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Mog Stapleton
University of Edinburgh
  1. Es Are Good. Cognition as Enacted, Embodied, Embedded, Affective and Extended.Dave Ward & Mog Stapleton - 2012 - In Fabio Paglieri (ed.), Consciousness in Interaction: The role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness.
    We present a specific elaboration and partial defense of the claims that cognition is enactive, embodied, embedded, affective and (potentially) extended. According to the view we will defend, the enactivist claim that perception and cognition essentially depend upon the cognizer’s interactions with their environment is fundamental. If a particular instance of this kind of dependence obtains, we will argue, then it follows that cognition is essentially embodied and embedded, that the underpinnings of cognition are inextricable from those of affect, that (...)
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  2. Enacting Education.Mog Stapleton - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1.
    Education can transform our cognitive world. Recent use of enactivist and enactivist-friendly work to propose understanding transformational learning in terms of affective reframing is a promising first step to understanding how we can have or inculcate transformational learning in different ways without relying on meta-cognition. Building on this work, I argue that to fully capture the kind of perspectival changes that occur in transformational learning we need to further distinguish between ways of reorienting one’s perspective, and I specify why different (...)
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  3. Steps to a "Properly Embodied" Cognitive Science.Mog Stapleton - 2013 - Cognitive Systems Research 22 (June):1-11.
    Cognitive systems research has predominantly been guided by the historical distinction between emotion and cognition, and has focused its efforts on modelling the “cognitive” aspects of behaviour. While this initially meant modelling only the control system of cognitive creatures, with the advent of “embodied” cognitive science this expanded to also modelling the interactions between the control system and the external environment. What did not seem to change with this embodiment revolution, however, was the attitude towards affect and emotion in cognitive (...)
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  4. The Enactive Philosophy of Embodiment: From Biological Foundations of Agency to the Phenomenology of Subjectivity.Mog Stapleton & Froese Tom - 2016 - In Miguel García-Valdecasas, José Ignacio Murillo & Nathaniel Barrett (eds.), Biology and Subjectivity Philosophical Contributions to Non-reductive Neuroscience. Springer Verlag. pp. 113-129.
    Following the philosophy of embodiment of Merleau-Ponty, Jonas and others, enactivism is a pivot point from which various areas of science can be brought into a fruitful dialogue about the nature of subjectivity. In this chapter we present the enactive conception of agency, which, in contrast to current mainstream theories of agency, is deeply and strongly embodied. In line with this thinking we argue that anything that ought to be considered a genuine agent is a biologically embodied (even if distributed) (...)
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  5. Is Collective Agency a Coherent Idea? Considerations From the Enactive Theory of Agency.Mog Stapleton & Tom Froese - 2015 - In Catrin Misselhorn (ed.), Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems. Springer Verlag. pp. 219-236.
    Whether collective agency is a coherent concept depends on the theory of agency that we choose to adopt. We argue that the enactive theory of agency developed by Barandiaran, Di Paolo and Rohde (2009) provides a principled way of grounding agency in biological organisms. However the importance of biological embodiment for the enactive approach might lead one to be skeptical as to whether artificial systems or collectives of individuals could instantiate genuine agency. To explore this issue we contrast the concept (...)
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  6.  32
    Leaky Levels and the Case for Proper Embodiment.Mog Stapleton - 2016 - In G. Etzelmüller & C. Tewes (eds.), Embodiment in Evolution and Culture. Tübingen, Germany: pp. 17-30.
    In this chapter I present the thesis of Proper Embodiment: the claim that (at least some of) the details of our physiology matter to cognition and consciousness in a fundamental way. This thesis is composed of two sub-claims: (1) if we are to design, build, or evolve artificial systems that are cognitive in the way that we are, these systems will have to be internally embodied, and (2) the exploitation of the particular internal embodiment that allows systems to evolve solutions (...)
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  7. Proper Embodiment: The Role of the Body in Affect and Cognition.Mog Stapleton - 2012 - Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
    Embodied cognitive science has argued that cognition is embodied principally in virtue of grossmorphological and sensorimotor features. This thesis argues that cognition is also internally embodied in affective and fine-grained physiological features whose transformative roles remain mostly unnoticed in contemporary cognitive science. I call this ‘proper embodiment’. I approach this larger subject by examining various emotion theories in philosophy and psychology. These tend to emphasise one of the many gross components of emotional processes, such as ‘feeling’ or ‘judgement’ to the (...)
