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John Morrison [16]John Ross Morrison [1]
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John Morrison
Barnard College
  1. Perceptual Confidence.John Morrison - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (1):15-48.
    Perceptual Confidence is the view that perceptual experiences assign degrees of confidence. After introducing, clarifying, and motivating Perceptual Confidence, I catalogue some of its more interesting consequences, such as the way it blurs the distinction between veridical and illusory experiences, a distinction that is sometimes said to carry a lot of metaphysical weight. I also explain how Perceptual Confidence fills a hole in our best scientific theories of perception and why it implies that experiences don't have objective accuracy conditions.
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  2. Perceptual Variation and Structuralism.John Morrison - 2020 - Noûs 54 (2):290-326.
    I use an old challenge to motivate a new view. The old challenge is due to variation in our perceptions of secondary qualities. The challenge is to say whose perceptions are accurate. The new view is about how we manage to perceive secondary qualities, and thus manage to perceive them accurately or inaccurately. I call it perceptual structuralism. I first introduce the challenge and point out drawbacks with traditional responses. I spend the rest of the paper motivating and defending a (...)
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  3.  11
    Third-Personal Evidence for Perceptual Confidence.John Morrison - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Perceptual Confidence is the view that our conscious perceptual experiences assign degrees of confidence. In previous papers, I motived it using first-personal evidence (Morrison 2016) and Jessie Munton motivated it using normative evidence (Munton 2016). In this paper, I will consider the extent to which it is motivated by third-personal evidence. I will argue that the current evidence is supportive but not decisive. I will also describe experiments that might provide more decisive evidence.
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  4. Perceptual Confidence and Categorization.John Morrison - 2017 - Analytic Philosophy 58 (1):71-85.
    In “Perceptual Confidence,” I argue that our perceptual experiences assign degrees of confidence. In “Precision, not Confidence, Describes the Uncertainty of Perceptual Experience,” Rachel Denison disagrees. In this reply I first clarify what i mean by ‘perceptual experiences’, ‘assign’ and ‘confidence’. I then argue, contra Denison, that perception involves automatic categorization, and that there is an intrinsic difference between a blurry perception of a sharp image and a sharp perception of a blurry image. -/- .
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  5.  80
    Truth in the Emendation.John Morrison - 2015 - In Yitzhak Melamed (ed.), The Young Spinoza: A Metaphysician in the Making. pp. 67–91.
    Spinoza’s claims about true ideas are central to the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect. It is therefore worth trying to reconstruct what he means when he says that an idea is true. I argue that the three leading interpretations – correspondence, coherence, and causal – don’t explain key passages. I then propose a new interpretation. Roughly, I propose that an idea is true if and only if it represents an essence and was derived in the right kind of (...)
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  6. Anti‐Atomism About Color Representation.John Morrison - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):94-122.
    According to anti-atomism, we represent color properties (e.g., red) in virtue of representing color relations (e.g., redder than). I motivate anti-atomism with a puzzle involving a series of pairwise indistinguishable chips. I then develop two versions of anti-atomism.
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  7. Two Puzzles About Thought and Identity in Spinoza.John Morrison - 2017 - In Yitzhak Melamed (ed.), Cambridge Critical Guide to Spinoza’s Ethics. pp. 56–81.
    I suggest a solution to two puzzles in Spinoza's metaphysics. The first puzzle involves the mind and the idea of the mind, in particular how they can be identical, even though the mind thinks about bodies and nothing else, whereas the idea of the mind thinks about ideas and nothing else. The second puzzle involves the mind and the idea of a thing that belongs to an unknown attribute, in particular how they can be identical, even though the mind thinks (...)
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  8. Colour in a Physical World: A Problem Due to Visual Noise.John Morrison - 2012 - Mind 121 (482):333-373.
    I will develop a new problem for almost all realist theories of colour. The problem involves fluctuations in our colour experiences that are due to visual noise rather than changes in the objects we are looking at.
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  9. The Relation Between Conception and Causation in Spinoza's Metaphysics.John Morrison - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13:1-17.
    Conception and causation are fundamental notions in Spinoza's metaphysics. I argue against the orthodox view that, due to the causal axiom, if one thing is conceived through another thing, then the second thing causes the first thing. My conclusion forces us to rethink Spinoza's entitlement to some of his core commitments, including the principle of sufficient reason, the parallelism doctrine and the conatus doctrine.
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  10. Restricting Spinoza's Causal Axiom.John Morrison - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (258):40-63.
    Spinoza's causal axiom is at the foundation of the Ethics. I motivate, develop and defend a new interpretation that I call the ‘causally restricted interpretation’. This interpretation solves several longstanding puzzles and helps us better understand Spinoza's arguments for some of his most famous doctrines, including his parallelism doctrine and his theory of sense perception. It also undermines a widespread view about the relationship between the three fundamental, undefined notions in Spinoza's metaphysics: causation, conception and inherence.
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  11.  31
    Spinoza on Mind, Body, and Numerical Identity.John Morrison - 2022 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind. pp. 293-336.
    Spinoza claims that a person’s mind and body are one and the same. But he also claims that minds think and do not move, whereas bodies move and do not think. How can we reconcile these claims? I believe that Spinoza is building on a traditional view about identity over time. According to this view, identity over time is linked to essence, so that a thing that is now resting is identical to a thing that was previously moving, provided that (...)
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  12.  24
    Three Medieval Aristotelians on Numerical Identity and Time.John Morrison - forthcoming - In Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy.
    Aquinas, Ockham, and Burdan all claim that a person can be numerically identical over time, despite changes in size, shape, and color. How can we reconcile this with the Indiscernibility of Identicals, the principle that numerical identity implies indiscernibility across time? Almost all contemporary metaphysicians regard the Indiscernibility of Identicals as axiomatic. But I will argue that Aquinas, Ockham, and Burdan would reject it, perhaps in favor of a principle restricted to indiscernibility at a time.
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  13.  14
    Perceptual Variation and Relativism.John Morrison - 2020 - In Epistemology After Sextus Empiricus. pp. p.13–47.
    There is variation in how people perceive colors and other secondary qualities. The challenge of perceptual variation is to say whose perceptions are accurate. According to Sextus, Protagoras’ response is that all of our perceptions might be accurate. As this response is traditionally developed, it is difficult to explain color illusion and color constancy. This difficulty is due to a widespread assumption called perceptual atomism. This chapter argues that, if we want to develop Protagoras’ response, we need to give up (...)
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  14. Triangulating How Things Look.John Morrison - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (2):140-161.
    Suppose you're unable to discriminate the colors of two objects. According to the triangulation view, their colors might nonetheless look different to you, and that's something you can discover as a result of further comparisons. The primary motivation for this view is its apparent ability to solve a puzzle involving a series of pairwise indiscriminable objects. I argue that, due to visual noise, the triangulation view doesn't really solve the puzzle.
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  15. Descartes and the Puzzle of Sensory Representation, by Raffaella De Rosa. [REVIEW]Elliot Samuel Paul & John Morrison - 2014 - Mind 123 (492):1187-1191.
    A book review of Raffaella De Rosa's Descartes and the Puzzle of Sensory Representation".
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  16.  86
    Spinoza's Geometry of Power. [REVIEW]John Morrison - 2013 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (3):610-613.
    A book review of Valtteri Viljanen's "Spinoza’s Geometry of Power".
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  17.  65
    Visual Noise Due to Quantum Indeterminacies.John Ross Morrison & David Anderson - unknown
    We establish that, due to certain quantum indeterminacies, there must be foundational colours that do not reliably cause any particular experience. This report functions as an appendix to Morrison's "Colour in a Physical World.".
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