Severity of Test (SoT) is an alternative to Popper's logical falsification that solves a number of problems of the logical view. It was presented by Popper himself in 1963. SoT is a less sophisticated probabilistic model of hypothesis testing than Oaksford & Chater's (O&C's) information gain model, but it has a number of striking similarities. Moreover, it captures the intuition of everyday hypothesis testing.

We review the literature on the hot hand fallacy by highlighting the positive and negative aspects of hot hand research over the past 20 years, and suggesting new avenues of research. Many researchers have focused on criticising Gilovich et al.'s claim that the hot hand fallacy exists in basketball and other sports, instead of exploring the general implications of the hot hand fallacy for human cognition and probabilistic reasoning. Noting that researchers have shown that people perceive hot streaks in a (...) gambling domain in which systematic streaks cannot possibly exist, we suggest that researchers have paid too much attention to investigating the independence of outcomes in various sporting domains. Instead, we advocate a domain-general mechanistic approach to understanding the hot hand fallacy, and conclude by suggesting approaches that might refocus the literature on the important general implications of the hot hand fallacy for human probabilistic reasoning. (shrink)

Using a prototype approach, we assessed people’s lay conceptions of intuition and analysis. Open-ended descriptions of intuition and analysis were generated by participants (Study 1) and resulting exemplars were sorted into features subsequently rated in centrality by independent participants (Study 2). Feature centrality was validated by showing that participants were quicker and more accurate in classifying central (as compared to peripheral) features (Study 3). Centrality ratings suggested a single-factor structure describing analysis but revealed that participants held lay conceptions of intuition (...) as involving two different types of processes: (1) as an automatic, affective, and non-logical processing, and (2) as a holistic processing that can assist in problem-solving. Additional analyses showed that the centrality ratings of intuition’s facets were predicted by participants’ self-reported intuitive style, suggesting intuition is differently perceived by intuitive and non-intuitive people. We discuss the implications of these results for the study of intuition and analysis. (shrink)

The post-truth condition is just as much about naming a meta-game as winning it. This condition can be tracked across Western intellectual history from the Homeric epics to popular culture. The common thread is that players are more likely to succeed in this meta-game if they have a certain consistency of character, which Thomas More called “integrity.” The presence of integrity means that the historical losers have often had an advantage in defining for subsequent generations the name of the game (...) because the steadfastness of their characters may make them be regarded as the agents of history, for better or worse. Further, naming the game tends to be stabilized by a variety of mental and material conditions, including “modal power”—control over what people think is and is not possible. Modal power is related to both Machiavellian politics and Kantian transcendentalism, and to the phenomenon of “truthiness.” The character of the post-truth player is epitomized by Thomas More, the “man for all seasons,” who remained consistent as he moved between multiple games, and ultimately to his execution. (shrink)

In recent years, the philosophy and psychology of reasoning have made a ‘social turn’: in both disciplines it is now common to reject the traditional picture of reasoning as a solitary intellectual exercise in favour of the idea that reasoning is a social activity driven by social aims. According to the most prominent social account, Mercier and Sperber’s interactionist theory, this implies that reasoning is not a normative activity. As they argue, in producing reasons we are not trying to ‘get (...) things right’; instead our aims are to justify ourselves and persuade others to accept our views. I will argue that even if interactionism has played a crucial role in bringing about the ‘social turn’ in our thinking about reasoning, it does not convince in its claim that reasoning is not a normative activity. Moreover, I argue that it is in fact perfectly possible to understand reasoning as a social tool that is also aimed at getting things right. I will propose that Gilbert Ryle’s conceptualization of reasoning as ‘didactic discourse’ offers one possible way to understand reasoning as both social and normative activity, and that as such his ideas could be of great value for the social turn in our thinking about reasoning. (shrink)

Many epistemologists endorse a view I call “evidence essentialism:” if e is evidence of h, for some agent at some time, then necessarily, e is evidence of h, for any agent at any time. I argue that such a view is only plausible if we ignore cognitive diversity among epistemic agents, i.e., the fact that different agents have different—sometimes radically different—cognitive skills, abilities, and proclivities. Instead, cognitive diversity shows that evidential relations are contingent and relative to cognizers. This is especially (...) obvious in extreme cases and in connection with epistemic defeat, but it is also very plausibly true of ordinary agents, and regarding prima facie justification. (shrink)

