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Belief versus acceptance

Philosophical Explorations 3 (2):122 – 137 (2000)

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  1. Democracia deliberativa y justificación mutua.Mariano Garreta Leclercq - 2009 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 34 (2):5-27.
    The requirement of mutual justification (MJ) is one or the fundamental ideas shared by some of the most influential deliberative theories of democracy. The aim of the present paper is to defend the plausibility of MJ against two possible objections. The first one states that MJ involves the commitment to a controversial conception of the notion of justification, which is incompatible with what is commonly understood by the epistemic justification of a belief. The second objection claims that satisfying MJ undermines (...)
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  • On the Dynamics of Institutional Agreements.Andreas Herzig, Tiago de Lima & Emiliano Lorini - 2009 - Synthese 171 (2):321 - 355.
    In this paper we investigate a logic for modelling individual and collective acceptances that is called acceptance logic. The logic has formulae of the form $A_{Gx} \phi $ reading 'if the agents in the set of agents G identify themselves with institution x then they together accept that φ'. We extend acceptance logic by two kinds of dynamic modal operators. The first kind are public announcements of the form x!ψ, meaning that the agents learn that ψ is the case in (...)
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  • Thinking is Believing.Eric Mandelbaum - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):55-96.
    Inquiry, Volume 57, Issue 1, Page 55-96, February 2014.
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  • Criteria of success for engineering accident investigations: a question-centered account.Wang Yafeng - 2024 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 14 (16):1-30.
    Engineering accident investigations are systematic inquiries into the facts and causes of engineering accidents. The aims of an engineering accident investigation include identifying significant truths about an accident, learning lessons to prevent similar future accidents, and authoritatively communicating the investigative results to the stakeholders. An important normative dimension along which an engineering accident investigation can be evaluated is its degree of success in fulfilling these aims. In this paper, I propose criteria for evaluating the degree of success of an engineering (...)
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  • The epistemic features of group belief.Kay Mathiesen - 2006 - Episteme 2 (3):161-175.
    Recently, there has been a debate focusing on the question of whether groups can literally have beliefs. For the purposes of epistemology, however, the key question is whether groups can have knowledge. More specifi cally, the question is whether “group views” can have the key epistemic features of belief, viz., aiming at truth and being epistemically rational. I argue that, while groups may not have beliefs in the full sense of the word, group views can have these key epistemic features (...)
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  • Belief, Knowledge and Practical Matters.Jie Gao - 2024 - Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press.
    This book takes purism about knowledge as the default position and defends it from the challenges of pragmatic encroachment. The book is divided into two parts, a negative and a positive one. The negative part critically examines existing purist strategies in response to pragmatic encroachment. The positive part provides a new theory of how practical factors can systematically influence our confidence and explores some implications of such influence.
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  • ARGO: Arguments Ontology.John Beverley, Neil Otte, Francesco Franda, Brian Donohue, Alan Ruttenberg, Jean-Baptiste Guillion & Yonatan Schreiber - manuscript
    Although the last decade has seen a proliferation of ontological approaches to arguments, many of them employ ad hoc solutions to representing arguments, lack interoperability with other ontologies, or cover arguments only as part of a broader approach to evidence. To provide a better ontological representation of arguments, we present the Arguments Ontology (ArgO), a small ontology for arguments that is designed to be imported and easily extended by researchers who work in different upper-level ontology frameworks, different logics, and different (...)
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  • Degrees of Acceptance.Alexander Dinges - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly (3):578-594.
    While many authors distinguish belief from acceptance, it seems almost universally agreed that no similar distinction can be drawn between degrees of belief, or credences, and degrees of acceptance. I challenge this assumption in this paper. Acceptance comes in degrees and acknowledging this helps to resolve problems in at least two philosophical domains. Degrees of acceptance play vital roles when we simplify our reasoning, and they ground the common ground of a conversation if we assume context probabilism, i.e., that the (...)
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  • Collective Epistemic Luck.Moisés Barba & Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2021 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):99-119.
    A platitude in epistemology is that an individual’s belief does not qualify as knowledge if it is true by luck. Individuals, however, are not the only bearers of knowledge. Many epistemologists agree that groups can also possess knowledge in a way that is genuinely collective. If groups can know, it is natural to think that, just as true individual beliefs fall short of knowledge due to individual epistemic luck, true collective beliefs may fall short of knowledge because of collective epistemic (...)
