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  1. C. S. Peirce and Intersemiotic Translation.Joao Queiroz & Daniella Aguiar - 2015 - In Peter Pericles Trifonas (ed.), International Handbook of Semiotics. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 201-215.
    Intersemiotic translation (IT) was defined by Roman Jakobson (The Translation Studies Reader, Routledge, London, p. 114, 2000) as “transmutation of signs”—“an interpretation of verbal signs by means of signs of nonverbal sign systems.” Despite its theoretical relevance, and in spite of the frequency in which it is practiced, the phenomenon remains virtually unexplored in terms of conceptual modeling, especially from a semiotic perspective. Our approach is based on two premises: (i) IT is fundamentally a semiotic operation process (semiosis) and (ii) (...)
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  • (2 other versions)From semiosis to semioethics.John Deely - 2008 - Sign Systems Studies 36 (2):437-489.
    How anything acts depends upon what it is, both as a kind of thing and as a distinct individual of that kind: “agere sequitur esse” — action follows being. This is as true of signs as it is of lions or centipedes: therefore, in order to determine the range or extent of semiosis we need above all to determine the kind of being at stake under the name “sign”. Since Poinsot, in a thesis that the work of Peirce centuries later (...)
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  • Objective Being and “Ofness” in Descartes.Lionel Shapiro - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (2):378-418.
    It is generally assumed that Descartes invokes “objective being in the intellect” in order to explain or describe an idea’s status as being “of something.” I argue that this assumption is mistaken. As emerges in his discussion of “materially false ideas” in the Fourth Replies, Descartes recognizes two senses of ‘idea of’. One, a theoretical sense, is itself introduced in terms of objective being. Hence Descartes can’t be introducing objective being to explain or describe “ofness” understood in this sense. Descartes (...)
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