We argue that some fictional truths are fictionally true by default. We also argue that these fictional truths are subject to being undermined. We propose that the context within which we are to evaluate what is fictionally true changes when a possibility which was previously ignorable is brought to attention. We argue that these cases support a model of fictional truth which makes the conversational dynamics of determining truth in fiction structurally akin to the conversational dynamics of knowledge-ascription, as this (...) is understood by David Lewis’s contextualist approach to knowledge. We show how a number of the rules which Lewis proposes for the case of knowledge-ascription can be employed to develop a novel and powerful framework for the case of truth in fiction. (shrink)

The objective of this study was to jointly analyze the importance of cognitive and financial factors in the accuracy of profit forecasting by analysts. Data from publicly traded Brazilian companies in 2019 were obtained. We used text analysis to assess the cognitive biases from the qualitative reports of analysts. Further, we analyzed the data using statistical regression learning methods and statistical classification learning methods, such as Multiple Linear Regression, k-dependence Bayesian, and Random Forest. The Bayesian inference and classification methods allow (...) an expansion of the research line, especially in the area of machine learning, which can benefit from the examples of factors addressed in this research. The results indicated that, among cognitive biases, optimism had a negative relationship with forecasting accuracy while anchoring bias had a positive relationship. Commonality, to a lesser extent, also had a positive relationship with the analyst’s accuracy. Among financial factors, the most important aspects in the accuracy of analysts were volatility, indebtedness, and profitability. Age of the company, fair value, American Depositary Receipts, performance, and loss were still important but on a smaller scale. The results of the RF models showed a greater explanatory power. This research sheds light on the cognitive as well as financial aspects that influence the analyst’s accuracy, jointly using text analysis and machine learning methods, capable of improving the explanatory power of predictive models, together with the use of training models followed by testing. (shrink)

Topics in Cognitive Science, Volume 14, Issue 3, Page 528-549, July 2022.

Using research in social psychology, philosophers such as Gilbert Harman and John Doris argue that human beings do not have – and cannot acquire – character traits such as virtues. Along with defenders of virtue ethics such as Julia Annas and Rachana Kamtekar, they assume that this constitutes a dangerous attack on virtue ethics. I argue that even if virtues and vices did not exist and everyone accepted that truth, (1) we would continue to make attributions of character traits in (...) our ordinary practices and institutions and (2) it would still be useful to strategically harness – rather than suppress or ignore – our virtue (and vice) attributions. (shrink)

In his recent book on skill and virtue, Matt Stichter provides an account based on work in empirical psychology, specifically on self-regulation. In this paper I wish to argue that while this account is novel and well informed, it falls short. I present several examples that I believe Stichter’s view cannot explain and I try to identify the reasons for that. I argue that while trying to avoid the completely anti-intellectualist account of skill especially when it comes to virtue, Stichter (...) may have inadvertently presented an account that is too intellectualist. To clarify my claims, I start with a brief explanation of Stichter’s account of skill as self-regulation, a quick discussion of how he sees this as applying to virtue and then I turn to objections. I present cases in which the skill one acquires was never set as a goal to be achieved as Stichter’s picture would suggest, but simply comes as a byproduct of either aiming at developing a different skill or behaving in ways that don’t involve any goals at all. To this end, I discuss cases with no set goal and cases of transferable skills both in the moral and non-moral domains. I conclude that by defining virtue as self-regulation with a specific moral standard, Stichter may have violated one of the original motivations for the return to virtue ethics, namely that other views tend to over-intellectualize our moral behavior. (shrink)

This article examines perceptions of and response to food risk by consumers who are allergic to or intolerant of certain food types. Food risk in general and risk related to genetically modified food are discussed, as well as issues of responsibility and judgment regarding food labeling. Eight hundred individuals were recruited for a postal questionnaire study. The response rate was 63% for allergic people and 59% for nonallergic. The results suggest that the experience of personal harm from food in the (...) form of allergic or intolerant reactions can influence how people evaluate food risk. For example, the ranking of food risks demonstrated a difference of perception with respect to naturally occurring food allergens. The allergic group was more disposed to buy genetically modified products that had been engineered not to contain allergens. Allergic consumers also were inclined to take more individual responsibility for risk avoidance than consumers without allergies. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 7, July 2020, Page 106-109.

Probabilistic reasoning is heavily investigated in decision research. Violations of probability theory have been demonstrated numerously, for instance, the tendency to overestimate the joint probab...

