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  1. Perceptual symbol systems.Lawrence W. Barsalou - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4):577-660.
    Prior to the twentieth century, theories of knowledge were inherently perceptual. Since then, developments in logic, statis- tics, and programming languages have inspired amodal theories that rest on principles fundamentally different from those underlying perception. In addition, perceptual approaches have become widely viewed as untenable because they are assumed to implement record- ing systems, not conceptual systems. A perceptual theory of knowledge is developed here in the context of current cognitive science and neuroscience. During perceptual experience, association areas in the (...)
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  • Construal-level theory of psychological distance.Yaacov Trope & Nira Liberman - 2010 - Psychological Review 117 (2):440-463.
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  • (1 other version)Homo Heuristicus: Why Biased Minds Make Better Inferences.Gerd Gigerenzer & Henry Brighton - 2009 - Topics in Cognitive Science 1 (1):107-143.
    Heuristics are efficient cognitive processes that ignore information. In contrast to the widely held view that less processing reduces accuracy, the study of heuristics shows that less information, computation, and time can in fact improve accuracy. We review the major progress made so far: the discovery of less-is-more effects; the study of the ecological rationality of heuristics, which examines in which environments a given strategy succeeds or fails, and why; an advancement from vague labels to computational models of heuristics; the (...)
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  • Intuitive and deliberate judgments are based on common principles.Arie W. Kruglanski & Gerd Gigerenzer - 2011 - Psychological Review 118 (1):97-109.
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  • Can quantum probability provide a new direction for cognitive modeling?Emmanuel M. Pothos & Jerome R. Busemeyer - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (3):255-274.
    Classical (Bayesian) probability (CP) theory has led to an influential research tradition for modeling cognitive processes. Cognitive scientists have been trained to work with CP principles for so long that it is hard even to imagine alternative ways to formalize probabilities. However, in physics, quantum probability (QP) theory has been the dominant probabilistic approach for nearly 100 years. Could QP theory provide us with any advantages in cognitive modeling as well? Note first that both CP and QP theory share the (...)
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  • Preferences: neither behavioural nor mental.Francesco Guala - 2019 - Economics and Philosophy 35 (3):383-401.
    Recent debates on the nature of preferences in economics have typically assumed that they are to be interpreted either as behavioural regularities or as mental states. In this paper I challenge this dichotomy and argue that neither interpretation is consistent with scientific practice in choice theory and behavioural economics. Preferences are belief-dependent dispositions with a multiply realizable causal basis, which explains why economists are reluctant to make a commitment about their interpretation.
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  • How (far) can rationality be naturalized?Gerd Gigerenzer & Thomas Sturm - 2012 - Synthese 187 (1):243-268.
    The paper shows why and how an empirical study of fast-and-frugal heuristics can provide norms of good reasoning, and thus how (and how far) rationality can be naturalized. We explain the heuristics that humans often rely on in solving problems, for example, choosing investment strategies or apartments, placing bets in sports, or making library searches. We then show that heuristics can lead to judgments that are as accurate as or even more accurate than strategies that use more information and computation, (...)
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  • Précis of simple heuristics that make us Smart.Peter M. Todd & Gerd Gigerenzer - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):727-741.
    How can anyone be rational in a world where knowledge is limited, time is pressing, and deep thought is often an unattainable luxury? Traditional models of unbounded rationality and optimization in cognitive science, economics, and animal behavior have tended to view decision-makers as possessing supernatural powers of reason, limitless knowledge, and endless time. But understanding decisions in the real world requires a more psychologically plausible notion of bounded rationality. In Simple heuristics that make us smart (Gigerenzer et al. 1999), we (...)
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  • The priority heuristic: Making choices without trade-offs.Eduard Brandstätter, Gerd Gigerenzer & Ralph Hertwig - 2006 - Psychological Review 113 (2):409-432.
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  • Multialternative decision field theory: A dynamic connectionst model of decision making.Robert M. Roe, Jermone R. Busemeyer & James T. Townsend - 2001 - Psychological Review 108 (2):370-392.
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  • Cognitive niches: An ecological model of strategy selection.Julian N. Marewski & Lael J. Schooler - 2011 - Psychological Review 118 (3):393-437.
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  • The Architecture of Belief: An Essay on the Unbearable Automaticity of Believing.Eric Mandelbaum - 2010 - Dissertation, Unc-Chapel Hill
    People cannot contemplate a proposition without believing that proposition. A model of belief fixation is sketched and used to explain hitherto disparate, recalcitrant, and somewhat mysterious psychological phenomena and philosophical paradoxes. Toward this end I also contend that our intuitive understanding of the workings of introspection is mistaken. In particular, I argue that propositional attitudes are beyond the grasp of our introspective capacities. We learn about our beliefs from observing our behavior, not from introspecting our stock beliefs. -/- The model (...)