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  • Can groups be genuine believers? The argument from interpretationism.Marvin Backes - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):10311-10329.
    In ordinary discourse we often attribute beliefs not just to individuals but also to groups. But can groups really have genuine beliefs? This paper considers but ultimately rejects one of the main arguments in support of the claim that groups can be genuine believers – the Argument From Interpretationism – and concludes that we have good reasons to be sceptical about the existence of group beliefs. According to the Argument From Interpretationism, roughly speaking, groups qualify as genuine believers because we (...)
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  • Deliberación moral, creencia y aceptación.Mariano Garreta Leclercq - 2018 - Análisis Filosófico 38 (1):5-32.
    La meta del presente artículo es probar que existen contextos de acción en los que tiene lugar una escisión entre el conocimiento moral de los sujetos y la justificación, también moral, de sus acciones. Para que ello ocurra, según sostendremos, deben darse al menos dos condiciones: el costo de actuar sobre la base de creencias falsas debe ser muy elevado para el bienestar de los afectados y la probabilidad de que tal resultado se produzca efectivamente, aunque baja, debe ser significativa (...)
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  • Modal Empiricism Made Difficult: An Essay in the Meta-Epistemology of Modality.Ylwa Sjölin Wirling - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Gothenburg
    Philosophers have always taken an interest not only in what is actually the case, but in what is necessarily the case and what could possibly be the case. These are questions of modality. Epistemologists of modality enquire into how we can know what is necessary and what is possible. This dissertation concerns the meta-epistemology of modality. It engages with the rules that govern construction and evaluation of theories in the epistemology of modality, by using modal empiricism – a form of (...)
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  • On the rationality of positive mysterianism.James N. Anderson - 2018 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 83 (3):291-307.
    In Paradox in Christian Theology I argued that the Christian doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation are paradoxical—that is, they appear to involve implicit contradictions—yet Christians can still be rational in affirming and believing those doctrines. Dale Tuggy has characterized my theory of theological paradox as a form of “positive mysterianism” and argues that the theory “faces steep epistemic problems, and is at best a temporarily reasonable but ultimately unsustainable stance.” After summarizing my proposed model for the rational affirmation (...)
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  • Delusions, Acceptances, and Cognitive Feelings.Richard Dub - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):27-60.
    Psychopathological delusions have a number of features that are curiously difficult to explain. Delusions are resistant to counterevidence and impervious to counterargument. Delusions are theoretically, affectively, and behaviorally circumscribed: delusional individuals often do not act on their delusions and often do not update beliefs on the basis of their delusions. Delusional individuals are occasionally able to distinguish their delusions from other beliefs, sometimes speaking of their “delusional reality.” To explain these features, I offer a model according to which, contrary to (...)
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  • Fallibilism, Verisimilitude, and the Preface Paradox.Gustavo Cevolani - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (1):169-183.
    The Preface Paradox apparently shows that it is sometimes rational to believe logically incompatible propositions. In this paper, I propose a way out of the paradox based on the ideas of fallibilism and verisimilitude. More precisely, I defend the view that a rational inquirer can fallibly believe or accept a proposition which is false, or likely false, but verisimilar; and I argue that this view makes the Preface Paradox disappear. Some possible objections to my proposal, and an alternative view of (...)
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  • Rational Action without Knowledge (and vice versa).Jie Gao - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6):1901-1917.
    It has been argued recently that knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning. This norm can be formulated as a bi-conditional: it is appropriate to treat p as a reason for acting if and only if you know that p. Other proposals replace knowledge with warranted or justified belief. This paper gives counter-examples of both directions of any such bi-conditional. To the left-to-right direction: scientists can appropriately treat as reasons for action propositions of a theory they believe to be false (...)
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  • Social Objects Without Intentions.Brian Epstein - 2013 - In Anita Konzelmann Ziv & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 53-68.
    It is often seen as a truism that social objects and facts are the product of human intentions. I argue that the role of intentions in social ontology is commonly overestimated. I introduce a distinction that is implicit in much discussion of social ontology, but is often overlooked: between a social entity’s “grounds” and its “anchors.” For both, I argue that intentions, either individual or collective, are less essential than many theorists have assumed. Instead, I propose a more worldly – (...)
