- A non-reductive science of personality, character, and well-being must take the person's worldview into account.Artur Nilsson - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.details
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Moral responsibility and determinism: The cognitive science of folk intuitions.Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):663–685.details
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The Consequence argument and the Mind argument.Dana Nelkin - 2001 - Analysis 61 (2):107-115.details
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Folk fears about freedom and responsibility: Determinism vs. reductionism.Eddy Nahmias - 2006 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1-2):215-237.details
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Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about free will and moral responsibility.Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):561-584.details
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Mec'nica Qu'ntica e Livre Arbítrio: Cinco questões-fundamentais.José Manuel Muñoz - 2015 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 19 (1):65-92.details
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A new argument against compatibilism.Stephen Mumford & Rani Lill Anjum - 2013 - Analysis (1):ant095.details
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Free Will and Open Alternatives.Carlos J. Moya - 2017 - Disputatio 9 (45):167-191.details
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La fiabilidad teórica del determinismo. Un examen desde la propuesta de Mariano Artigas.Martín Montoya - 2016 - Scientia et Fides 4 (2):245-262.details
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A Stochastic Process Model for Free Agency under Indeterminism.Thomas Müller & Hans J. Briegel - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (2):219-252.details
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Determinismo, compatibilismo y escepticismo respecto al libre albedrío.Miranda-Rojas Rafael - 2017 - Cinta de Moebio 60:295-305.details
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A critique of Vihvelin’s Three-fold Classification.Kristin Mickelson - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (1):85-99.details
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Free will and mental disorder: Exploring the relationship.Gerben Meynen - 2010 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (6):429-443.details
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Truth and freedom.Trenton Merricks - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (1):29-57.details
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Ultimate Responsibility and Dumb Luck*: ALFRED R. MELE.Alfred R. Mele - 1999 - Social Philosophy and Policy 16 (2):274-293.details
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Two Libertarian Theories: or Why Event-causal Libertarians Should Prefer My Daring Libertarian View to Robert Kane's View.Alfred R. Mele - 2017 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 80:49-68.details
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Free will and moral responsibility: does either require the other?Alfred Mele - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (3):297-309.details
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Free Will and Moral Responsibility: Manipulation, Luck, and Agents’ Histories.Alfred R. Mele - 2019 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43 (1):75-92.details
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Free will and luck: Reply to critics.Alfred R. Mele - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):153 – 155.details
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Can Libertarians Make Promises?Alfred Mele - 2004 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55:217-241.details
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Whose Argumentative Burden, which Incompatibilist Arguments?—Getting the Dialectic Right.Michael McKenna - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):429-443.details
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Does Situationism Threaten Free Will and Moral Responsibility?Michael McKenna & Brandon Warmke - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (6):698-733.details
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XV—Intelligent Capacities.Victoria McGeer - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (3):347–376.details
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An intuitionistic defence of Berkeley’s master argument.Conor McGlynn - 2019 - Analysis 79 (2):236-242.details
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Thomas Reid on moral liberty and common sense.Douglas McDermid - 1999 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 7 (2):275 – 303.details
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The principle of sufficient reason and necessitarianism.Kris McDaniel - 2019 - Analysis 79 (2):230-236.details
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Conceptualism and Concept Acquisition.Blake McAllister - 2019 - Theoria 87 (1):69-86.details
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Alternative Possibilities, Volitional Necessities, and Character Setting.Benjamin Matheson - 2017 - Disputatio 9 (45):287-307.details
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Agentive Modals.Matthew Mandelkern, Ginger Schultheis & David Boylan - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (3):301-343.details
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Mumford and Anjum on incompatibilism, powers and determinism.Penelope Mackie - 2014 - Analysis 74 (4):593-603.details
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Free Will and the Burden of Proof.William G. Lycan - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 53:107-122.details
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Fatalism and the necessity of the present: Reply to Campbell.Roberto Loss - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):76-78.details
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Free will and the necessity of the present.Roberto Loss - 2009 - Analysis 69 (1):63-69.details
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What’s Wrong with the Consequence Argument: A Compatibilist Libertarian Response.Christian List - 2019 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 119 (3):253-274.details
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Unconscious modulation of the conscious experience of voluntary control.Katrin Linser & Thomas Goschke - 2007 - Cognition 104 (3):459-475.details
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Divine foreknowledge and the libertarian conception of human freedom.Mark D. Linville - 1993 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 33 (3):165 - 186.details
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The Paradox of Sufficient Reason.Samuel Levey - 2016 - Philosophical Review Recent Issues 125 (3):397-430.details
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Blocking Blockage.Ken Levy - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (2):565-583.details
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The temporal prison.R. le Poidevin - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):456-465.details
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Flanagan and Cartesian Free Will: A Defense of Agent Causation.John Lemos - 2006 - Disputatio 2 (21):1 - 22.details
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Alternative Possibilities and a Dogma on Freedom Debate選択可能性と「自由論のドグマ」.Taehee Lee - 2018 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 51 (1):19-40.details
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Why Cognitive Sciences Do Not Prove That Free Will Is an Epiphenomenon.Andrea Lavazza - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.details
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The Conceptual Impossibility of Free Will Error Theory.Andrew J. Latham - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):99-120.details
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Good Night and Good Luck - In Search of a Neuroscience Challenge to Criminal Justice.Frej Klem Thomsen - 2018 - Utilitas 30 (1):1-31.details
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Incompatibilism and ambiguity in the practical modalities.T. Kapitan - 1996 - Analysis 56 (2):102-110.details
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Ability and cognition: A defense of compatibilism.Tomis Kapitan - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 63 (August):231-43.details
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Autonomy and manipulated freedom.Tomis Kapitan - 2000 - Philosopical Perspectives 14 (s14):81-104.details
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De Gustibus: Arguing about Taste and Why We Do It By Peter Kivy. [REVIEW]Eileen John - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):581-583.details
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‘Brain-Malfunction’ Cases and the Dispositionalist Reply to Frankfurt's Attack on PAP.Greg Janzen - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):646-657.details
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Libertarian Free Will and CNC Manipulation.Stefaan E. Cuypers Ishtiyaque Haji - 2001 - Dialectica 55 (3):221-239.details
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