This paper studies, by way of an example, the intuitionistic propositional connective * defined in the language of second order propositional logic by. In full topological models * is not generally definable, but over Cantor-space and the reals it can be classically shown that; on the other hand, this is false constructively, i.e. a contradiction with Church's thesis is obtained. This is comparable with some well-known results on the completeness of intuitionistic first-order predicate logic.Over [0, 1], the operator * is (...) (constructively and classically) undefinable. We show how to recast this argument in terms of intuitive intuitionistic validity in some parameter. The undefinability argument essentially uses the connectedness of [0, 1]; most of the work of recasting consists in the choice of a suitable intuitionistically meaningful parameter, so as to imitate the effect of connectedness. (shrink)

In the author's Relative lawlessness in intuitionistic analysis [this JOURNAL. vol. 52 (1987). pp. 68-88] and An intuitionistic theory of lawlike, choice and lawless sequences [Logic Colloquium '90. Springer-Verlag. Berlin. 1993. pp. 191-209] a notion of lawless ness relative to a countable information base was developed for classical and intuitionistic analysis. Here we simplify the predictability property characterizing relatively lawless sequences and derive it from the new axiom of closed data (classically equivalent to open data) together with a natural principle (...) of invariance under finite translation. We characterize relative lawlessness in terms of a notion of forcing. Finally, we study relative lawlessness on an arbitrary fan and show that the collection of lawless binary sequences (which is comeager in the sense of Baire) has probability measure zero. The reasoning is predominantly constructive. (shrink)

This paper studies, by way of an example, the intuitionistic propositional connective * defined in the language of second order propositional logic by * ≡ ∃Q. In full topological models * is not generally definable but over Cantor-space and the reals it can be classically shown that *↔ ⅂⅂P; on the other hand, this is false constructively, i.e. a contradiction with Church's thesis is obtained. This is comparable with some well-known results on the completeness of intuitionistic first-order predicate logic. Over (...) [0, 1], the operator * is undefinable. We show how to recast this argument in terms of intuitive intuitionistic validity in some parameter. The undefinability argument essentially uses the connectedness of [0, 1]; most of the work of recasting consists in the choice of a suitable intuitionistically meaningful parameter, so as to imitate the effect of connectedness. Parameters of the required kind can be obtained as so-called projections of lawless sequences. (shrink)

There are two principles that lend Brouwer's mathematics the extra power beyond arithmetic. Both are presented in Brouwer's writings with little or no argument. One, the principle of bar induction, will not concern us here. The other, the continuity principle for numbers, occurs for the first time in print in [4]. It is formulated and immediately applied to show that the set of numerical choice sequences is not enumerable. In fact, the idea of the continuity property can be dated fairly (...) precisely, it is to be found in the margin of Brouwer's notes for his course on Pointset Theory of 1915/16. The course was repeated in 1916/17 and he must have inserted his first formulation of the continuity principle in the fall of 1916 as new material right at the beginning of the course.In modern language, the principle readswhere α and β range over choice sequences of natural numbers, m and x over natural numbers, and stands for ⟨α, α, …, α⟩, the initial segment of α of length m.An immediate consequence of WC-N is that all full functions are continuous, and, as a corollary, that the continuum is unsplittable [28]. Note that WC-N is incompatible with Church's thesis, [22], section 4.6.After Brouwer asserted WC-N, Troelstra was the first to ask in print for a conceptual motivation, but he remained an exception; most authors followed Brouwer by simply asserting it, cf. [18].Let us note first that in one particular case the principle is obvious indeed, namely in the case of the lawless sequences. The notion of lawless sequence surfaced fairly late in the history of intuitionism. Kreisel introduced it in [17] for metamathematical purposes. There is a letter from Brouwer to Heyting in which the phenomenon also occurs [7]. This is an important and interesting fact since it is the only time that Brouwer made use of a possibility expressly stipulated in, e.g., [5], see below. (shrink)

Kripke recently suggested viewing the intuitionistic continuum as an expansion in time of a definite classical continuum. We prove the classical consistency of a three-sorted intuitionistic formal system IC, simultaneously extending Kleene’s intuitionistic analysis I and a negative copy C° of the classically correct part of I, with an “end of time” axiom ET asserting that no choice sequence can be guaranteed not to be pointwise equal to a definite sequence. “Not every sequence is pointwise equal to a definite sequence” (...) is independent of IC. The proofs are by Crealizability interpretations based on classical ω-models ${\cal M}$ = $\left$ of C°. (shrink)

We show that various fragments of the intuitionistic/constructive theory of the reals are decidable.