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Deflationism and the gödel phenomena

Mind 111 (443):551-582 (2002)

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  1. Arithmetical Reflection and the Provability of Soundness.Walter Dean - 2015 - Philosophia Mathematica 23 (1):31-64.
    Proof-theoretic reflection principles are schemas which attempt to express the soundness of arithmetical theories within their own language, e.g., ${\mathtt{{Prov}_{\mathsf {PA}} \rightarrow \varphi }}$ can be understood to assert that any statement provable in Peano arithmetic is true. It has been repeatedly suggested that justification for such principles follows directly from acceptance of an arithmetical theory $\mathsf {T}$ or indirectly in virtue of their derivability in certain truth-theoretic extensions thereof. This paper challenges this consensus by exploring relationships between reflection principles (...)
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  • Homo deceptus: How language creates its own reality.Bruce Bokor - manuscript
    Homo deceptus is a book that brings together new ideas on language, consciousness and physics into a comprehensive theory that unifies science and philosophy in a different kind of Theory of Everything. The subject of how we are to make sense of the world is addressed in a structured and ordered manner, which starts with a recognition that scientific truths are constructed within a linguistic framework. The author argues that an epistemic foundation of natural language must be understood before laying (...)
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  • Does Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem Prove that Truth Transcends Proof?Joseph Vidal-Rosset - 2006 - In Johan van Benthem, Gerhard Heinzman, M. Rebushi & H. Visser (eds.), The Age of Alternative Logics: Assessing Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics Today. Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer. pp. 51--73.
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  • Challenges to Deflationary Theories of Truth.Bradley Armour-Garb - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (4):256-266.
    In this paper, I address some of the chief challenges, or problems, for Deflationary Theories of Truth, viz., the Generalization Problem, the Conservativeness Argument, and the Success Argument.
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  • Truth, Conservativeness, and Provability.Cezary Cieśliński - 2010 - Mind 119 (474):409-422.
    Conservativeness has been proposed as an important requirement for deflationary truth theories. This in turn gave rise to the so-called ‘conservativeness argument’ against deflationism: a theory of truth which is conservative over its base theory S cannot be adequate, because it cannot prove that all theorems of S are true. In this paper we show that the problems confronting the deflationist are in fact more basic: even the observation that logic is true is beyond his reach. This seems to conflict (...)
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  • Truth, Conservativeness, and Provability: Reply to Cieslinski.J. Ketland - 2010 - Mind 119 (474):423-436.
    Cieslinski has given an interesting response to Shapiro 1998 and Ketland 1999, which argued that deflationary truth theories are inadequate, since they lack the property of ‘reflective adequacy’. Cieslinski’s response, following Tennant (2002, 2005), aims to explain, without a detour using truth axioms, why someone who accepts the axioms of a theory should also accept its reflection principles. The argument is formulated very clearly (in fact, to justify a different reflection principle), and involves a couple of important assumptions, the crucial (...)
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  • Deflationism and the Godel Phenomena: Reply to Cieslinski.N. Tennant - 2010 - Mind 119 (474):437-450.
    I clarify how the requirement of conservative extension features in the thinking of various deflationists, and how this relates to another litmus claim, that the truth-predicate stands for a real, substantial property. I discuss how the deflationist can accommodate the result, to which Cieslinski draws attention, that non-conservativeness attends even the generalization that all logical theorems in the language of arithmetic are true. Finally I provide a four-fold categorization of various forms of deflationism, by reference to the two claims of (...)
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  • Does truth equal provability in the maximal theory?Luca Incurvati - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):233-239.
    According to the received view, formalism – interpreted as the thesis that mathematical truth does not outrun the consequences of our maximal mathematical theory – has been refuted by Goedel's theorem. In support of this claim, proponents of the received view usually invoke an informal argument for the truth of the Goedel sentence, an argument which is supposed to reconstruct our reasoning in seeing its truth. Against this, Field has argued in a series of papers that the principles involved in (...)
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  • What theories of truth should be like (but cannot be).Hannes Leitgeb - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (2):276–290.
    This article outlines what a formal theory of truth should be like, at least at first glance. As not all of the stated constraints can be satisfied at the same time, in view of notorious semantic paradoxes such as the Liar paradox, we consider the maximal consistent combinations of these desiderata and compare their relative advantages and disadvantages.
