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Two models of truth

Analysis 71 (3):465-472 (2011)

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  1. Modeling, Truth, and Philosophy.Paul Teller - 2012 - Metaphilosophy 43 (3):257-274.
    Knowledge requires truth, and truth, we suppose, involves unflawed representation. Science does not provide knowledge in this sense but rather provides models, representations that are limited in their accuracy, precision, or, most often, both. Truth as we usually think of it is an idealization, one that serves wonderfully in most ordinary applications, but one that can terribly mislead for certain issues in philosophy. This article sketches how this happens for five important issues, thereby showing how philosophical method must take into (...)
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  • Counterfactuals and Scientific Realism.Michael J. Shaffer - 2012 - London and Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
    This book is a sustained defense of the compatibility of the presence of idealizations in the sciences and scientific realism. So, the book is essentially a detailed response to the infamous arguments raised by Nancy Cartwright to the effect that idealization and scientific realism are incompatible.
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  • Test case for perspectivism: incompatible models in quantum chemistry.Hernan Lucas Accorinti & Juan Camilo Martínez González - forthcoming - Foundations of Chemistry:1-12.
    The incompatibility within the context of modeling cannot be established simpliciter. The fact that modeling is understood as an activity whose representational power can only be partially established, may minimize the supposed existence of incompatible models. Indeed, it is argued from perspectivism that incompatibility can be dissolved, meaning that it becomes trivial or simply false due to the inherently pragmatic and partial nature of the act of representation and modeling. From this perspective, incompatibility can only be a consequence of a (...)
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  • Navigating Massimi’s Perspectival Garden with Inferential Forking Paths. [REVIEW]Daian Bica - 2022 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 35 (3-4):291-303.
    In this review article, I situate Michela Massimi’s 2022 Perspectival Realism book in the broader state of the art of the contemporary philosophy of science by examining critically its contribution to the perspectival realism debate. Setting up a new agenda of philosophical problems for the perspectival realist, Massimi’s book is the most comprehensive assessment of perspectival realism since the publication of Giere’s 2006 Giere, Ronald. Ed. 2006. Scientific Perspectivism. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.[Crossref], [Google Scholar] Scientific Perspectivism (the starting (...)
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  • Scientific Perspectivism and the Methodology of Modern Mathematical Physics.Noah Stemeroff - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (3):504-520.
    Perspectival realists often appeal to the methodology of science to secure a realist account of the retention and continued success of scientific claims through the progress of science. However, in the context of modern physics, the retention and continued success of scientific claims are typically only definable within a mathematical framework. In this article, I argue that this concern leaves the perspectivist open to Cassirer’s neo-Kantian critique of the applicability of mathematics in the natural sciences. To support this criticism, I (...)
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  • Should we be skeptics or contextualists about counterfactual conditionals?Yael Loewenstein - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (10).
    Just as knowledge contextualism offers a way out of knowledge skepticism in the face of powerful skeptical arguments, counterfactual contextualism purports to answer the many compelling arguments for the skeptical thesis that most ordinary counterfactuals of the form ‘if A had happened, C would have happened’, are false. In this article I review a few of the arguments for counterfactual skepticism, before surveying the various types of contextualist responses. I then discuss some of the recent objections to counterfactual contextualism, with (...)
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  • Heim Sequences and Why Most Unqualified ‘Would’-Counterfactuals Are Not True.Yael Loewenstein - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (3):597-610.
    ABSTRACT The apparent consistency of Sobel sequences famously motivated David Lewis to defend a variably strict conditional semantics for counterfactuals. If Sophie had gone to the parade, she would have seen Pedro. If Sophie had gone to the parade and had been stuck behind someone tall, she would not have seen Pedro. But if the order of the counterfactuals in a Sobel sequence is reversed—in the example, if is asserted prior to —the second counterfactual asserted no longer rings true. This (...)
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  • Making worlds with symbols.Paul Teller - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 21):5015-5036.
    I modify and generalize Carnap’s notion of frameworks as a way of unpacking Goodman’s metaphor of “making worlds with symbols”. My frameworks provide, metaphorically, a way of making worlds out of symbols in as much as all our framework-bound access to the world is through frameworks that always stand to be improved in accuracy, precision, and usually both. Such improvement is characterized in pragmatist terms.
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  • Scientific perspectivism in the phenomenological tradition.Philipp Berghofer - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (3):1-27.
    In current debates, many philosophers of science have sympathies for the project of introducing a new approach to the scientific realism debate that forges a middle way between traditional forms of scientific realism and anti-realism. One promising approach is perspectivism. Although different proponents of perspectivism differ in their respective characterizations of perspectivism, the common idea is that scientific knowledge is necessarily partial and incomplete. Perspectivism is a new position in current debates but it does have its forerunners. Figures that are (...)
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  • A New Perspective on Time and Physical Laws.Lucy James - 2022 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 (4):849-877.
    Craig Callender claims that ‘time is the great informer’, meaning that the directions in which our ‘best’ physical theories inform are temporal. This is intended to be a metaphysical claim, and as such expresses a relationship between the physical world and information-gathering systems such as ourselves. This article gives two counterexamples to this claim, illustrating the fact that time and informative strength doubly dissociate, so the claim cannot be about physical theories in general. The first is a case where physical (...)
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  • Computer simulations and experiments: The case of the Higgs boson.Michela Massimi & Wahid Bhimji - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 51 (C):71-81.
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  • Four Kinds of Perspectival Truth.Michela Massimi - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):342-359.
    In this paper, I assess recent claims in philosophy of science about scientific perspectivism being compatible with realism. I clarify the rationale for scientific perspectivism and the problems and challenges that perspectivism faces in delivering a form of realism. In particular, I concentrate my attention on truth, and on ways in which truth can be understood in perspectival terms. I offer a cost-benefit analysis of each of them and defend a version that in my view is most promising in living (...)
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  • Realism, perspectivism, and disagreement in science.Michela Massimi - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 25):6115-6141.
    This paper attends to two main tasks. First, I introduce the notion of perspectival disagreement in science. Second, I relate perspectival disagreement in science to the broader issue of realism about science: how to maintain realist ontological commitments in the face of perspectival disagreement among scientists? I argue that often enough perspectival disagreement is not at the level of the scientific knowledge claims but rather of the methodological and justificatory principles. I introduce and clarify the notion of ‘agreeing-whilst-perspectivally-disagreeing’ with an (...)
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  • Perspectival Instruments.Ana-Maria Creţu - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (3):521-541.
    Despite its potential implications for the objectivity of scientific knowledge, the claim that “scientific instruments are perspectival” has received little critical attention. I show that this claim is best understood as highlighting the dependence of instruments on different perspectives. When closely analyzed, instead of constituting a novel epistemic challenge, this dependence can be exploited to mount novel strategies for resolving two old epistemic problems: conceptual relativism and theory-ladeness. The novel content of this article consists in articulating and developing these strategies (...)
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