Aquinas, Ockham, and Burdan all claim that a person can be numerically identical over time, despite changes in size, shape, and color. How can we reconcile this with the Indiscernibility of Identicals, the principle that numerical identity implies indiscernibility across time? Almost all contemporary metaphysicians regard the Indiscernibility of Identicals as axiomatic. But I will argue that Aquinas, Ockham, and Burdan would reject it, perhaps in favor of a principle restricted to indiscernibility at a time.

The article aims to show how the acceptance of non-monotonic logic enables arguments to be held between science and religion in a way that does not exclude either of these two spheres. The starting point of the analyses is the idea of the 13th century Danish philosopher, Boethius of Dacia, who states that it is both acceptable that: a natural scientist negates that the world had a beginning, and a Christian theologian asserts that the world had a beginning, because each (...) of them is basing their statements on the principles of their respective discipline: the first on the principles of nature, and the latter on knowledge supplemented by divine revelation. What is more, analogically: a metaphysician, when limited to his principles, cannot settle the issue, as he takes into account supranatural beings and their powers, but cannot know what God or another powerful supranatural would have decided in a such a case. The paper shows that Boethius’s approach: violates the rule of monotonicity, cannot be finally interpreted in terms of classical logic and assumes certain non-monotonic logic as its inference framework. Other presented examples of arguments between religious beliefs and the statements of natural science are resolved in the same way. Thus, it is shown how non-monotonic thinking allows us to seriously treat both scientific and religious inference as compatible. (shrink)

In both Christian and Islamic world, some writers have accused averroes and his followers of believing to and defending of double truth: that philosophical facts and religious facts despite their inconsistency can both be true. But this charg is true or is a mere accusation? This article examines this matter. We should distinguish between for meaning of double truth: a) the idea that some people can believe in a proposition and others are justified in believing to its contrary. B) The (...) idea that a person can in a given time believe to a proposition and in another time approve its contrary. C) The idea that a person epistemologically is justified to believe in a proposition and at the same time accept its contrary. D) The idea that, ontologically, in the field of reality the truth is twin, I. E ، both A and its contrary are in reality correct. We will prove that none of the averroists agree with D, and a few of them confirmC, and almost all of them approve A and B. (shrink)