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  • Soundness arguments for consistency and their epistemic value: A critical note.Matteo Zicchetti - 2024 - Philosophical Quarterly.
    Soundness Arguments for the consistency of a (mathematical) theory S aim to show that S is consistent by first showing or employing the fact that S is sound, i.e., that all theorems of S are true. Although soundness arguments are virtually unanimously accepted as valid and sound for most of our accepted theories, philosophers disagree about their epistemic value, i.e., about whether such arguments can be employed to improve our epistemic situation concerning questions of consistency. This article provides a (partial) (...)
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  • Nothing Is True.Will Gamester - 2023 - Journal of Philosophy 120 (6):314-338.
    This paper motivates and defends alethic nihilism, the theory that nothing is true. I first argue that alethic paradoxes like the Liar and Curry motivate nihilism; I then defend the view from objections. The critical discussion has two primary outcomes. First, a proof of concept. Alethic nihilism strikes many as silly or obviously false, even incoherent. I argue that it is in fact well-motivated and internally coherent. Second, I argue that deflationists about truth ought to be nihilists. Deflationists maintain that (...)
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  • The Function of Truth and the Conservativeness Argument.Kentaro Fujimoto - 2022 - Mind 131 (521):129-157.
    Truth is often considered to be a logico-linguistic tool for expressing indirect endorsements and infinite conjunctions. In this article, I will point out another logico-linguistic function of truth: to enable and validate what I call a blind argument, namely, an argument that involves indirectly endorsed statements. Admitting this function among the logico-linguistic functions of truth has some interesting consequences. In particular, it yields a new type of so-called conservativeness argument, which poses a new type of threat to deflationism about truth.
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  • Interpreting the compositional truth predicate in models of arithmetic.Cezary Cieśliński - 2021 - Archive for Mathematical Logic 60 (6):749-770.
    We present a construction of a truth class (an interpretation of a compositional truth predicate) in an arbitrary countable recursively saturated model of first-order arithmetic. The construction is fully classical in that it employs nothing more than the classical techniques of formal proof theory.
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  • Deflationism beyond arithmetic.Kentaro Fujimoto - 2019 - Synthese 196 (3):1045-1069.
    The conservativeness argument poses a dilemma to deflationism about truth, according to which a deflationist theory of truth must be conservative but no adequate theory of truth is conservative. The debate on the conservativeness argument has so far been framed in a specific formal setting, where theories of truth are formulated over arithmetical base theories. I will argue that the appropriate formal setting for evaluating the conservativeness argument is provided not by theories of truth over arithmetic but by those over (...)
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  • Deflationary truth and the ontology of expressions.Carlo Nicolai - 2015 - Synthese 192 (12):4031-4055.
    The existence of a close connection between results on axiomatic truth and the analysis of truth-theoretic deflationism is nowadays widely recognized. The first attempt to make such link precise can be traced back to the so-called conservativeness argument due to Leon Horsten, Stewart Shapiro and Jeffrey Ketland: by employing standard Gödelian phenomena, they concluded that deflationism is untenable as any adequate theory of truth leads to consequences that were not achievable by the base theory alone. In the paper I highlight, (...)
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  • A Note on Typed Truth and Consistency Assertions.Carlo Nicolai - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (1):89-119.
    In the paper we investigate typed axiomatizations of the truth predicate in which the axioms of truth come with a built-in, minimal and self-sufficient machinery to talk about syntactic aspects of an arbitrary base theory. Expanding previous works of the author and building on recent works of Albert Visser and Richard Heck, we give a precise characterization of these systems by investigating the strict relationships occurring between them, arithmetized model constructions in weak arithmetical systems and suitable set existence axioms. The (...)
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  • Deflationism and the Invisible Power of Truth.Andrea Strollo - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (4):521-543.
    In recent decades deflationary theories of truth have been challenged with a technical argument based on the notion of conservativeness. In this paper, I shall stress that conservative extensions of theories and expandability of their models are not equivalent notions. Then, I shall argue that the deflationary thesis of the unsubstantiality of truth is better understood as leveraging on the stronger notion of expandability of models. Once expandability is involved in the argument, some notable consequences follow: the strategy proposed by (...)