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  • Theory Selection in Modal Epistemology.Robert William Fischer - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (4):381-395.
    Accounts of modal knowledge are many and varied. How should we choose between them? I propose that we employ inference to the best explanation, and I suggest that there are three desiderata that we should use to rank hypotheses: conservatism, simplicity, and the ability to handle disagreement. After examining these desiderata, I contend that they can’t be used to justify belief in the modal epistemology that fares best, but that they can justify our accepting it in an epistemically significant sense. (...)
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  • Introduction to special issue of social epistemology on "collective knowledge and collective knowers".Kay Mathiesen - 2007 - Social Epistemology 21 (3):209 – 216.
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  • On the possibility of group knowledge without belief.Raul Hakli - 2007 - Social Epistemology 21 (3):249 – 266.
    Endorsing the idea of group knowledge seems to entail the possibility of group belief as well, because it is usually held that knowledge entails belief. It is here studied whether it would be possible to grant that groups can have knowledge without being committed to the controversial view that groups can have beliefs. The answer is positive on the assumption that knowledge can be based on acceptance as well as belief. The distinction between belief and acceptance can be seen as (...)
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  • La perspectiva de la segunda persona: ¿comprensión o interpretación?Ángeles Eraña - forthcoming - Critica:71-91.
    Diana I. Pérez y Antoni Gomila, Social Cognition and the Second Person in Human Interaction, Routledge, Nueva York, 2022, 194pp., ISBN 978–0–367–67859–3 (hbk); ISBN 978–0–367–67857–9 (pbk); ISBN 978–1–003–13315–5 (ebk).
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  • Consciousness, belief, and the group mind hypothesis.Søren Overgaard & Alessandro Salice - 2019 - Synthese 198 (2):1-25.
    According to the Group Mind Hypothesis, a group can have beliefs over and above the beliefs of the individual members of the group. Some maintain that there can be group mentality of this kind in the absence of any group-level phenomenal consciousness. We present a challenge to the latter view. First, we argue that a state is not a belief unless the owner of the state is disposed to access the state’s content in a corresponding conscious judgment. Thus, if there (...)
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  • (1 other version)Market epistemology.Michael Thicke - 2018 - Synthese 195 (12):5571-5594.
    According to Margaret Gilbert’s collective epistemology, we should take attributions of beliefs to groups seriously, rather than metaphorically or as reducible to individual belief. I argue that, similarly, attributions of belief to markets ought to be taken seriously and not merely as reports of the average beliefs of market participants. While many of Gilbert’s purported examples of group belief are better thought of as instances of acceptance, some collectives, such as courts and markets, genuinely believe. Such collectives enact truth-aimed processes (...)
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  • A pragmatic, existentialist approach to the scientific realism debate.Curtis Forbes - 2017 - Synthese 194 (9):3327-3346.
    It has become apparent that the debate between scientific realists and constructive empiricists has come to a stalemate. Neither view can reasonably claim to be the most rational philosophy of science, exclusively capable of making sense of all scientific activities. On one prominent analysis of the situation, whether we accept a realist or an anti-realist account of science actually seems to depend on which values we antecedently accept, rather than our commitment to “rationality” per se. Accordingly, several philosophers have attempted (...)
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  • In search of the best explanation about the nature of the gene: Avery on pneumococcal transformation.Eleonora Cresto - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 39 (1):65-79.
    In this paper I present a model of rational belief change, and I show how to use it to obtain a better insight into the debate about the nature of pneumococcal transformation, genes and DNA that took place in the forties, as a result of Oswald T. Avery’s work. The model offers a particular elaboration of the concept of inference to the best explanation, along decision theoretic lines. Within this framework, I distinguish different senses in which Avery’s team can be (...)
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  • Trust and the doxastic family.Pascal Engel - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (1):17-26.
    This article examines Keith Lehrer's distinction between belief and acceptance and how it differs from other accounts of belief and of the family of doxastic attitudes. I sketch a different taxonomy of doxastic attitudes. Lehrer's notion of acceptance is mostly epistemic and at the service of his account of the "loop of reason", whereas for other writers acceptance is mostly a pragmatic attitude. I argue, however, that his account of acceptance underdetermines the role that the attitude of trust plays in (...)
