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  1. Fearful Object Seeing.Felipe Nogueira de Carvalho - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (3):627-644.
    What is it like to perceive a feared object? According to a popular neo-Gibsonian theory in psychology, fear biases our perceptions of objects so as to encourage particular kinds of actions: when we are afraid, spiders may be perceived as physically closer than they are in order to promote fleeing. Firestone mounted severe criticisms against this view, arguing that these cases are better explained by non-perceptual biases that operate on accurate perceptions of the external environment. In this paper I will (...)
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  • A Metacognitive Account of Phenomenal Force.Lu Teng - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
    According to phenomenal conservatism or dogmatism, perceptual experiences can give us immediate justification for beliefs about the external world in virtue of having a distinctive kind of phenomenal character—namely phenomenal force. I present three cases to show that phenomenal force is neither pervasive among nor exclusive to perceptual experiences. The plausibility of such cases calls out for explanation. I argue that contrary to a long-held assumption, phenomenal force is a separate, non-perceptual state generated by some metacognitive mechanisms that monitor one’s (...)
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  • Dual Counterstream Architecture May Support Separation Between Vision and Predictions.Mateja Marić & Dražen Domijan - 2022 - Consciousness and Cognition 103:103375.
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  • Is Color Experience Linguistically Penetrable?Raquel Krempel - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):4261-4285.
    I address the question of whether differences in color terminology cause differences in color experience in speakers of different languages. If linguistic representations directly affect color experience, then this is a case of what I call the linguistic penetrability of perception, which is a particular case of cognitive penetrability. I start with some general considerations about cognitive penetration and its alleged occurrence in the memory color effect. I then apply similar considerations to the interpretation of empirical studies of color perception (...)
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  • Negative Affect Impedes Perceptual Filling-in in the Uniformity Illusion.N. Kraus, M. Niedeggen & G. Hesselmann - 2022 - Consciousness and Cognition 98:103258.
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  • Categorical Perception Meets El Greco: Categories Unequally Influence Color Perception of Simultaneously Present Objects.Marina Dubova & Robert L. Goldstone - 2022 - Cognition 223 (C):105025.
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  • Perceptual Learning and Reasons-Responsiveness.Zoe Jenkin - forthcoming - Noûs.
    Perceptual experiences are not immediately responsive to reasons. You see a stick submerged in a glass of water as bent no matter how much you know about light refraction. Due to this isolation from reasons, perception is traditionally considered outside the scope of epistemic evaluability as justified or unjustified. Is perception really as independent from reasons as visual illusions make it out to be? I argue no, drawing on psychological evidence from perceptual learning. The flexibility of perceptual learning is a (...)
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  • Hi-Def Memories of Lo-Def Scenes.Jose Rivera-Aparicio, Qian Yu & Chaz Firestone - 2021 - Psychonomic Bulletin and Review.
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  • Perceptual Learning, Categorical Perception, and Cognitive Permeation.Daniel Burnston - forthcoming - Dialectica.
    Proponents of cognitive penetration often argue for the thesis on the basis of combined intuitions about categorical perception and perceptual learning. The claim is that beliefs penetrate perceptions in the course of learning to perceive categories. I argue that this “diachronic” penetration thesis is false. In order to substantiate a robust notion of penetration, the beliefs that enable learning must describe the particular ability that subjects learn. However, they cannot do so, since in order to help with learning they must (...)
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