CAT4 is proposed as a general method for representing information, enabling a powerful programming method for large-scale information systems. It enables generalised machine learning, software automation and novel AI capabilities. This is Part 3 of a five-part introduction. The focus here is on explaining the semantic model for CAT4. Points in CAT4 graphs represent facts. We introduce all the formal (data) elements used in the classic semantic model: sense or intension (1st and 2nd joins), reference (3rd join), functions (4th join), (...) time and truth (logical fields), and symbolic content (name/value fields). Concepts are introduced through examples alternating with theoretical discussion. Some concepts are assumed from Part 1 and 2, but key ideas are re-introduced. The purpose is to explain the CAT4 interpretation, and why the data structure and CAT4 axioms have been chosen: to make the semantic model consistent and complete. We start with methods to translate information from database tables into graph DBs and into CAT4. We conclude with a method for translating natural language into CAT4. We conclude with a comparison of the system with an advanced semantic logic, the hyper-intensional logic TIL, which also aims to translate NL into a logical calculus. The CAT4 Natural Language Translator is discussed in further detail in Part 4, when we introduce functions more formally. Part 5 discusses software design considerations. (shrink)

The paper presents a two-level approach to an assessment of meaning theories. To begin with, language is distinguished from lan guage-model and, analogously, meaning is discerned from a model of meaning. The first level of a theory assessment is presented as dealing with the relation of a model of meaning to intra-theoretical aims and assumptions of a theory with specific language-model. The second level of assessment concerns ontological, epistemological, logical and other assumptions underlying the respective language-model. Finally, several questions are (...) set forth as methodological directives for elucidating hidden assumptions behind the theories of meaning. (shrink)

The paper examines two possible analyses of fictional names within Pavel Tichý’s Transparent Intensional Logic. The first of them is the analysis actually proposed by Tichý in his (1988) book The Foundations of Frege’s Logic. He analysed fictional names in terms of free variables. I will introduce, explain, and assess this analysis. Subsequently, I will explain Tichý’s notion of individual role (office, thing-to-be). On the basis of this notion, I will outline and defend the second analysis of fictional names. This (...) analysis is close to the approach known in the literature as role realism (the most prominent advocates of this position are Nicholas Wolterstorff, Gregory Currie, and Peter Lamarque). (shrink)

The “dynamic turn” in semantic theory of natural language, which has been taking place roughly during the last decade, has resulted into seeing the meaning of a sentence as a “context-change-potential”, as a function which maps the set of possible contexts on itself. The development of theories of this kind has been stimulated especially by the effort to semantically cope with the anaphoric items of natural language . The most significant species of dynamic semantic theories are represented by Kamp´s “discourse (...) representations theory” and Groenendijk and Stokhof´s “dynamic logic”. The former sees sentences as means of building and rebuilding “discourse representations structures”; the latter, which tries to be an expressly logical objects to “discourse markers” into the same set. The paper presents basic principles of theories of both of these kinds and indicates how they can help us analyse natural language locutions involving anaphora. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper can be described as follows. The contemporary philosophical logic cannot work without using some terms well-known from mathematics and logic. Among such terms that play an important role in logical and philosophical analyses of language, meaning and the like we can find function, procedure and construction. One problem is that various authors use these terms in various ways, another problem consists in the well-known fact that many philosophers do not have any idea of what those (...) and similar terms could mean. The present paper tries to explain why an exact explication of the three mentioned terms can contribute to understanding and even solving many problems with semantics of natural language, which a philosopher should be interested in. (shrink)