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  • Strange beliefs: essays on delusion formation.Federico Bongiorno Dr - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Birmingham
    This thesis is set out as a collection of self-standing essays. Throughout these essays, I try to illuminate a number of controversies surrounding the way in which delusions are formed, and relatedly, their nature and epistemic standing. In Chapter 2, after an introductory chapter, I flesh out a new ‘endorsement’ approach to the Capgras delusion, the main idea being that the delusion is formed by endorsing the content of a metaphorical-perceptual state in which a loved one is represented metaphorically as (...)
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  • Structure and Agency: An Analysis of the Impact of Structure on Group Agents.Elizabeth Kaye Victor - unknown
    Different kinds of collectives help to coordinate between individuals and social groups to solve distribution problems, supply goods and services, and enable individuals to live fulfilling lives. Collectives, as part of the process of socialization, contribute to the normalization of behaviors, and consequently, structure our ability to be self-reflective autonomous agents. Contemporary philosophy of action models characterize collective action as the product of individuals who have the proper motivations to perform cooperative activities (bottom-up); or they begin with the social-level phenomena (...)
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  • Group (epistemic) competence.Dani Pino - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):11377-11396.
    In this paper, I present an account of group competence that is explicitly framed for cases of epistemic performances. According to it, we must consider group epistemic competence as the group agents’ capacity to produce knowledge, and not the result of the summation of its individual members’ competences to produce knowledge. Additionally, I contend that group competence must be understood in terms of group normative status. To introduce my view, I present Jesper Kallestrup’s denial that group competence involves anything over (...)
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  • A dialogue model of belief.Douglas Walton - 2010 - Argument and Computation 1 (1):23-46.
    This paper offers a new model of belief by embedding the Peircean account of belief into a formal dialogue system that uses argumentation schemes for practical reasoning and abductive reasoning. A belief is characterised as a stable proposition that is derived abductively by one agent in a dialogue from the commitment set (including commitments derived from actions and goals) of another agent. On the model (to give a rough summary), a belief is defined as a proposition held by an agent (...)
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  • Belief and contextual acceptance.Eleonora Cresto - 2010 - Synthese 177 (1):41-66.
    I develop a strategy for representing epistemic states and epistemic changes that seeks to be sensitive to the difference between voluntary and involuntary aspects of our epistemic life, as well as to the role of pragmatic factors in epistemology. The model relies on a particular understanding of the distinction between full belief and acceptance , which makes room for the idea that our reasoning on both practical and theoretical matters typically proceeds in a contextual way. Within this framework, I discuss (...)
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  • Group knowledge analyzed.Raimo Tuomela - 2004 - Episteme 1 (2):109-127.
    The main task of the present paper is to investigate the nature of collective knowledge and discuss what kind of justificatory aspects are involved in it to discuss it from collective belief. The central kind of collective knowledge investigated is normatively binding knowledge attributed to a social group. A distinction is made between natural knowledge and constitutive knowledge related to social (especially institutional) matters. In the case of the latter kind of knowledge, in contrast to the former kind, justification and (...)
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  • Membership and Knowledge. Scientific Research as a Group Activity.Silvia Tossut - 2014 - Episteme 11 (3):349-367.
    Much scientific research is characterized by a high degree of multidisciplinarity and interdependence between the experts. In these cases research may be described as a group activity, and as such analysed in terms of the intentions of the participants. In this paper I apply Bratman's notion of shared intentionality to explain the relations between social and epistemic elements in groups with a truth-oriented common goal. I argue that in truth-oriented activities the disposition to help – which is a constitutive part (...)
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  • Against Cognitivism About Supposition.Margherita Arcangeli - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (3):607-624.
    A popular view maintains that supposition is a kind of cognitive mental state, very similar to belief in essential respects. Call this view “cognitivism about supposition”. There are at least three grades of cognitivism, construing supposition as (i) a belief, (ii) belief-like imagination or (iii) a species of belief-like imagination. I shall argue against all three grades of cognitivism and claim that supposition is a sui generis form of imagination essentially dissimilar to belief. Since for good reasons (i) is not (...)
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  • The epistemology of scientific evidence.Douglas Walton & Nanning Zhang - 2013 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 21 (2):173-219.