A number of important decision domains, including decisions about hiring, global warming, and weather hazards, are characterized by a global–local incompatibility. These domains involve variables that cannot be observed by a single decision maker (DM) and require the integration of observations from locally available information cues. This paper presents a new bifocal lens model that describes how the structure of the environment can lead to a unique form of overconfidence when generalizing the reliability of the local environment to a global (...) scale. When the local environment does not reliably reflect the global environment, they are incompatible. While local perspectives vary across DMs, global–local incompatibility can be understood using the structure of classical test theory as the difference between (a) perceived estimates of the reliability derived from the local environment and (b) the true reliability of the local environment. I model global–local incompatibility as the difference between the true and estimated reliability when the assumptions of classical test theory are violated. Using a series of case studies and an empirical study, I demonstrate the widespread utility of this framework, and I conclude by discussing implications for cognitive–ecological theory, risk communication, and overconfidence. (shrink)

Definition of the problemThe Shared Decision Making model is becoming increasingly popular also in the German-speaking context, but it only considers values of patients to be relevant for medical decisions. Nevertheless, studies show that the values of physicians are also influential in medical decisions. Moreover, physicians are often unaware of this influence, which makes it impossible to control it.ArgumentsThe influence of both patients’ and physicians’ values is examined from an empirical and normative perspective. The review about the empirical data provides (...) a necessary overview about the status quo, whereas I deduct rules for value-influenced behaviour in the decision making process in the normative approach. Therefore, different scenarios are taken into account to explore in which situations it is acceptable for physicians to let their values be part of the decision making process. The conscious use of values is only possible, when physicians are aware of their influence. To raise awareness, the best option would be to educate future physicians about it in their training. Therefore, this article provides a teaching concept for a unit that could be part of an ethics class for physicians in training. Furthermore, patient’s rights and responsibilities in the decision making process are discussed.ConclusionI conclude that it is necessary to take the influence of values into account and include this knowledge into the training of physicians. Conclusively, recommendations for patients and physicians and their dealing with values in shared decision making processes are suggested. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to describe the mechanism of the public perception of risk of artificial intelligence. For that we apply the social amplification of risk framework to the public perception of artificial intelligence using data collected from Twitter from 2007 to 2018. We analyzed when and how there appeared a significant representation of the association between risk and artificial intelligence in the public awareness of artificial intelligence. A significant finding is that the image of the risk of (...) AI is mostly associated with existential risks that became popular after the fourth quarter of 2014. The source of that was the public positioning of experts who happen to be the real movers of the risk perception of AI so far instead of actual disasters. We analyze here how this kind of risk was amplified, its secondary effects, what are the varieties of risk unrelated to existential risk, and what is the dynamics of the experts in addressing their concerns to the audience of lay people. (shrink)

Die spezifischen Anforderungen riskanter Entscheidungslagen stellen die Medizinethik zunehmend vor die Herausforderung, normative Modelle der Risikokommunikation zu etablieren. Dabei geht es freilich nicht nur darum, Informationen über die Wahrscheinlichkeiten, mit denen bestimmte Ereignisse eintreten, bereitzustellen. Zur medizinischen Aufklärung gehört auch, dass Risiken verständlich kommuniziert werden. Andernfalls würde ein Patient zwar über Informationen verfügen, wäre aber nicht in der Lage, sie richtig zu interpretieren und zu bewerten. Der Beitrag stellt am Beispiel von Mammographie-Screenings Probleme der transparenten Kommunikation medizinischer Risiken dar. Diese (...) betreffen zum einen Informationen, die Ärztinnen und Ärzten in medizinischen Fachzeitschriften, zum anderen Informationen, die interessierten oder betroffenen Frauen in Broschüren vermittelt werden. Diese Schwierigkeiten der Risikokommunikation können teils durch institutionelle Lösungen, teils durch Aufklärung überwunden werden. (shrink)

Standard dual-process models in the action domain postulate that stimulus-driven processes are responsible for suboptimal behavior because they take them to be rigid and automatic and therefore the default. We propose an alternative dual-process model in which goal-directed processes are the default instead. We then transfer the dual- process logic from the action domain to the emotion domain. This reveals that emotional behavior is often attributed to stimulus-driven processes. Our alternative model submits that goal-directed processes could be the primary determinant (...) of emotional behavior instead. We evaluate the type of empirical evidence required for validating our model and we consider implications of our model for behavior change, encouraging strategies focused on the expectancies and values of action outcomes. (shrink)