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  • The multiattribute linear ballistic accumulator model of context effects in multialternative choice.Jennifer S. Trueblood, Scott D. Brown & Andrew Heathcote - 2014 - Psychological Review 121 (2):179-205.
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  • Conviction Narrative Theory: A theory of choice under radical uncertainty.Samuel G. B. Johnson, Avri Bilovich & David Tuckett - 2023 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 46:e82.
    Conviction Narrative Theory (CNT) is a theory of choice underradical uncertainty– situations where outcomes cannot be enumerated and probabilities cannot be assigned. Whereas most theories of choice assume that people rely on (potentially biased) probabilistic judgments, such theories cannot account for adaptive decision-making when probabilities cannot be assigned. CNT proposes that people usenarratives– structured representations of causal, temporal, analogical, and valence relationships – rather than probabilities, as the currency of thought that unifies our sense-making and decision-making faculties. According to CNT, (...)
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  • Loss Aversion and Inhibition in Dynamical Models of Multialternative Choice.Marius Usher & James L. McClelland - 2004 - Psychological Review 111 (3):757-769.
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  • Cognitive models of risky choice: Parameter stability and predictive accuracy of prospect theory.Andreas Glöckner & Thorsten Pachur - 2012 - Cognition 123 (1):21-32.
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  • Multialternative decision by sampling: A model of decision making constrained by process data.Takao Noguchi & Neil Stewart - 2018 - Psychological Review 125 (4):512-544.
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  • Goal-directed decision making as probabilistic inference: A computational framework and potential neural correlates.Alec Solway & Matthew M. Botvinick - 2012 - Psychological Review 119 (1):120-154.
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  • Mad as Hell or Scared Stiff? The Effects of Value Conflict and Emotions on Potential Whistle-Blowers.Erika Henik - 2008 - Journal of Business Ethics 80 (1):111-119.
    Existing whistle-blowing models rely on “cold” economic calculations and cost-benefit analyses to explain the judgments and actions of potential whistle-blowers. I argue that “hot” cognitions – value conflict and emotions – should be added to these models. I propose a model of the whistle-blowing decision process that highlights the reciprocal influence of “hot” and “cold” cognitions and advocate research that explores how value conflict and emotions inform reporting decisions. I draw on the cognitive appraisal approach to emotions and on the (...)
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  • Expanding the Nudge: Designing Choice Contexts and Choice Contents.Kalle Grill - 2014 - Rationality, Markets and Morals 5:139-162.
    To nudge is to design choice contexts in order to improve choice outcomes. Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein emphatically endorse nudging but reject more restrictive means. In contrast, I argue that the behavioral psychology that motivates nudging also motivates what may be called jolting — i.e. the design of choice content. I defend nudging and jolting by distinguishing them from the sometimes oppressive means with which they can be implemented, by responding to some common arguments against nudging, and by showing (...)
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  • Précis and replies to contributors for book symposium on accuracy and the laws of credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1):1-30.
    ABSTRACTThis book symposium onAccuracy and the Laws of Credenceconsists of an overview of the book’s argument by the author, Richard Pettigrew, together with four commentaries on different aspects of that argument. Ben Levinstein challenges the characterisation of the legitimate measures of inaccuracy that plays a central role in the arguments of the book. Julia Staffel asks whether the arguments of the book are compatible with an ontology of doxastic states that includes full beliefs as well as credences. Fabrizio Cariani raises (...)
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  • Framing as path dependence.Natalie Gold & Christian List - 2004 - Economics and Philosophy 20 (2):253-277.
    A framing effect occurs when an agent's choices are not invariant under changes in the way a decision problem is presented, e.g. changes in the way options are described (violation of description invariance) or preferences are elicited (violation of procedure invariance). Here we identify those rationality violations that underlie framing effects. We attribute to the agent a sequential decision process in which a “target” proposition and several “background” propositions are considered. We suggest that the agent exhibits a framing effect if (...)
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  • Stakeholder Influence Strategies: The Roles of Structural and Demographic Determinants.Jeff Frooman & Audrey J. Murrell - 2005 - Business and Society 44 (1):3-31.
    Using Frooman’s typology of stakeholder influence strategies, this research examines the strategies that stakeholders select to exert influence on a firm. Using an experimental approach, the responses of actual environmental leaders to a series of hypothetical vignettes were examined. The results of the experiment suggest how both structural and demographic variables can act as determinants of strategy choice along with how these two types of variables may both complement and inhibit one another. Specifically, the results suggest that repertoires of strategies (...)
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  • Does optimization imply rationality?Philippe Mongin - 2000 - Synthese 124 (1-2):73 - 111.
