A Metacognitive Account of Phenomenal Force

Mind and Language 38 (4):1081-1101 (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX


According to phenomenal conservatism or dogmatism, perceptual experiences can give us immediate justification for beliefs about the external world in virtue of having a distinctive kind of phenomenal character—namely phenomenal force. I present three cases to show that phenomenal force is neither pervasive among nor exclusive to perceptual experiences. The plausibility of such cases calls out for explanation. I argue that contrary to a long-held assumption, phenomenal force is a separate, non-perceptual state generated by some metacognitive mechanisms that monitor one’s first-order mental processes and states. This new account advances our understanding of the nature of phenomenal force.

Author's Profile

Lu Teng
New York University, Shanghai


Added to PP

350 (#36,764)

6 months
129 (#13,306)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?