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  8. Editorial Introduction: Socializing the Extended Mind.Michele Merritt, Somogy Varga & Mog Stapleton - 2013 - Cognitive Systems Research 25:1-3.
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  9.  45
    How the Body Narrows the Interaction with the Environment.Marcello Costantini & Mog Stapleton - 2015 - In Yann Coello & Martin Fischer (eds.), Foundations of embodied cognition: Perceptual and emotional embodiment. pp. 181-197.
    Embodiment matters to perception and action. Beyond the triviality that, under normal circumstances, we need a body in order to perceive the world and act in it, our particular embodiment, right here, right now, both enables and constrains our perception of possibilities for action. In this chapter, we provide empirical support for the idea that the structural and morphological features of the body can narrow the set of our possible interactions with the environment by shaping the way we perceive the (...)
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  10. Andy Clark and His Critics.Matteo Colombo, Elizabeth Irvine & Mog Stapleton (eds.) - 2019 - Oxford University Press.
    In this volume, a range of high-profile researchers in philosophy of mind, philosophy of cognitive science, and empirical cognitive science, critically engage with Clark's work across the themes of: Extended, Embodied, Embedded, Enactive, and Affective Minds; Natural Born Cyborgs; and Perception, Action, and Prediction. Daniel Dennett provides a foreword on the significance of Clark's work, and Clark replies to each section of the book, thus advancing current literature with original contributions that will form the basis for new discussions, debates and (...)
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  11. A Dynamic Expedition Through the Affective Landscape. Review of The Feeling Body: Affective Science Meets the Enactive Mind by Giovanna Colombetti. [REVIEW]Mog Stapleton - 2015 - Constructivist Foundations 10 (2):274-276.
    Upshot: Colombetti’s book is a contribution to the literature of at least three intellectual communities within philosophy and the cognitive sciences: affective science, embodiment, and enactivism. Despite the emphasis on embodiment over the past ten to fifteen years, and the resurgence of interest in emotion in the mid-to-late twentieth century, affect nevertheless remains underrepresented in the philosophy of mind and cognition, even in the embodiment and enactive communities. In her book, Colombetti helps to close this gap in the literature.
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  12.  63
    Classical Chinese for Everyone: A Guide for Absolute Beginners, by Bryan W. Van Norden. [REVIEW]Mog Stapleton - 2020 - Teaching Philosophy 43 (2):218-221.
    Review of Van Norden's 'Classical Chinese for Everyone' from the perspective of a learner and non-specialist teacher of Chinese Philosophy.
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  13. Feeling the Strain: Predicting the Third Dimension of Core Affect.Mog Stapleton - 2012 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (3):166-167.
    This commentary (1) raises the question about the possible conflation of core affect with the neural representation of interoceptive changes in regard to whether biological value is subpersonal or must be experienced, and (2) proposes that Wundt’s third dimension of core affect – strain-relaxation – can be accounted for in the target model under a generalised predictive model of attention.
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  14.  12
    Le emozione.Mog Stapleton - 2011 - In Massimo Marraffa & Alfredo Paternoster (eds.), Scienze Cognitive: Un'introduzione Filosofica. pp. 161-180.
    A chapter on emotion, translated into Italian by Massimo Marraffa for the book 'Scienze Cognitive: Un'introduzione Filosofica'. Published in 2011.
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  15.  44
    Putting Autopoietic Bodies Under Pressure.Mog Stapleton - 2020 - Adaptive Behavior 28 (1):45-46.
    This commentary puts pressure on the “resistance to dissipation” criterion for Villalobos and Razeto-Barry’s conception of “autopoietic bodies.” It argues that resistance to dissipation can only be assessed against the backdrop of certain background conditions. If this is right then it is no longer so clear that systems not considered as autopoietic bodies but merely as autopoietic systems do not fulfill the requirements of being an autopoietic body. -/- .
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  16.  41
    Transaction or Transformation: Why Do Philosophy in Prisons?Mog Stapleton & Dave Ward - 2021 - Journal of Prison Education and Reentry 7 (2):214-226.
    Why do public philosophy in prisons? When we think about the value and aims of public philosophy there is a well-entrenched tendency to think in transactional terms. The academy has something of value that it aims to pass on or transmit to its clients. Usually, this transaction takes place within the confines of the university, in the form of transmission of valuable skills or knowledge passed from faculty to students. Public philosophy, construed within this transactional mindset, then consists in passing (...)
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