    In place of the traditional epistemological view of knowledge as justified true belief we argue that artificial intelligence and law needs an evidence-based epistemology according to which scientific knowledge is based on critical analysis of evidence using argumentation. This new epistemology of scientific evidence (ESE) models scientific knowledge as achieved through a process of marshaling evidence in a scientific inquiry that results in a convergence of scientific theories and research results. We show how a dialogue interface of argument from expert (...)
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  • On the principle of intention agglomeration.Jing Zhu - 2010 - Synthese 175 (1):89 - 99.
    In this article, I first elaborate and refine the Principle of Intention Agglomeration (PIA), which was introduced by Michael Bratman as “a natural constraint on intention”. According to the PIA, the intentions of a rational agent should be agglomerative. The proposed refinement of the PIA is not only in accordance with the spirit of Bratman’s planning theory of intention as well as consistency constraints for intentions rooted in the theory, but also reveals some deep rationales of practical rationality regarding resource-limited (...)
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  • Acceptance and Managerial Doxastic Agency.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2022 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 99 (3):359-378.
    Managerial doxastic agency is one species of indirect doxastic agency. In this article, the author builds on some earlier work and sketches an account of managerial doxastic agency. In particular, he argues that fairly robust doxastic agency can be exercised by performing metamental actions of non-doxastically accepting propositions as true as part of a general strategy involving various means of mental control. That the sort of control counts as a form of internal control and, hence, as a form of genuine (...)
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  • (1 other version)Market epistemology.Michael Thicke - 2017 - Synthese:1-24.
    According to Margaret Gilbert’s collective epistemology, we should take attributions of beliefs to groups seriously, rather than metaphorically or as reducible to individual belief. I argue that, similarly, attributions of belief to markets ought to be taken seriously and not merely as reports of the average beliefs of market participants. While many of Gilbert’s purported examples of group belief are better thought of as instances of acceptance, some collectives, such as courts and markets, genuinely believe. Such collectives enact truth-aimed processes (...)
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  • How to share a mind: Reconsidering the group mind thesis.Thomas Szanto - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):99-120.
    Standard accounts in social ontology and the group cognition debate have typically focused on how collective modes, types, and contents of intentions or representational states must be construed so as to constitute the jointness of the respective agents, cognizers, and their engagements. However, if we take intentions, beliefs, or mental representations all to instantiate some mental properties, then the more basic issue regarding such collective engagements is what it is for groups of individual minds to share a mind. Somewhat surprisingly, (...)
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  • Legality policies and theories of legality: From bananas to radbruch's formula.Giovanni Sartor - 2009 - Ratio Juris 22 (2):218-243.
    Abstract. In this paper I shall take an inferential approach to legality (legal validity), and consider how the legality of a norm can be inferred, and what can be inferred from it. In particular, I shall analyse legality policies, namely, conditionals conferring the quality of legality upon norms having certain properties, and I shall examine to what extent such conditionals need to be positivistic, so that legality is only dependant on social facts. Finally, I shall consider how legality is transmitted (...)
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  • Arguing on the Toulmin Model: New Essays in Argument Analysis and Evaluation.David Hitchcock & Bart Verheij (eds.) - 2006 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.
    In The Uses of Argument, Stephen Toulmin proposed a model for the layout of arguments: claim, data, warrant, qualifier, rebuttal, backing. Since then, Toulmin’s model has been appropriated, adapted and extended by researchers in speech communications, philosophy and artificial intelligence. This book assembles the best contemporary reflection in these fields, extending or challenging Toulmin’s ideas in ways that make fresh contributions to the theory of analysing and evaluating arguments.
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  • The Conditions of Collectivity: Joint Commitment and the Shared Norms of Membership.Titus Stahl - 2013 - In Anita Konzelmann Ziv & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 229-244.
    Collective intentionality is one of the most fundamental notions in social ontology. However, it is often thought to refer to a capacity which does not presuppose the existence of any other social facts. This chapter critically examines this view from the perspective of one specific theory of collective intentionality, the theory of Margaret Gilbert. On the basis of Gilbert’s arguments, the chapter claims that collective intentionality is a highly contingent achievement of complex social practices and, thus, not a basic social (...)
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