Although Responsible Conduct of Research (RCR) training is common in the sciences, the effectiveness of RCR training is open to question. Three key factors appear to be particularly important in ensuring the effectiveness of ethics education programs: (1) educational efforts should be tied to day-to-day practices in the field, (2) educational efforts should provide strategies for working through the ethical problems people are likely to encounter in day-to-day practice, and (3) educational efforts should be embedded in a broader program of (...) on-going career development efforts. This article discusses a complex qualitative approach to RCR training development, based on a sensemaking model, which strives to address the afore-mentioned training concerns. Ethnographic observations and prior RCR training served the purpose of collecting information specific to a multi-disciplinary and multi-university research center with the goal of identifying metacognitive reasoning strategies that would facilitate ethical decision-making. The extensive qualitative analyses resulted in the identification of nine metacognitive reasoning strategies on which future RCR training will be developed. The implications of the findings for RCR training in the sciences are discussed. (shrink)

Humans have long been characterized as poor probabilistic reasoners when presented with explicit numerical information. Bayesian word problems provide a well-known example of this, where even highly educated and cognitively skilled individuals fail to adhere to mathematical norms. It is widely agreed that natural frequencies can facilitate Bayesian reasoning relative to normalized formats (e.g. probabilities, percentages), both by clarifying logical set-subset relations and by simplifying numerical calculations. Nevertheless, between-study performance on “transparent” Bayesian problems varies widely, and generally remains rather unimpressive. (...) We suggest there has been an over-focus on this representational facilitator (i.e. transparent problem structures) at the expense of the specific logical and numerical processing requirements and the corresponding individual abilities and skills necessary for providing Bayesian-like output given specific verbal and numerical input. We further suggest that understanding this task-individual pair could benefit from considerations from the literature on mathematical cognition, which emphasizes text comprehension and problem solving, along with contributions of online executive working memory, metacognitive regulation, and relevant stored knowledge and skills. We conclude by offering avenues for future research aimed at identifying the stages in problem solving at which correct versus incorrect reasoners depart, and how individual difference might influence this time point. (shrink)

Prior experimental studies have shown that individuals' actual ordering decisions significantly deviate from the theoretical optimum in newsvendor problems and show the robust pull-to-centre effect. Several human behaviours have been confirmed to be the causes of the PTC. However, most newsvendor experiments have been conducted in multicultural countries. As there exist mutual influences between culture and behaviour, in this study, we revisit the ordering biases in a monocultural country to examine the robustness of the PTC and whether the causes can (...) still explain this phenomenon. Our results show that the PTC still prevails and heuristics still work. However, overconfidence cannot perfectly interpret the PTC in China for probable inconsistent confidence levels in individual judgments and decisions. Moreover, the “centre" may no longer be the mean demand but the average value of the realised demand. We explain these changes from the perspective of cultural differences. To be more specific, collectivism, holistic style, and Doctrine of the Mean play vital roles in Chinese newsvendors' decisions. (shrink)

It makes sense that the more information people share, the better they communicate. To evaluate the effect of knowledge overlap on the effectiveness of communication, participants played a communication game where the “director” identified objects to the “addressee”. Pairs either shared information about most objects' names (high overlap), or about the minority of objects' names (low overlap). We found that high-overlap directors tended to use more names than low overlap directors. High overlap directors also used more names with objects whose (...) names only they knew, thereby confusing their addressees more often than low-overlap directors. We conclude that while sharing more knowledge can be beneficial to communication overall, it can cause communication to be locally ineffective. Sharing more information reduces communication effectiveness precisely when there is an opportunity to inform—when people communicate information only they themselves know. (shrink)

This article investigates the challenge of developing a robot capable of determining if a social situation demands trust. Solving this challenge may allow a robot to react when a person over or under trusts the system. Prior work in this area has focused on understanding the factors that influence a person’s trust of a robot (Hancock, et al., 2011). In contrast, by using game-theoretic representations to frame the problem, we are able to develop a set of conditions for determining if (...) an interactive situation demands trust. In two separate experiments, human subjects were asked to evaluate either written narratives or mazes in terms of whether or not they require trust. The results indicate aΦ1= +0.592 andΦ2= +0.406 correlation respectively between the subjects’ evaluations and the condition’s predictions. This is a strong correlation for a study involving human subjects. (shrink)