In the first part of this paper, the author analyzes several unacceptable views of properties of physical objects and justifies the familiar explication, according to which properties of physical objects are certain functions defined on the set of all couples w,t, where w is a possible world and t is a moment of time . On the background of the indicated understanding of properties, the author demonstrates that there exist empirical essential properties. An empirical property is understood as a property, (...) the extension of which cannot be identified without applying experience. He distinguishes two kinds of essential properties: purely essential and partially essential. A purely essential property has the same extension at every world-time couple. The extension of a partially essential properties changes in the logical space, but there exists a non-empty set of objects which is a subset of their extension at every world-time couple. Every partially essential property is empirical. The author pays special attention to the essential properties expressible by means of expressions of the form ∨ Q) where P, Q are non-essential empirical properties that are allied through some objects X1, ..., Xn - i.e., the property ∨ Q) belongs to the objects X1, ..., Xn at every world-time couple. In the last part of the paper, the author demonstrates that every empirical property of the type where ”<” denotes the relation of being a part of, and ”I” stands for any physical object, is purely essential. The assumption that the extensions of these properties are changeable, entails unacceptable consequences. (shrink)

Vít Gvoždiak published a reconciliatory analysis of Searle’s social ontology with semiotics in Gvoždiak (2012). Without prior knowledge of his paper, an analysis of the same subject appeared in Msimang (2014). Even though Searle’s social ontology is a common point of reference in the formulation of semiotics in these papers, it also serves as a point of departure in their understanding of semiotics and its development. The semiotic theory expressed in Gvoždiak (2012) is an inherently linguistic (speech act centred) theory, (...) whereas the semiotic theory presented in Msimang (2014) tends more towards a general theory of communicative systems in which social ontology, which follows from speech act theory, is an interesting part. It is my purpose in this note to contrast the two positions of semiotic theory as they appear in the aforementioned papers in reference to their appropriation of Searle’s social ontology. (shrink)

Určité okolnosti (konkrétně historické okolnosti vývoje jazyka) určují, co slova, ze kterých se tato věta skládá, znamenají. (ii) Jiné okolnosti (kontext výpovědi této věty) mohou určovat, k čemu některé výrazy v této větě (já, tady, ...) odkazují. (iii) Další okolnosti (odpovídající tomu, o čem tato věta hovoří) určují, zda se věci mají tak, jak věta říká. Vezměme například větu..

Quine claims that a) considering meaning as a separate object leads to mentalism and b) to overcome mentalism we have to accept an empirical analysis. The paper shows that a) is wrong and not accepting mentalism we can apply a logical, i.e., not empirical approach.

The terms denotation and reference are commonly used as synonyms. A more fine-grained analysis of natural language as offered by TIL shows that we can distinguish these terms in the case of empirical expressions. The latter are shown to denote non-trivial intensions while their reference is the value of these intensions in the actual world.

In 1905 Bertrand Russell took on the problem of definite descriptions, and his analysis became the standard up until 1950 when Peter Strawson criticised Russell’s solution as inadequate. Since then many opponents as well as proponents of the Russellian solution have been involved in a long-term debate on definite descriptions. In this paper I show that both sides of the contention are partly right and partly wrong, because sentences of the form “The F is a G” are ambiguous. However, the (...) ambiguity does not concern reference shift of the description ‘the F’. Rather, the ambiguity consists in different topic-focus articulations of a given sentence involving occurrences of ‘the F’. I demonstrate that when ‘the F’ is used as part of the topic of such a sentence the existence of the object denoted by ‘the F’ is not only entailed by but also presupposed by the sentence. On the other hand, ‘the F’ used in the focus of a sentence triggers merely existential entailment. Thus sentences differing only in their topic-focus articulation should have assigned different logical forms. In order to make such hidden features explicit, I apply the procedural semantics of Transparent Intensional Logic , furnishing sentences with hyperpropositions that are precisely defined in terms of TIL constructions. These are procedures assigned to sentences as their context-invariant structured meanings. Moreover, I generalise the phenomenon of the topic-focus distinction to sentences of any form, proposing an adequate analytic schema of sentences that come with a presupposition. (shrink)

