I argue that the separation of conjoined twins in infancy or early childhood is unethical. Cases may be divided into three types: both twins suffer from lethal abnormalities, only one twin has a lethal abnormality, or neither twin does. In the first kind of case, there is no reason to separate, since both twins will die regardless of treatment. In the third kind of case, I argue that separation at an early age is unethical because the twins are likely to (...) achieve an irreplaceably good quality of life—the goods of conjoinment—that separation takes away. Evaluation of this possibility requires maturation past early childhood. Regarding the second type, I point out that with conceivable but unrecorded exceptions, these cases will consistently involve sacrifice separation. I present an argument that sacrifice separation is unethical, but in some cases a moral dilemma may exist in which separation and refraining from separation are both unethical. Perhaps in such cases a decision can be made on non-moral grounds; however, the possibility of such a decision serves not to mitigate but to underscore the fact that the separation is unethical. My conclusion, which applies to all three types of cases, is that it is unethical to separate conjoined twins before their developing personalities give some reliable indication as to whether they desire separation and whether they will achieve those goods of conjoinment. (shrink)

We examine the philosophical and ethical issues associated with conjoined twins and their surgical separation. In cases in which there is an extensive sharing of organs, but nevertheless two distinguishable functioning brains, there are a number of philosophical and ethical challenges. This is because such conjoined twins: 1. give rise to puzzles concerning our identity, about whether we are identical to something psychological or biological;2. force us to decide whether what matters from an ethical point of view is the biological (...) life of our organisms or the existence of our consciousness or mind; 3. raise questions concerning when, if ever, it is morally acceptable to sacrifice one of us to save another;4. force us to reflect on the conditions for ownership of organs and the justification of removal of organs for transplantation which causes the death of the donor; 5. raise questions about who should take decisions about life-risking treatments when this cannot be decided by patients themselves.We examine and suggest answers to these questions. (shrink)

In dieser Arbeit werden drei Gedankenexperimente geprüft, die im Diskurs zur Moralität der Abtreibung vorgebracht wurden: der Geiger von Judith J. Thomson und zwei Erwiderungen darauf von Kenneth Himma und Christopher H. Conn. Sie sind dadurch charakterisiert, dass sie von Rechten sprechen, eine besondere Betonung auf Verkörperung legen und an die moralische Intuition appellieren. Ich behaupte, dass nur menschliche Individuen Menschenrechte haben können und dass Individuation nicht auf der Verletzung der moralischen Rechte anderer basieren kann. Deshalb kann der Fetus weder (...) Träger von moralischen Rechten noch ein Aggressor gegen die Rechte seiner Mutter sein. Die Paradigmen der Umweltethik scheinen für moralische Überlegungen über Abtreibung besser geeignet zu sein als das Paradigma der Rechte. Im Zentrum der Umweltethik stehen eher Fürsorge und Achtung vor dem Leben als Rechte; sie ist auf Verkörperung und natürliche Prozesse abgestimmt und beruft sich mehr auf Gefühle der Fürsorge und Tugend als auf ein Gerechtigkeitsgefühl. (shrink)