Burke suggests that we should view society as a partnership between the past, the present, and the future. I defend this idea by outlining how we can understand the interests of the past and future people and the obligations that they have towards each other. I argue that we have forward-looking obligations to leave the world a decent place, and backward-looking obligations to respect the legacy of the past. The latter obligation requires an understanding of the role that traditions and (...) meta-traditions should (and should not) play in tying together societies—especially national societies—over time. (shrink)

“Opt-out” organ procurement policies based on presumed consent are typically advertised as being superior to “opt-in” policies based on explicit consent at securing organs for transplantation. However, Michael Gill has argued that presumed consent policies are also better than opt-in policies at respecting patient autonomy. According to Gill’s Fewer Mistakes Argument, we ought to implement the procurement policy that results in the fewest frustrated wishes regarding organ donation. Given that the majority of Americans wish to donate their organs, it is (...) plausible that a presumed consent policy would result in fewer frustrated wishes compared to the current opt-in policy. It follows that we ought to implement a policy of presumed consent. In this paper, I first consider and find wanting an objection to the Fewer Mistakes Argument developed recently by Douglas MacKay. I also consider an objection put forth by James Taylor but argue that there is a methodological reason to prefer my own argument to Taylor’s. Finally, I argue for two theses: first, that Gill’s major argument in favor of the crucial premise of the Fewer Mistakes Argument is flawed, and second, that the major premise of the Fewer Mistakes Argument is false. (shrink)

Perhaps death’s badness is an illusion. Epicureans think so and argue that agents cannot be harmed by death when they’re alive nor when they’re dead. I argue that each version of Epicureanism faces a fatal dilemma: it is either committed to a demonstrably false view about the relationship between self-regarding reasons and well-being or it is involved in a merely verbal dispute with deprivationism. I first provide principled reason to think that any viable view about the badness of death must (...) allow that agents have self-regarding reason to avoid death if doing so would increase their total well-being. I then show that Epicurean views which do not preserve this link are subject to reductio arguments and so should be rejected. After that, I show that the Epicurean views which accommodate this desideratum are involved in a merely verbal dispute with deprivationism. (shrink)

There has been increasing attention in sociology and internet studies to the topic of ‘digital remains’: the artefacts users of social network services (SNS) and other online services leave behind when they die. But these artefacts also pose philosophical questions regarding what impact, if any, these artefacts have on the ontological and ethical status of the dead. One increasingly pertinent question concerns whether these artefacts should be preserved, and whether deletion counts as a harm to the deceased user and therefore (...) provides pro tanto reasons against deletion. In this paper, I build on previous work invoking a distinction between persons and selves to argue that SNS offer a particularly significant material instantiation of persons. The experiential transparency of the SNS medium allows for genuine co-presence of SNS users, and also assists in allowing persons (but not selves) to persist as ethical patients in our lifeworld after biological death. Using Blustein’s “rescue from insignificance” argument for duties of remembrance, I argue that this persistence function supplies a nontrivial (if defeasible) obligation not to delete these artefacts. Drawing on Luciano Floridi’s account of “constitutive” information, I further argue that the “digital remains” metaphor is surprisingly apt: these artefacts in fact enjoy a claim to moral regard akin to that of corpses. (shrink)

Deprivationism cannot accommodate the common sense assumption that we should lament our death iff, and to the extent that, it is bad for us. Call this the Nothing Bad, Nothing to Lament Assumption. As such, either this assumption needs to be rejected or deprivationism does. I first argue that the Nothing Bad, Nothing to Lament Assumption is false. I then attempt to figure out which facts our attitudes concerning death should track. I suggest that each person should have two distinct (...) attitudes toward death: one determined by agent’s reasonable expectations about when she will die and one determined by the amount of metaphysically possible good one reasonably believes death precludes. (shrink)

In his recent book, Death, Posthumous Harm, and Bioethics (Routeledge 2012), James Stacey Taylor challenges two ideas whose provenance may be traced all the way back to Aristotle. The first of these is the thought that death (typically) harms the one who dies (mortal harm thesis). The second is the idea that one can be harmed (and wronged) by events that occur after one’s death (posthumous harm thesis). Taylor devotes two-thirds of the book to arguing against both theses and the (...) remainder to working out the implications of their falsity for various bioethical concerns, including euthanasia, suicide, organ procurement, etc. In this brief article, I concentrate on Taylor’s case against the mortal harm thesis and suggest that his main argument against this claim begs the question. (shrink)