The paper focuses on the problem of identification of laws of nature and their demarcation from other kinds of regularities. The problem is approached from the viewpoint of several metaphysical, epistemological, logical and methodological criteria. Firstly, several dominant approaches to the problem are introduced. Secondly, the logical and semantic explicatory framework – Transparent Intensional Logic – is presented for the sake of clarification of logical forms of sentences that are supposed to express the laws of nature. Finally, a complementary strategy (...) to the demarcation problem is proposed, including reconsideration of relevant metaphysical, epistemological, logical and methodological requirements and principles behind the former conceptions. (shrink)

In the paper we offer a logical explication of the frequently used, but rather vague, notion of point of view. We show that the concept of point of view prevents certain paradoxes from arising. A point of view is a means of partial characterisation of something. Thus nothing is a P and at the same time a non-P, because it is a P only relative to some point of view and a non-P from another point of view. But there is (...) a major, complicating factor involved in applying a logical method that is supposed to provide a formal and rigorous counterpart of the intuitively understood notion: ‘point of view’ is a homony-mous expression, and so there is not just one meaning that would explain points of view. Yet we propose a common scheme of the logical type of the entities denoted by the term ‘point of view’. It is an empirical function: when applied to the viewed object in question, it results in a evaluating proposition about the object. If there is an agent applying the criterion, the result is the agent’s attitude to the respective object. The paper is organised into two parts. In Part I we first adduce and analyse various examples of typical cases of applying a point of view to prevent paradox. These cases are examined according to the type of the viewed object: a) the viewed object is an individual and b) the viewed object is a property or an office. In Part II we then show that the method described in Part I can be applied also to the analyses of agents’ attitudes. We thus explain how an agent can believe of something that it is a P and at the same time a non-P: the agent applies different viewpoint criteria to the viewed object. The inversion of perspective consisting in the perspective shifting from the believer on to the reporter in the case of attitudes de re, and from the reporter to the believer in the case of attitudes de dicto, is also analyzed. We show that there is no smooth logical traffic back and forth between such attitudes and prove that they are not equivalent. By way of conclusion, we explicate the notion of conceptual point of view and analyze cases of viewpoints given by conceptual distinction. We show, finally, that the proposed scheme of the type of point of view can be preserved, this time, however, in its extensional version. (shrink)

We approach the topic of solution equivalence of propositional problems from the perspective of non-constructive procedural theory of problems based on Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL). The answer we put forward is that two solutions are equivalent if and only if they have equivalent solution concepts. Solution concepts can be understood as a generalization of the notion of proof objects from the Curry-Howard isomorphism.

The article contains several applications of the version of the historical theory of proper names presented in the previous article . They are designed to defend its epistemologically meager point of view . It is argued that the distinction between reference of an expression and that of a speaker which lies in the very heart of the theory enables one to handle with many well-known examples . Then bounds of referential uses of proper names are tested with respect to some (...) other examples as well . The point is that the theory is neither too narrow nor too broad: it does not exclude, on the one hand, those uses of a name that are demonstrably referrential and it does not, on the other hand, count as referring clearly non-referrential “uses” of a name. (shrink)

In a 1997 paper Jennifer Saul adduces various examples of simple sentences in which the substitution of one co-referential singular term for another appears to be invalid. I address the question of whether anti-substitution is logically justified by examining the validity and soundness of substitution of co-referential singular terms in three simple-sentence arguments each exhibiting a different logical structure. The result is twofold. First, all three arguments are valid, provided Leibniz’s Law is valid with respect to simple sentences . Thus, (...) as far as these arguments are concerned, there is no logical problem with substitution in simple sentences. Second, two of the arguments cannot be sound, because their respective sets of premises are inconsistent. Thus, it would be logically irrational to commit oneself to all the premises of the respective arguments. To the extent that the origin of Saul’s puzzles is in logic , I suggest, tentatively, that substitution may appear to be invalid because the issues of validity and soundness have not been kept separate. I then consider in depth Saul’s first sentence, “Clark Kent enters a phone booth and Superman exits”. Obviously, two-way substitution is trivially valid, if the expressions are co-referential semantically proper names, the conclusion being but a rephrasing of the premise. However, I argue that a non-trivial semantic analysis of this sentence should take account of the diachronicity of Clark Kent’s entrance and Superman’s exit while preserving the internal link between being Superman and being Clark Kent. I propose the following. ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’ refer to two distinct individual concepts. “Superman is Clark Kent” then no longer expresses the self-identity of an individual bearing two names, but that two named concepts are held together by the requisite relation: wherever and whenever someone falls under the concept of Superman the same individual also falls under the Clark Kent concept, whereas there are exceptions to the converse. This semantic analysis always validates the substitution of ‘Clark Kent’ for ‘Superman’, but validates the substitution of ‘Superman’ for ‘Clark Kent’ only if the additional condition is met that somebody should fall under the Superman concept when Clark Kent. (shrink)