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  • Louis Joly as a Platonist Painter?Roger Pouivet - 2006 - In Johan van Benthem, Gerhard Heinzman, M. Rebushi & H. Visser (eds.), The Age of Alternative Logics: Assessing Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics Today. Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer. pp. 337--341.
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  • Axiomatic theories of truth.Volker Halbach - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Definitional and axiomatic theories of truth -- Objects of truth -- Tarski -- Truth and set theory -- Technical preliminaries -- Comparing axiomatic theories of truth -- Disquotation -- Classical compositional truth -- Hierarchies -- Typed and type-free theories of truth -- Reasons against typing -- Axioms and rules -- Axioms for type-free truth -- Classical symmetric truth -- Kripke-Feferman -- Axiomatizing Kripke's theory in partial logic -- Grounded truth -- Alternative evaluation schemata -- Disquotation -- Classical logic -- Deflationism (...)
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  • Deflationism, conservativeness and maximality.Cezary Cieśliński - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (6):695 - 705.
    We discuss two desirable properties of deflationary truth theories: conservativeness and maximality. Joining them together, we obtain a notion of a maximal conservative truth theory - a theory which is conservative over its base, but can't be enlarged any further without losing its conservative character. There are indeed such theories; we show however that none of them is axiomatizable, and moreover, that there will be in fact continuum many theories of this sort. It turns out in effect that the deflationist (...)
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  • Beth's theorem and deflationism.Timothy Bays - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):1061-1073.
    In 1999, Jeffrey Ketland published a paper which posed a series of technical problems for deflationary theories of truth. Ketland argued that deflationism is incompatible with standard mathematical formalizations of truth, and he claimed that alternate deflationary formalizations are unable to explain some central uses of the truth predicate in mathematics. He also used Beth’s definability theorem to argue that, contrary to deflationists’ claims, the T-schema cannot provide an ‘implicit definition’ of truth. In this article, I want to challenge this (...)
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  • Truth is Simple.Leon Horsten & Graham E. Leigh - 2016 - Mind:fzv184.
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  • How do We Know that the Godel Sentence of a Consistent Theory Is True?G. Sereny - 2011 - Philosophia Mathematica 19 (1):47-73.
    Some earlier remarks Michael Dummett made on Gödel’s theorem have recently inspired attempts to formulate an alternative to the standard demonstration of the truth of the Gödel sentence. The idea underlying the non-standard approach is to treat the Gödel sentence as an ordinary arithmetical one. But the Gödel sentence is of a very specific nature. Consequently, the non-standard arguments are conceptually mistaken. In this paper, both the faulty arguments themselves and the general reasons underlying their failure are analysed. The analysis (...)
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  • Tarski on the Necessity Reading of Convention T.Douglas Eden Patterson - 2006 - Synthese 151 (1):1-32.
    Tarski’s Convention T is often taken to claim that it is both sufficient and necessary for adequacy in a definition of truth that it imply instances of the T-schema where the embedded sentence translates the mentioned sentence. However, arguments against the necessity claim have recently appeared, and, furthermore, the necessity claim is actually not required for the indefinability results for which Tarski is justly famous; indeed, Tarski’s own presentation of the results in the later Undecidable Theories makes no mention of (...)
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  • (1 other version)Deflationism and arithmetical truth.Tapani Hyttinen & Gabriel Sandu - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (3):413–426.
    Deflationists have argued that truth is an ontologically thin property which has only an expressive function to perform, that is, it makes possible to express semantic generalizations like 'All the theorems are true', 'Everything Peter said is true', etc. Some of the deflationists have also argued that although truth is ontologically thin, it suffices in conjunctions with other facts not involving truth to explain all the facts about truth. The purpose of this paper is to show that in the case (...)
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  • Between proof and truth.Julien Boyer & Gabriel Sandu - 2012 - Synthese 187 (3):821-832.
    We consider two versions of truth as grounded in verification procedures: Dummett's notion of proof as an effective way to establish the truth of a statement and Hintikka's GTS notion of truth as given by the existence of a winning strategy for the game associated with a statement. Hintikka has argued that the two notions should be effective and that one should thus restrict one's attention to recursive winning strategies. In the context of arithmetic, we show that the two notions (...)
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  • Erratum to: Between proof and truth.Julien Boyer & Gabriel Sandu - 2012 - Synthese 187 (3):973-974.
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