In this paper, I try to develop an account of functions which might be of use to a biologist engaged in classifying and explaining natural phenomena. The most pressing difficulty facing such an account is the need to reconcile the normativity of function statements with their explanatory force. I consider two familiar accounts of function statements, offered by Andrew Woodfield and Larry Wright . I examine both accounts in search of the strongest possible formulation of each type of theory. I (...) fail to find a formulation of the ACT which is completely immune from counterexamples, but I do find a satisfactory formulation of the HT. In particular, I argue that the HT should incorporate a point central to the ACT that functions involve a means/end relationship between two devices. I then consider functional explanations: I argue that an ACT which holds that function statements are intrinsically explanatory cannot offer a satisfactory account. The account offered by Woodfield, who rejects this assumption, is adequate, though less attractive than the account suggested by the HT. I conclude by considering how the HT can account for functional norms. (shrink)

Online collection of papers by Devitt, Dretske, Guarino, Hochberg, Jackson, Petitot, Searle, Tye, Varzi and other leading thinkers on philosophy and the foundations of cognitive Science. Topics dealt with include: Wittgenstein and Cognitive Science, Content and Object, Logic and Foundations, Language and Linguistics, and Ontology and Mereology.

1Certain developments in recent philosophy of mind that contemporary philosophers would regard as both novel and important were fully anticipated by writers in (or reacting to) the tradition of Nat...