    The relations between rationality and optimization have been widely discussed in the wake of Herbert Simon's work, with the common conclusion that the rationality concept does not imply the optimization principle. The paper is partly concerned with adding evidence for this view, but its main, more challenging objective is to question the converse implication from optimization to rationality, which is accepted even by bounded rationality theorists. We discuss three topics in succession: (1) rationally defensible cyclical choices, (2) the revealed preference (...)
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  • IIA, rationality, and the individuation of options.Tina Rulli & Alex Worsnip - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (1):205-221.
    The independence of irrelevant alternatives is a popular and important axiom of decision theory. It states, roughly, that one’s choice from a set of options should not be influenced by the addition or removal of further, unchosen options. In recent debates, a number of authors have given putative counterexamples to it, involving intuitively rational agents who violate IIA. Generally speaking, however, these counterexamples do not tend to move IIA’s proponents. Their strategy tends to be to individuate the options that the (...)
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  • In the attraction, compromise, and similarity effects, alternatives are repeatedly compared in pairs on single dimensions.Takao Noguchi & Neil Stewart - 2014 - Cognition 132 (1):44-56.
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  • Constraints and Preferences in Inductive Learning: An Experimental Study of Human and Machine Performance.Douglas L. Medin, William D. Wattenmaker & Ryszard S. Michalski - 1987 - Cognitive Science 11 (3):299-339.
    The paper examines constraints and preferences employed by people in learning decision rules from preclassified examples. Results from four experiments with human subjects were analyzed and compared with artificial intelligence (AI) inductive learning programs. The results showed the people's rule inductions tended to emphasize category validity (probability of some property, given a category) more than cue validity (probability that an entity is a member of a category given that it has some property) to a greater extent than did the AI (...)
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  • Is Collective Agency a Coherent Idea? Considerations from the Enactive Theory of Agency.Mog Stapleton & Tom Froese - 1st ed. 2015 - In Catrin Misselhorn (ed.), Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems. Springer Verlag. pp. 219-236.
    Whether collective agency is a coherent concept depends on the theory of agency that we choose to adopt. We argue that the enactive theory of agency developed by Barandiaran, Di Paolo and Rohde (2009) provides a principled way of grounding agency in biological organisms. However the importance of biological embodiment for the enactive approach might lead one to be skeptical as to whether artificial systems or collectives of individuals could instantiate genuine agency. To explore this issue we contrast the concept (...)
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  • Why contextual preference reversals maximize expected value.Andrew Howes, Paul A. Warren, George Farmer, Wael El-Deredy & Richard L. Lewis - 2016 - Psychological Review 123 (4):368-391.
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  • Bounded rationality: the two cultures.Konstantinos V. Katsikopoulos - 2014 - Journal of Economic Methodology 21 (4):361-374.
    Research on bounded rationality has two cultures, which I call ‘idealistic’ and ‘pragmatic’. Technically, the cultures differ on whether they build models based on normative axioms or empirical facts, assume that people's goal is to optimize or to satisfice, do not or do model psychological processes, let parameters vary freely or fix them, aim at explanation or prediction and test models from one or both cultures. Each culture tells a story about people's rationality. The story of the idealistic culture is (...)
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  • A model of choice from lists.Ariel Rubinstein - unknown
    The standard economic choice model assumes that the decision maker chooses from sets of alternatives. In contrast, we analyze a choice model in which the decision maker encounters the alternatives in the form of a list. We present two axioms similar in nature to the classical axioms of choice from sets. We show that they characterize all the choice functions from lists that involve the choice of either the first or the last optimal alternative in the list according to some (...)
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  • Intentions are Optimality Beliefs – But Optimizing What?Christoph Lumer - 2005 - Erkenntnis 62 (2):235-262.
    In this paper an empirical theory about the nature of intention is sketched. After stressing the necessity of reckoning with intentions in philosophy of action a strategy for deciding empirically between competing theories of intention is exposed and applied for criticizing various philosophical theories of intention, among others that of Bratman. The hypothesis that intentions are optimality beliefs is defended on the basis of empirical decision theory. Present empirical decision theory however does not provide an empirically satisfying elaboration of the (...)
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  • Kahneman, Tversky, and Kahneman-Tversky: three ways of thinking.P. N. Johnson-Laird - 2024 - Thinking and Reasoning 30 (4):531-547.
    This homage to Danny Kahneman and Amos Tversky describes how each of them thought about psychology. It outlines the principal results of their collaborative research, which was their most original and most influential. Why? In search of an explanation it examines their joint thinking during their collaboration.
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  • The robust beauty of ordinary information.Konstantinos V. Katsikopoulos, Lael J. Schooler & Ralph Hertwig - 2010 - Psychological Review 117 (4):1259-1266.
