When Bertrand Russell alerted Gottlob Frege to an inconsistency in his Grundgesetze, Frege relinquished deep commitments. When Edward Evans-Pritchard alerted the Azande to an inconsistency in their beliefs about witchcraft inheritance, they did not revise their beliefs. Nor did they engage in the defensive maneuvers depicted in Plato’s dialogues. Evans-Pritchard characterized their indifference to contradiction as irrational. My historical thesis is that the ensuing anthropological debate mirrors the debate about the sorites paradox. I favor a simple explanation of this parallelism: (...) Evans-Pritchard’s witchcraft inheritance argument is a sorites argument—albeit in a form masked by the different ontologies of the Azande and Evans-Pritchard. Evans-Pritchard failed to recognize his witchcraft inheritance argument as a sorites paradox because he was witchcraft nihilist in a community of witchcraft realists. My general conjecture is that many of the irrationalities that seem distinctive of alien cultures are actually paradoxes that are universal. The irrationality of the aliens is real and profound; it is just not distinctive of those aliens or their cultures. The universality of the irrationality helps to explain Evans-Pritchard’s surprising success at understanding the Azande. Since he shares their core irrationality, Evans-Pritchard could simulate Azande thinking. Although I am attributing an anthropological illusion to Evans-Pritchard, I think it is one that coheres nicely with his compelling account of Azande. I am a conservative follower of Evans-Pritchard, trying to debug his research programme. I endorse all of his central doctrines and I rely on his insights. (shrink)

When Bertrand Russell alerted Gottlob Frege to an inconsistency in his Grundgesetze, Frege relinquished deep commitments. When Edward Evans-Pritchard alerted the Azande to an inconsistency in their beliefs about witchcraft inheritance, they did not revise their beliefs. Nor did they engage in the defensive maneuvers depicted in Plato’s dialogues. Evans-Pritchard characterized their indifference to contradiction as irrational. My historical thesis is that the ensuing anthropological debate mirrors the debate about the sorites paradox. I favor a simple explanation of this parallelism: (...) Evans-Pritchard’s witchcraft inheritance argument is a sorites argument—albeit in a form masked by the different ontologies of the Azande and Evans-Pritchard. Evans-Pritchard failed to recognize his witchcraft inheritance argument as a sorites paradox because he was witchcraft nihilist in a community of witchcraft realists. My general conjecture is that many of the irrationalities that seem distinctive of alien cultures are actually paradoxes that are universal. The irrationality of the aliens is real and profound; it is just not distinctive of those aliens or their cultures. The universality of the irrationality helps to explain Evans-Pritchard’s surprising success at understanding the Azande. Since he shares their core irrationality, Evans-Pritchard could simulate Azande thinking. Although I am attributing an anthropological illusion to Evans-Pritchard, I think it is one that coheres nicely with his compelling account of Azande. I am a conservative follower of Evans-Pritchard, trying to debug his research programme. I endorse all of his central doctrines and I rely on his insights. (shrink)

The recent republication of David Bloor's Knowledge and Social Imagery in a second edition provides an occasion to reappraise the celebrated work which launched the so-called Strong Programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge. This work embodies the general outlook and foundational principles in a way that is still characteristic of its descendents. Above all, the recent republication of Bloor's original book is evidence of the continuing interest and importance of the work, but it also provides the clearest evidence of (...) the shortcomings of the enterprise. The arguments presented in the bulk of the book have received relatively little attention by comparison with the principal tenets enunciated in the first few pages. Accordingly, a detailed examination is made of these original arguments which were so influential in establishing the sociology of scientific knowledge. A close analysis reveals their seemingly unnoticed vacuity, as well as a vast discrepancy between the radical tenets of the Strong Programme and the theses that are actually defended in the body of Bloor's text. In this sense, this article serves to complement and reinforce Mario Bunge's recent masterful survey of the field, which he describes as "a grotesque cartoon of scientific research.". (shrink)

The recent republication of David Bloor's Knowledge and Social Imagery in a second edition provides an occasion to reappraise the celebrated work which launched the so-called Strong Programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge. This work embodies the general outlook and foundational principles in a way that is still characteristic of its descendents. Above all, the recent republication of Bloor's original book is evidence of the continuing interest and importance of the work, but it also provides the clearest evidence of (...) the shortcomings of the enterprise. The arguments presented in the bulk of the book have received relatively little attention by comparison with the principal tenets enunciated in the first few pages. Accordingly, a detailed examination is made of these original arguments which were so influential in establishing the sociology of scientific knowledge. A close analysis reveals their seemingly unnoticed vacuity, as well as a vast discrepancy between the radical tenets of the Strong Programme and the theses that are actually defended in the body of Bloor's text. In this sense, this article serves to complement and reinforce Mario Bunge's recent masterful survey of the field, which he describes as "a grotesque cartoon of scientific research.". (shrink)

The issue of what consequences to draw from the existence of non-classical logical systems has been the subject of an interesting debate across a diversity of fields. In this paper the matter of alternative logics is considered with reference to a specific belief system and its propositions :the Azande are said to maintain beliefs about witchcraft which, when expressed propositionally, appear to be inconsistent. When the Azande have been presented with such inconsistencies, they either fail to see them as such (...) or else accept them as non-problematical. Is our knowledge of logical truths a relative and culturally determined phenomenon, or is there some (transcendent) criterion that allows us to adjudicate between alternative logical systems? The authors propose an approach for resolving disputes about the status of Azande reasoning which assumes a paraconsistent framework, thus providing a new perspective on this debate. (shrink)