On a view most secularists accept, the deceased individual goes out of existence. How, then, can death be a bad thing for, or harm, the deceased? I consider the doctrine of subsequentism, according to which the bad thing for the deceased, or the harm of death to the deceased, takes place after he or she has died. The main puzzle for this view is to explain how we can predicate a property at a time (such as having a misfortune or (...) being harmed) to an individual who does not exist at that time. This is the Problem of Predication. I consider alternative attempts to solve this puzzle, including one suggested by Ben Bradley, and I argue that they do not succeed. I go on to provide a new way of addressing the Problem of Predication and thus defending subsequentism against this specific threat, contrasting my approach with others currently on offer. (shrink)

A familiar Epicurean argument for the conclusion that death is not bad for those who die goes like this. The dead cannot experience anything, including being dead and its effects. But something is bad for an individual only if that person can experience it or its effects. Therefore, death is not bad for those who die. In this article, I consider several alleged counterexamples to this argument's second premise, along with some responses to them. The responses are not entirely without (...) merit, as we will see. However, I contend that even if none of the cases cited are straightforward counterexamples to the Epicurean premise, they can be used to challenge it indirectly. I conclude that this familiar Epicurean argument is unsound. (shrink)

I cannot possibly do justice to James Taylor's main contention that full-blooded epicureanism is true. But if it is true then, as he notes, this ‘bold’ philosophical position promises to revise our thinking about many areas in bioethics which presuppose that death is bad.1 Of course if Epicureanism is true, the implications run much wider and deeper than bioethics. Any human activity that in any way presupposes the badness of death will be groundless—killing or being killed in war will be (...) morally inconsequential, saving people from death will be without merit and execution could not count as punishment. But, Taylor assures us, the truth of Epicureanism need not force such drastic practical changes for two reasons: excising the mistaken non-epicurean portion of those practical matters might not exhaust our concerns with those questions, and in any case we might be hard-wired to think that death is bad, so we would be stuck with a view that we see on reflection is false .2 However, that much of our common sense practical thinking about life and death might remain intact despite being groundless is small comfort, since we would then be something like Christians trying to carry on who realise, on reflection, that there is no God.Taylor seeks to mitigate …. (shrink)

I cannot fully respond here to all of the subtle and sophisticated criticisms of my full-blooded Epicureanism that have been advanced by Frederik Kaufman, Stephan Blatti, TM Wilkinson and Walter Glannon.1–4 Accordingly, I will focus on correcting some misunderstandings of my position and on responding to some of the most pressing objections.Kaufman holds that the implications of my full-blooded Epicureanism are ‘startling,’ since if I am right “killing or being killed in war will be morally inconsequential, saving people from death (...) will be without merit, and execution could not count as punishment”.1 Second, he criticises my distinction between something being a harm to a person , and something being a harm for a person . Kaufman holds that this distinction does little work, and that it is question-begging to assert that only harms to a person are harms proper. Finally, Kaufman criticises my view that there might be instances of harmless wrongdoing, claiming that it is ‘a conceptual truth’ that ‘to be wronged entails being harmed’. …. (shrink)

In a recent article in this journal, Anna Christensen raises an ‘Epicurean challenge’ to Don Marquis’ much-discussed argument for the immorality of abortion. According to Marquis’ argument, abortion ispro tantomorally wrong because it deprives the fetus of ‘a future like ours’. Drawing on the Epicurean idea that death cannot harm its victim because there isno subjectto be harmed, Christensen argues that neither fetuses nor anyone else can be deprived of a future like ours by dying. Thus, Christensen suggests, the moral (...) wrongness of abortion (and other killings) cannot be grounded in the relevant individual’s being deprived of a future like ours. In this reply, I argue that on no interpretation of Christensen’s Epicurean challenge does it succeed. (shrink)

In his précis, James Stacey Taylor sets out his full-blooded Epicureanism, which concludes that “death is not a harm to the person who dies and that persons can neither be harmed nor wronged by events that occur after their deaths.”1 He then considers various topics in bioethics in the light of his Epicureanism, one of which I consider here: presumed consent in the procurement of organs for transplantation. Although I do not accept Taylor's Epicureanism and although his examination of presumed (...) consent is flawed in various ways, I think we can learn something important from him.Taylor couches the problem in terms of what we are supposed to presume about people's consent or dissent and he thinks that the USA and UK have a system of ‘presumed refusal’ “whereby it is presumed that a person would refuse to have her transplantable organs removed from her postmortem unless she had explicitly indicated otherwise” . Taylor makes a common mistake. The USA and UK have never had such a presumption. In these countries, people who explicitly refuse may not have their organs taken, whereas people who do not explicitly consent may have their organs taken if, roughly speaking, their families consent. Thus non-consenters are not presumed to be refusers.Leaving aside the mistake about the status quo, …. (shrink)

advanced directivesend-of-life decisionsharming the deadposthumous reproductiontransplant ethics.