When an agent suffers in their capacity as a knower, they are a victim of epistemic injustice. Varieties of epistemic injustices have been theorised. A salient feature across these theories is that perpetrators and victims of epistemic injustice belong to different social groups. In this paper, I argue for a form of epistemic injustice that could occur between members of the same social group. This is a form of epistemic injustice where the knower is first a victim of historical and (...) continuing oppression. Secondly, they internalise and appreciate the systems that harm them as a knower. This is possible because the victim subscribes to perniciously formed epistemic systems. This form of epistemic injustice is a valuable explanatory tool for non-standard and obscure instances of epistemic injustice where the victim a) accepts and appreciates the injustice they experience and b) is even the seeming perpetrator of the injustice against themselves. (shrink)

As a site of colonial conquest, sub-Saharan Africa has experienced colonialism’s historic and continuing harms. One of the aspects of this harm is epistemic. In the analytic philosophical tradition, this harm can partly be theorised in line with the literature on epistemic injustice, although it does not fit squarely. I show this by arguing for what can be understood as a colonial state’s specific manifestation of epistemic injustice. This manifestation takes into account the historical context of colonisation and the continuing (...) coloniality of sub-Saharan African countries. From this, I argue for an approach to remediating this epistemic injustice that relies on the fair-minded pursuit of knowledge. This approach, I briefly argue, gains valuable insights from African epistemological traditions and can be beneficial to other epistemic injustice instances that result specifically from historical cases of oppression. (shrink)

This essay unpacks several arguments about the metaphilosophic nature of African philosophy and charts a way through the problems these arguments encounter. It argues that we must be careful in our attempt to define African philosophy conceptually. Because to define it is to limit it—and to limit it is to conserve it and lead it to a cesspool. It also argues that finding a single meaning for African philosophy is not a rich endeavour, because, just like Western philosophy, African philosophy (...) should not be a thing but be a vast array of things. The argument, one hopes, is taken as a normative rather than a merely prescriptive enterprise. (shrink)

In typical instances of epistemic injustice, the victims and perpetrators are distinct across social groups – as marginally or dominantly situated. When epistemic injustice happens, the dominantly situated typically rely on prejudicial stereotypes to prevent the marginally situated from participating in epistemic activities. This is a manifestation/ exercise of their social power. However, with anonymity on the internet, a marginally situated person can effectively pose as a dominantly situated person and vice versa. When this happens, we cannot always tell who (...) is behind a post. Consequently, relying on differential power relations, as in typical cases of epistemic injustice, might be ineffective online. In this paper, I argue for three ways that anonymity might complicate instances of epistemic injustice online. (shrink)