Carole Pearce's argument against African philosophy is founded on a set of factual flaws and the fallacious assumption that African philosophy is equivalent to ethnophilosophy, which she defines as a form of intellectual apartheid founded on irrational belief systems. I argue that African philosophy is in no way qualitatively different from, say, French or Chinese philosophy, and that ethnophilosophy is merely one aspect of it But ethnophilosophy could play the important role of critically evaluating African ethnic belief systems and the (...) interpretation of such by Western anthropologists. In general, African philoso phy is nothing more than the philosophical research (of whatever order) carried out by African philosophers in the context of African research paradigms. (shrink)

Zande Logic and Western Logic’ Richard Jennings argues that contrary to the view of Evans-Pritchard and Tim Triplett the system of logic employed by the Azande is sui generis and distinct from that of Westerners. I argue that this thesis is erroneous because Jennings, following Evans-Pritchard, is at fault in his analysis of the logic of the Azande. Zande thinking on the topic of witchcraft-substance heritability is not contradictory as believed. But even if one assumes that the Azande do reason (...) contradictorily on matters of institutional importance, Jennings' thesis on the possibility of incompatible logics still fails because similar instances of contradictory thinking could be found in the West. Although in practical matters all peoples appeal to orthodox logic, in matters of institutional importance the epistemological relativist could be on fertile ground where orthodox logic is in conflict with beliefs that are institutionally grounded. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss logic from a naturalist point of view, characterizing it as those shared patterns of thought which are socially selected from among the various patterns of thought to which we are naturally inclined. Drawing on Evans-Pritchard's anthropology. I discuss a particular example of Zande thought. I argue that Evans-Pritchard's and Timm Triplett's analyses of this example make the mistake of applying Western logic to Zande beliefs and thus find a contradiction. I argue that from the naturalistic (...) point of view. Zande logic is different from Western logic and that there is no contradiction in Zande thought. (shrink)

Em Science and Partial Truth (da Costa and French 2003) argumentamos que inconsistências no raciocínio científico podem ser acomodadas pela combinação de estruturas parciais e quase-verdade, junto com uma noção de ‘crença representacional’. Neste artigo, examino se isso pode ser estendido aos raciocínios e crenças de outras culturas, focando em particular nas crenças de feitiçaria dos Azande. Argumento que tais crenças são similares às crenças teóricas da ciência ocidental, mas que o modo mais apropriado de representar esta última — e (...) portanto também a primeira — é através de estruturas parciais e quase-verdade. Dessa maneira, espero encontrar um caminho plausível entre as abordagens ‘imperialista’ e ‘relativista’. DOI: 10.5007/1808-1711.2011v15n1p77. (shrink)

In recent analytic philosophy, there is a growing interest in the project of conceptual engineering. This paper examines two ways this project might be applied to scientific research, specifically anthropological research. It argues that both of them are harmful to this research. Specifically, it argues that a reliance on the axiological standards of analytic philosophy conflicts with the goal of empirical adequacy. Section one proffers two forms that the engineering project might take when applied to the science. Section two proffers (...) a case study drawn from anthropology. Specifically, it lays out Evans-Pritchard’s Witchcraft, Oracles, and Magic Among the Azande, paying particular attention to the inconsistency he discovered in Azande witchcraft. Sections three and four argue that attempting to remove this inconsistency via the two forms of engineering disable critical features of emic research and discard empirical findings. Finally, I close by noting how the conflict between axiological standards and empirical adequacy might generalize beyond anthropology. (shrink)

The relevance of any logical analysis lies in its ability to solve paradoxes and trace conceptual troubles back; with this respect, the task of epistemic logic is to handle paradoxes in connection with the concept of knowledge. Epistemic logic is currently introduced as the logical analysis of crucial concepts within epistemology, namely: knowledge, belief, truth, and justification. An alternative approach will be advanced here in order to enlighten such a discourse, as centred upon the word assertion and displayed in terms (...) of utterance. Insofar as epistemic modalities express some attitudes, the intentionality of discourse will be emphasized within an illocutionary modal logic. Two large views will range over the whole study: declarative and epistemic sentences have one and the same logic (assertion logic); the plurality of languages games doesn’t entail any logical pluralism. -/- La valeur d'une analyse logique réside dans sa capacité à résoudre des paradoxes et à comprendre l'origine de nos problèmes conceptuels ; à ce titre, le rôle d'une logique épistémique est de traiter des paradoxes liés au concept de connaissance. On présente généralement la logique épistémique comme une analyse logique de concepts centraux en épistémologie : connaissance, croyance, vérité, justification. Une autre approche sera proposée ici en vue de clarifier ce genre de discours, centrée sur la notion d'assertion et décrite en termes d'énonciation. Parce que les modalités épistémiques expriment des attitudes, c'est l'intentionnalité du discours qui sera mise en valeur dans le cadre d'une logique modale illocutoire. Deux thèses transversales parcourront l'ensemble du travail : les énoncés déclaratifs et épistémiques partagent la même logique (logique assertorique) ; la pluralité des jeux de langages n'implique pas un pluralisme logique. (shrink)