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  1. Toward a monistic theory of science: The `strong programme' reconsidered.Stephen Kemp - 2003 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 33 (3):311-338.
    This article considers the `Strong Programme' account of scientific knowledge from a fresh perspective. It argues that insufficient attention has been paid to the Strong Programme's monistic intent, that is, its aim to unify considerations of instrumental adequacy and social interests in explanations of the development of scientific knowledge. Although sharing the judgment of many critics that the Strong Programme approach is flawed, the article diverges from standard criticisms by suggesting that the best alternative is not a dualistic framework but (...)
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  • Is islamic science possible?Behrooz Ghamari‐Tabrizi - 1996 - Social Epistemology 10 (3 & 4):317 – 330.
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  • The very idea of social epistemology: What prospects for a truly radical 'radically naturalized epistemology'?Steve Woolgar - 1991 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 34 (3-4):377 – 389.
    Steve Fuller's social epistemology aims to integrate the philosophy of science and sociology of science, and to enhance the ability of these disciplines to contribute to science policy. While applauding the re?vitalizing energy of the enterprise, a sociological perspective requires attention to four key aspects of the programme. First, the character of interdisciplinarity requires careful specification, lest the critical dynamic of social studies of science be compromised by calls to pluralism. Second, social epistemology can and should transcend the traditional epistemological (...)
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  • (1 other version)Allan Franklin’s Transcendental Physics.Michael Lynch - 1990 - PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990 (2):471-485.
    Does Allan Franklin’s study of atomic parity-violation experiments provide convincing evidence against social constructivism? According to Franklin (1990a, p. 2), “when questions of theory choice, confirmation, or refutation are raised they are answered on the basis of valid experimental evidence… [and] there are good reasons for belief in the validity of that evidence.” Franklin asserts that social constructivists take the opposite position: “They would say that it is not the experimental results, but rather the social and/or cognitive interests of the (...)
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