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  1. Como os Nomes Nomeiam: Um Passeio Filosófico Sobre a Referência.Sagid Salles - 2020 - Pelotas: UFPel.
    Uma das características mais interessantes da filosofia é sua capacidade de revelar problemas difíceis em lugares inesperados. É precisamente isto que ocorre com o caso dos nomes próprios. Usamos nomes cotidianamente para selecionar ou fazer referência a objetos particulares, e depois podermos dizer algo sobre eles. Talvez o leitor diga a um colega que gostaria de estar tomando um café em Paris, ao invés de gastar tempo lendo mais um livro de filosofia. Neste caso, estará usando o nome “Paris” para (...)
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  • Sainsbury on Thinking About Fictional Things.Anthony Everett - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (2):181-194.
    In a number of places Mark Sainsbury has recently developed an attractive irrealist account of fiction and intentionality, on which there are no fictional objects or exotic intentional entities. A central component of his account is an ambitious argument, which aims to establish that the truth of intensional transitives such as “I think about Holmes” and “Alexander feared Zeus” does not require the existence of fictional or intentional objects. It would be good news indeed for the irrealist if Sainsbury’s argument (...)
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  • Can There Be a Davidsonian Theory of Empty Names?Siu-Fan Lee - 2016 - In Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations into Proper Names. Frankfurt, Germany: pp. 203-226.
    This paper examines to what extent Davidsonian truth-theoretic semantics can give an adequate account for empty names in natural languages. It argues that the prospect is dim because of a tension between metaphysical austerity, non-vacuousness of theorems and empirical adequacy. Sainsbury (2005) proposed a Davidsonian account of empty names called ‘Reference Without Referents’ (RWR), which explicates reference in terms of reference-condition rather than referent, thus avoiding the issue of existence. This is an inspiring account. However, it meets several difficulties. First, (...)
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  • Nomes Próprios: o princípio de Russell e o argumento semântico.Sagid Salles - 2020 - Prometeus: Filosofia em Revista 33: 231-255.
    I have two main goals in this paper. First, I develop a version of Theory of Identification for the reference of proper names, one which comes from Strawson and Evans. The theory is not developed in detail, but its central elements are revealed, focusing on its treatment of the phenomenon of reference borrowing. At the center of this theory is Russell’s Principle which, applied to the reference of proper names, states that the identification of the named object is a necessary (...)
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  • The Use-Conditional Indexical Conception of Proper Names.Dolf Rami - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (1):119-150.
    In this essay I will defend a novel version of the indexical view on proper names. According to this version, proper names have a relatively sparse truth-conditional meaning that is represented by their rigid content and indexical character, but a relatively rich use-conditional meaning, which I call the (contextual) constraint of a proper name. Firstly, I will provide a brief outline of my favoured indexical view on names in contrast to other indexical views proposed in the relevant literature. Secondly, two (...)
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  • The Same Name.Mark Sainsbury - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (S2):195-214.
    When are two tokens of a name tokens of the same name? According to this paper, the answer is a matter of the historical connections between the tokens. For each name, there is a unique originating event, and subsequent tokens are tokens of that name only if they derive in an appropriate way from that originating event. The conditions for a token being a token of a given name are distinct from the conditions for preservation of the reference of a (...)
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