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  • Fast and frugal heuristics are plausible models of cognition: Reply to Dougherty, Franco-Watkins, and Thomas (2008).Gerd Gigerenzer, Ulrich Hoffrage & Daniel G. Goldstein - 2008 - Psychological Review 115 (1):230-239.
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  • Posture-based motion planning: Applications to grasping.David A. Rosenbaum, Ruud J. Meulenbroek, Jonathan Vaughan & Chris Jansen - 2001 - Psychological Review 108 (4):709-734.
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  • Why We Need to Talk About Preferences: Economic Experiments and the Where-Question.Lukas Beck - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (4):1435-1455.
    When economists perform experiments, they do so typically in one of two traditions: cognitive psychology experiments in the heuristics and biases tradition (H&B-experiments) and experimental economics in the tradition of Vernon Smith. What sets these two traditions apart? In this paper, I offer a novel conceptualization of their pervasive disagreements. Focusing on how each camp approaches preferences, one of the most fundamental concepts in economics, I argue that experimental economics can be reconstructed as holding that the constituents of preferences can (...)
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  • Making trade-offs: A probabilistic and context-sensitive model of choice behavior.Claudia González-Vallejo - 2002 - Psychological Review 109 (1):137-155.
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  • Personal probabilities of probabilities.Jacob Marschak, Morris H. Degroot, J. Marschak, Karl Borch, Herman Chernoff, Morris De Groot, Robert Dorfman, Ward Edwards, T. S. Ferguson, Koichi Miyasawa, Paul Randolph, Leonard J. Savage, Robert Schlaifer & Robert L. Winkler - 1975 - Theory and Decision 6 (2):121-153.
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  • The structure of random utility models.Charles F. Manski - 1977 - Theory and Decision 8 (3):229-254.
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  • Naturalistic multiattribute choice.Sudeep Bhatia & Neil Stewart - 2018 - Cognition 179 (C):71-88.
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  • Prospect relativity: how choice options influence decision under risk.Neil Stewart, Nick Chater, Henry P. Stott & Stian Reimers - 2003 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 132 (1):23.
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  • Multiple Objectives: A Neglected Problem in the Theory of Human Action.Stephen Ellis - 2006 - Synthese 153 (2):313-338.
    The options that people face are rarely ideal: they are good in some ways and poor in others. People have problems choosing among such options because they don’t know which ends to favor. Multiple objectives pose a problem not only for decision makers, but also for our account of decision making. People act to achieve their ends given their beliefs. In order to handle decisions with multiple objectives, however, this story must be supplemented by an account of which ends are (...)
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  • Reversing the similarity effect: The effect of presentation format.Andrea M. Cataldo & Andrew L. Cohen - 2018 - Cognition 175:141-156.
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  • Exploiting redundancy for flexible behavior: Unsupervised learning in a modular sensorimotor control architecture.Martin V. Butz, Oliver Herbort & Joachim Hoffmann - 2007 - Psychological Review 114 (4):1015-1046.
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  • Similarity and the trustworthiness of distributive judgements.Alex Voorhoeve, Arnaldur Stefansson & Brian Wallace - 2019 - Economics and Philosophy 35 (3):537-561.
    When people must either save a greater number of people from a smaller harm or a smaller number from a greater harm, do their choices reflect a reasonable moral outlook? We pursue this question with the help of an experiment. In our experiment, two-fifths of subjects employ a similarity heuristic. When alternatives appear dissimilar in terms of the number saved but similar in terms of the magnitude of harm prevented, this heuristic mandates saving the greater number. In our experiment, this (...)
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  • Biases in preferences for sequences of outcomes in monkeys.Tommy C. Blanchard, Lauren S. Wolfe, Ivo Vlaev, Joel S. Winston & Benjamin Y. Hayden - 2014 - Cognition 130 (3):289-299.
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  • Emotional expression and vocabulary learning in adults and children.Fabrice Clément, Stéphane Bernard, Didier Grandjean & David Sander - 2013 - Cognition and Emotion 27 (3):539-548.
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  • A theory of subjective expected utility with vague preferences.Peter C. Fishburn - 1975 - Theory and Decision 6 (3):287-310.
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  • Cognitive Models of Choice: Comparing Decision Field Theory to the Proportional Difference Model.Benjamin Scheibehenne, Jörg Rieskamp & Claudia González-Vallejo - 2009 - Cognitive Science 33 (5):911-939.
    People often face preferential decisions under risk. To further our understanding of the cognitive processes underlying these preferential choices, two prominent cognitive models, decision field theory (DFT; Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993) and the proportional difference model (PD; González‐Vallejo, 2002), were rigorously tested against each other. In two consecutive experiments, the participants repeatedly had to choose between monetary gambles. The first experiment provided the reference to estimate the models’ free parameters. From these estimations, new gamble pairs were generated for the second (...)
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