When deciding on an online purchase, consumers often face a plethora of information. Yet, individuals consumers differ greatly in the amount of information they are willing and able to acquire and process before making purchasing decisions. Extensively processing all available information does not necessarily promote good decisions. Instead, the empirical evidence suggests that reviewing too much information or too many choice alternatives can impair decision quality. Using simulated contract conclusion scenarios, we identify distinctive types of information processing styles and find (...) that certain search and selection strategies predict the quality of the final choice. Participants chose a cellular service contract in a web-based environment that closely resembled actual online settings in the country of study. Using information processing data obtained with tracking software, we identify three consumer segments differing along two dimensions – the extent dimension, referring to the overall effort invested in information processing, and the focus dimension, referring to the degree to which someone focuses on the best available options. The three subgroups of respondents can be characterized as follows: consumers with a low-effort and low-focus information processing strategy ; consumers with a moderate-effort and high-focus information processing strategy ; and consumers with high-effort and low-focus information processing strategy. The three groups differed not only in their information processing but also in the quality of their decisions. In line with the assumption of ecological rationality, most successful search strategies were not exhaustive, but instead involved the focused selection and processing of a medium amount of information. Implications for effective consumer information are provided. (shrink)

Nudges have gained popularity as a behavioral change tool that aims to facilitate the selection of the sensible choice option by altering the way choice options are presented. Although nudges are designed to facilitate these choices without interfering with people’s prior preferences, both the relation between individuals’ prior preferences and nudge effectiveness, as well as the notion that nudges ‘facilitate’ decision-making have received little empirical scrutiny. Two studies examine the hypothesis that a social proof nudge is particularly effective when people (...) have no clear prior preference, either because people are indifferent (in a colour-categorization task; Study 1, N = 255) or because people experience a choice conflict (making shopping decisions about meat products; Study 2, N = 97). Both studies employed a social proof nudge to steer participants’ choices. The potential facilitating effect of the nudge was tested using a mouse-tracker paradigm that implicitly assessed experienced uncertainty during decision-making. Results showed that the nudge was effective in steering participants’ decisions; the facilitation effect (i.e., reduced uncertainty regarding the decision) was only observed for conflicting preferences, but not under indifference. A better understanding of when and how nudges can influence individuals’ behavior may help in deciding whether nudges are an appropriate policy tool for changing particular undesirable behavior. (shrink)

Online vaccine-critical sentiments are often expressed in appealing personal narratives, whereas vaccine-supporting information is often presented in a non-narrative, expository mode describing scientific facts. In two experiments, we empirically test whether and how these different formats impact the way in which readers process and retrieve information about childhood vaccination, and how this may impact their perceptions regarding vaccination. We assess two psychological mechanisms that are hypothesized to underlie the persuasive nature of vaccination narratives: the availability heuristic and cognitive resistance. The (...) results of experiment 1 showed no empirical evidence for the availability heuristic, but exploratory analyses did indicate that an anti-vaccination narrative might reduce cognitive resistance, decrease vaccination attitudes and reduce attitude certainty in a generally pro-vaccination sample, especially for those who were more vaccine hesitant. Preregistered experiment 2 formally tested this and showed that not narrative format, but prior vaccine hesitancy predicts cognitive resistance and post-reading attitudes. Hesitant participants showed less resistance toward an anti-vaccine text than vaccine-supporting participants, as well as less positive post-reading attitudes and attitude certainty. These findings demonstrate belief consistency effects rather than narrative persuasion, which has implications for scientific research as well as public health policy. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Both classical and modern liberals tend to treat freedom of choice as if it is intrinsically valuable—regardless of what is chosen. They fear that treating freedom as, instead, instrumental only to good choices might open the door to paternalism if a polity were to decide that people were making bad choices. A middle course would be to treat freedom as independently valuable. On the one hand, the independent value of freedom does not treat all choices as good as long (...) as they are freely made. On the other hand, it does not reduce the value of freedom to the known, or predictable, good ends to which a free action may be conducive. Following from Hayek’s acknowledgement that we are often ignorant of what the future may hold, freedom may have value because it will allow us to make decisions whose positive consequences cannot now be predicted. (shrink)

Interest in the neural processes underlying decision making has led to a flurry of recent research in the fields of both moral psychology and neuroeconomics. In this paper, we first review some important findings from both disciplines, and then argue that the two fields can mutually benefit each other. A more explicit recognition of the role of values and norms will likely lead to more accurate models of decision making for neuroeconomists, whereas the tasks, insights into neural mechanisms, and mathematical (...) modeling common in neuroeconomic research offer moral psychologists the opportunity to expand their field and move beyond methodological limitations that may have hindered the field’s progress to this point. We conclude by highlighting an exciting group of recent studies that illustrate the potential of research that embraces the integrated moral/neuroeconomic approach that we suggest here. (shrink)