Switch to: References

Citations of:

"Ought" and Error

Christine Tiefensee

Journal of Philosophy 117 (2):96-114 (2020)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.

Do formal objections to the error theory overgeneralize?Bart Streumer & Daniel Wodak - 2023 - Analysis 83 (4):732-741.details We argued that formal objections to the error theory overgeneralize and therefore fail. Christine Tiefensee and Gregory Wheeler deny this. We argue that they are wrong, for two reasons. The first concerns how we should adjudicate conflicts between formal and substantive commitments. The second concerns an overlooked tension between formal objections and non-error-theoretic views. Our discussion shows that the commitments behind formal objections to the error theory, such as the dual schema, should be regarded as much more contentious than is (...) often assumed. (shrink) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
Why formal objections to the error theory are sound.Christine Tiefensee & Gregory Wheeler - 2022 - Analysis 82 (4):608-616.details Recent debate about the error theory has taken a ‘formal turn’. On the one hand, there are those who argue that the error theory should be rejected because of its difficulties in providing a convincing formal account of the logic and semantics of moral claims. On the other hand, there are those who claim that such formal objections fail, maintaining that arguments against the error theory must be of a substantive rather than a formal kind. In this paper, we argue (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
Defending the Kratzerian presuppositional error theory.Elliot Salinger - 2021 - Analysis 81 (4):701–709.details This paper provides a new solution to the problem of moral permissions for the moral error theory. The problem is that the error theorist seems committed to the claim that all actions are morally permitted, as well as to the contradictory claim that no action is morally permitted. My solution understands the moral error theory as the view that folk moral discourse is systematically in error by virtue of suffering from semantic presupposition failure, which I show is consistent with a (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
Error, Consistency and Triviality.Christine Tiefensee & Gregory Wheeler - 2022 - Noûs 56 (3):602-618.details In this paper, we present a new semantic challenge to the moral error theory. Its first component calls upon moral error theorists to deliver a deontic semantics that is consistent with the error-theoretic denial of moral truths by returning the truth-value false to all moral deontic sentences. We call this the ‘consistency challenge’ to the moral error theory. Its second component demands that error theorists explain in which way moral deontic assertions can be seen to differ in meaning despite necessarily (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
Why formal objections to the error theory fail.Bart Streumer & Daniel Wodak - 2021 - Analysis 81 (2):254-262.details Many philosophers argue that the error theory should be rejected because it is incompatible with standard deontic logic and semantics. We argue that such formal objections to the theory fail. Our discussion has two upshots. First, it increases the dialectical weight that must be borne by objections to the error theory that target its content rather than its form. Second, it shows that standard deontic logic and semantics should be revised. Download Export citation Bookmark 8 citations
On the Alleged Error of Formal Objections to Normative Error Theory.Jeremiah Joven Joaquin - 2023 - Manuscrito 46 (2):109-121.details According to Streumer and Wodak, a particular type of formal objection to normative error theory fails because it rests on a questionable assumption about the logical duality of the normative concepts of permissibility and impermissibility. In this discussion, we argue that there is an error in their indictment; as such, the formal objection to normative error theory might still prevail. Download Export citation Bookmark

1