysis and discusses the implications. Findings – The ethical checklist consists of three types of values: practical values that a technical product in personal health monitoring must have, quality of life values to be promoted by the development and use of the product, and moral values to be respected in this development and use. To give guidance in practice, the values in the checklist must be interpreted and balanced. The ethical matrix consists of the values in the checklist and a number of stakeholders. Originality/value – The overall ambition is to suggest a way of categorizing values that can be useful for stakeholders in personal health monitoring. In order to achieve this, the study takes empirical studies as a starting-point and includes a conceptual analysis. This means that the proposals are founded on practice rather than mere abstract thinking, and this improves its usability. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 9, Page 53-55, September 2012.

PurposeAlthough there is much public talk about privacy, it seems that there is no definite answer; rather, ambiguous concepts of what privacy is and what indeed privacy in peril is. The overall aim of this paper is to clarify how privacy is defined in the academic literature, what the different concepts of privacy have in common, what distinguish them from one another, and what advantages and disadvantages such definitions have in order to clarify if there is a gap in the (...) existing literature.Design/methodology/approachThis contribution constructs theoretically founded typologies in order to systemize the existing literature of privacy studies and to analyse examples of privacy (threats). Therefore, it mainly is a theoretical approach combined with illustrative examples.FindingsThis paper contains a systematic discussion of the state of the art of privacy studies by establishing a typology of existing privacy definitions and discussing commonalties and differences. In this paper, it is argued that the existing literature is insufficient for studying privacy. Therefore, a critical contribution to privacy studies is needed.Originality/valueA critical contribution to privacy studies avoids pitfalls of the existing literature and strives for the development of theoretical and empirical research methods in order to focus on privacy in the context of domination, asymmetrical power relations, resource control, social struggles, and exploitation. (shrink)