A bare individual was conceived by Tichý as an individual such as if the property the individual instantiates is non-trivial , it is possible for the individual to lack it ; and for any trivial property that it cannot lack this kind of property. The exact readings of Tichý’s original formulations of are subjected to a detailed analysis to reveal that any of them is refutable by means of Cmorejian objection that there exist contingent properties which are partly essential . (...) To avoid such objection, the present paper attempts to rebuild Tichý’s definitions into viable ones. (shrink)

Carnap’s analysis of the language of science had presupposed too close a connection between the semantics and testability. The core problem of the logical empiricist tradition was to show how to provide the interpretation of theoretical terms and hence the explanation of their application to observable entities by means of observation terms. It is argued that the utilization of a much more expressive semantic theory which identifies meanings with hyperintensional entities leads to a clarification of the competencies of semantics and (...) methodology. It is claimed that the observability or unobservability of term’s referents does not determine the meaning of the term. Carnap’s reduction sentences are therefore conceived only as methodological devices for the determination of unobservables via the theory-presupposed observable aspects. (shrink)

A review of the Czech translation of Nelson Goodman's Languages of Art. I emphasize Goodman's move away from the issue of the definition of art, and the fruitfulness of the autographic/allographic distinction.

The beginning of this century hailed a new paradigm in linguistics, the paradigm brought about by de Saussure's Cours de Linguistique Genérále and subsequently elaborated by Jakobson, Hjelmslev and other linguists. It seemed that the linguistics of this century was destined to be structuralistic. However, half of the century later a brand new paradigm was introduced by Chomsky's Syntactic Structures followed by Montague's formalization of semantics. This new turn has brought linguistics surprisingly close to mathematics and logic, and has facilitated (...) a direct practical exploitation of linguistic theory by computer science. (shrink)

It is a truism that semantic concepts are relative to language. I distinguish two kinds of them in accordance to their relativity to language L; the relativity is either explicit , or implicit . If language is explicated, the concepts of the former kind can be easily explicated in a plausible way and we resist semantic paradoxes. In the case of the latter concepts, the explication is also accessible and paradox-free. One can find then new interesting facts concerning famous Tarski’s (...) theorem. (shrink)

Ontology of a Musical Work: Platonism vs. "Platonism".

The paper focuses on treating partiality within Tichý’s logical system. Tichý’s logic is two-valued and type-theoretic. His simple theory of types (and the deduction system for it) accepts both total and partial functions. Tichý’s late framework is explicitly ramified. So-called constructions (roughly: algorithms) construct, e.g., values of functions at arguments; in some cases, however, they do not construct anything at all. This special partiality phenomenon is discussed in the second part of the paper.

The paper describes the solution to semantic paradoxes pioneered by Pavel Tichý and further developed by the present author. Its main feature is an examination (and then refutation) of the hidden premise of paradoxes that the paradox-producing expression really means what it seems to mean. Semantic concepts are explicated as relative to language, thus also language is explicated. The so-called ‘explicit approach’ easily treats paradoxes in which language is explicitly referred to. The residual paradoxes are solved by the ‘implicit approach’ (...) which employs ideas made explicit by the former one. (shrink)