- Attitude, Inference, Association: On the Propositional Structure of Implicit Bias.Eric Mandelbaum - 2015 - Noûs 50 (3):629-658.details
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The Border Between Seeing and Thinking, by Ned Block.Eric Mandelbaum - forthcoming - Mind.details
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Troubles with Bayesianism: An introduction to the psychological immune system.Eric Mandelbaum - 2018 - Mind and Language 34 (2):141-157.details
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Against dispositionalism: belief in cognitive science.Jake Quilty-Dunn & Eric Mandelbaum - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2353-2372.details
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If You Can't Change What You Believe, You Don't Believe It.Grace Helton - 2020 - Noûs 54 (3):501-526.details
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Seeing and Conceptualizing: Modularity and the Shallow Contents of Perception.Eric Mandelbaum - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):267-283.details
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No-Platforming and Higher-Order Evidence, or Anti-Anti-No-Platforming.Neil Levy - 2019 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (4):487-502.details
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The Fragmentation of Belief.Joseph Bendana & Eric Mandelbaum - 2021 - In Cristina Borgoni, Dirk Kindermann & Andrea Onofri (eds.), The Fragmented Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)The science of belief: A progress report.Nicolas Porot & Eric Mandelbaum - 2020 - WIREs Cognitive Science 1.details
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Implicit bias.Michael Brownstein - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Recent Issues in High-Level Perception.Grace Helton - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (12):851-862.details
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Everything and More: The Prospects of Whole Brain Emulation.Eric Mandelbaum - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy 119 (8):444-459.details
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Visually Perceiving the Intentions of Others.Grace Helton - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (271):243-264.details
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Experience, Seemings, and Evidence.Indrek Reiland - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):510-534.details
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Is there an empirical case for semantic perception?Steven Gross - 2024 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 67 (10):3770-3795.details
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Bad beliefs: automaticity, arationality, and intervention.Stephen Gadsby - 2023 - Philosophical Psychology 36 (4):778-791.details
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Exploring by Believing.Sara Aronowitz - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (3):339-383.details
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Epistemic obligations and free speech.Boyd Millar - 2024 - Analytic Philosophy 65 (2):203-222.details
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Subjective Probability as Sampling Propensity.Thomas Icard - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4):863-903.details
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Beliefs as inner causes: the (lack of) evidence.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (6):850-877.details
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Doing without believing: Intellectualism, knowledge-how, and belief-attribution.Michael Brownstein & Eliot Michaelson - 2016 - Synthese 193 (9):2815–2836.details
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The language-of-thought hypothesis as a working hypothesis in cognitive science.Jake Quilty-Dunn, Nicolas Porot & Eric Mandelbaum - 2023 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 46:e292.details
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What we can (and can’t) infer about implicit bias from debiasing experiments.Nick Byrd - 2019 - Synthese (2):1-29.details
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Belief’s minimal rationality.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3263-3282.details
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Belief revision in psychotherapy.J. P. Grodniewicz - 2024 - Synthese 203 (4):1-22.details
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The Powers that bind : doxastic voluntarism and epistemic obligation.Neil Levy & Eric Mandelbaum - 2014 - In Rico Vitz & Jonathan Matheson (eds.), The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 12-33.details
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Implicit attitudes and awareness.Jacob Berger - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):1291-1312.details
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Believing in Perceiving: Known Illusions and the Classical Dual‐Component Theory.Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):550-575.details
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Unconscious perceptual justification.Jacob Berger, Bence Nanay & Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (5):569-589.details
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The Information Environment and Blameworthy Beliefs.Boyd Millar - 2019 - Social Epistemology 33 (6):525-537.details
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Illocutionary Frustration.Samia Hesni - 2018 - Mind 127 (508):947-976.details
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Biased by our imaginings.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2018 - Mind and Language 34 (5):627-647.details
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What's Wrong With Testimony? Defending the Epistemic Analogy between Testimony and Perception.Peter Graham - 2025 - In Jennifer Lackey & Aidan McGlynn (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Bad Language Makes Good Politics.Adam F. Gibbons - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Out of habit.Santiago Amaya - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11161-11185.details
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Disagreement with a bald‐faced liar.Teresa Marques - 2020 - Ratio 33 (4):255-268.details
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Testimonial injustice and prescriptive credibility deficits.Wade Munroe - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (6):924-947.details
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Understanding a communicated thought.J. Adam Carter, Emma Gordon & J. P. Grodniewicz - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):12137-12151.details
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Morgan’s Quaker gun and the species of belief.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):119-144.details
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The representational structure of linguistic understanding.J. P. Grodniewicz - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Émotions et sensibilité aux valeurs : quatre conceptions philosophiques contemporaines.Constant Bonard - 2021 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 110 (2):209-229.details
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Assimilation and control: belief at the lowest levels.Eric Mandelbaum - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (2):441-447.details
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A new theory of absence experience.Laura Gow - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (1):168-181.details
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The Nature of Belief From a Philosophical Perspective, With Theoretical and Methodological Implications for Psychology and Cognitive Science.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13.details
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How can belief be akratic?Eugene Chislenko - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13925-13948.details
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The Intermediate Scope of Consciousness in the Predictive Mind.Francesco Marchi & Jakob Hohwy - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (2):891-912.details
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Implicit versus Explicit Attitudes: Differing Manifestations of the Same Representational Structures?Peter Carruthers - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (1):51-72.details
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Consciousness, belief, and the group mind hypothesis.Søren Overgaard & Alessandro Salice - 2019 - Synthese 198 (2):1-25.details
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Beliefs and biases.Shannon Spaulding - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7575-7594.details
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How to commit to commissive self‐knowledge.Benjamin Winokur - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):210-223.details
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