Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is an urgent threat to global public health and development. Mitigating this threat requires substantial short-term action on key AMR priorities. While international legal agreements are the strongest mechanism for ensuring collaboration among countries, negotiating new international agreements can be a slow process. In the second article in this special issue, we consider whether harnessing existing international legal agreements offers an opportunity to increase collective action on AMR goals in the short-term. We highlight ten AMR priorities and (...) several strategies for achieving these goals using existing “legal hooks” that draw on elements of international environmental, trade and health laws governing related matters that could be used as they exist or revised to include AMR. We also consider the institutional mandates of international authorities to highlight areas where additional steps could be taken on AMR without constitutional changes. Overall, we identify 37 possible mechanisms to strengthen AMR governance using the International Health Regulations, the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, the International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, and the Basel, Rotterdam, and Stockholm conventions. Although we identify many shorter-term opportunities for addressing AMR using existing legal hooks, none of these options are capable of comprehensively addressing all global governance challenges related to AMR, such that they should be pursued simultaneously with longer-term approaches including a dedicated international legal agreement on AMR. (shrink)

An international legal agreement governing the global antimicrobial commons would represent the strongest commitment mechanism for achieving collective action on antimicrobial resistance (AMR). Since AMR has important similarities to climate change—both are common pool resource challenges that require massive, long-term political commitments—the first article in this special issue draws lessons from various climate agreements that could be applicable for developing a grand bargain on AMR. We consider the similarities and differences between the Paris Climate Agreement and current governance structures for (...) AMR, and identify the merits and challenges associated with different international forums for developing a long-term international agreement on AMR. To be effective, fair, and feasible, an enduring legal agreement on AMR will require a combination of universal, differentiated, and individualized requirements, nationally determined contributions that are regularly reviewed and ratcheted up in level of ambition, a regular independent scientific stocktake to support evidence informed policymaking, and a concrete global goal to rally support. (shrink)

The scope and type of property rights recognized over the effectiveness of antibiotics have a direct effect on how those claiming ownership engage in the exploitation and stewardship of this scarce resource. We examine the different property claims and rights the four major interest groups are asserting on antibiotics: (i) the inventors, (ii) those demanding that the resource be treated like any other transferable commodity, (iii) those advocating usage restrictions based on good stewardship principles and (iv) those considering the resource (...) as common heritage of humankind. (shrink)

Time-tested commons characterize by having instituted sanctioning mechanisms that are sensitive to the circumstances and motivations of non-compliers. As a proposed Global Antimicrobial Commons cannot cost-effectively develop sanctioning mechanisms that are consistently sensitive to the circumstances of the global poor, I suggest concentrating on establishing a wider set of incentives that encourages both compliance and participation.

This commentary defines what shared yet differentiated ethical responsibilities to tackle antimicrobial resistance (AMR) mean, by introducing a threefold principled account of AMR global governance. It argues that the principles of solidarity, subsidiarity, and stewardship can be especially helpful for further justifying some of the universal, differentiated, and individual responsibilities that Van Katwyk et al propose. The upshot of my threefold principled account of AMR global governance is a less ambitious AMR treaty, one that can only justify (i) universal duties (...) of global coordination (as per the principle of solidarity); (ii) differentiated duties to local communities, which bear the primary AMR responsibilities (as per the principle of subsidiarity); and (iii) individualized duties for ensuring truthful, evidence-based, consistent, and timely shared accountable communication (as per the principle of stewardship). (shrink)

A treaty to regulate the global antimicrobial commons can be appropriately framed around the model provided by multilateral environmental agreements. At the same time, it is not clear that a comprehensive treaty is the only possible entry point and other options, such as an agreement on technology transfer or funding may be apt starting points. Any legal instrument adopted to regulate the global antimicrobial commons needs to reflect the global South-North dichotomy and integrate the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (...) and respective capabilities. Further, it would need to go beyond environmental instruments that have been structured around the sovereign interests of negotiating states even when dealing with issues of global concern, such as climate change. The proposed legal instrument would also need to be based not just on the precautionary principle as a marker of the necessity to address the negative environmental and health impacts, but also be based on the interests of patients and integrate concerns raised in terms of the human right to health. (shrink)