If scientists violate principles and practices of routine science to quickly develop interventions against catastrophic threats, they are engaged in what I call fast science. The magnitude, imminence, and plausibility of a threat justify engaging in and acting on fast science. Yet, that justification is incomplete. I defend two principles to assess fast science, which say: fast science should satisfy as much as possible the reliability-enhancing features of routine science, and the fast science developing an intervention against a threat should (...) not depend on the same problematic assumptions as the fast science which estimates the magnitude, imminence, and plausibility of the threat. (shrink)

How could the initial, drastic decisions to implement “lockdowns” to control the spread of COVID-19 infections be justifiable, when they were made on the basis of such uncertain evidence? We defend the imposition of lockdowns in some countries by first, and focusing on the UK, looking at the evidence that undergirded the decision, second, arguing that this provided us with sufficient grounds to restrict liberty given the circumstances, and third, defending the use of poorly-empirically-constrained epidemiological models as tools that can (...) legitimately guide public policy. (shrink)

We were slightly concerned, upon having read Eric Winsberg, Jason Brennan and Chris Surprenant’s reply to our paper “Were Lockdowns Justified? A Return to the Facts and Evidence”, that they may have fundamentally misunderstood the nature of our argument, so we issue the following clarification, along with a comment on our motivations for writing such a piece, for the interested reader.

Models not only represent but may also influence their targets in important ways. While models’ abilities to influence outcomes has been studied in the context of economic models, often under the label ‘performativity’, we argue that this phenomenon also pertains to epidemiological models, such as those used for forecasting the trajectory of the Covid-19 pandemic. After identifying three ways in which a model by the Covid-19 Response Team at Imperial College London may have influenced scientific advice, policy, and individual responses, (...) we consider the implications of epidemiological models’ performative capacities. We argue, first, that performativity may impair models’ ability to successfully predict the course of an epidemic; but second, that it may provide an additional sense in which these models can be successful, namely by changing the course of an epidemic. (shrink)

Philosophers have recently questioned the methodological status of agent-based modeling. Meanwhile, this methodology has been central to various studies of the COVID-19 pandemic. Few agent-based COVID-19 models are accessible to philosophers for inspection or experimentation. We make available a package for modeling the COVID-19 pandemic and similar pandemics and give an impression of what can be achieved with it. In particular, it is shown that by coupling an agent-based model to a standard optimizer we are able to identify strategies for (...) implementing non-pharmacological interventions that flexibly lower or raise social activity, depending on how the outbreak develops, while balancing various desiderata that cannot be fully satisfied together. The simulation outcomes to be presented testify to the power of agent-based modeling and thereby help to push back against the recent philosophical critique of this methodology. (shrink)

Lockdowns were a morally and medically appropriate anti-contagion policy to stop the spread of Covid. However, lockdowns came with considerable costs. Specifically, lockdowns imposed harms and losses upon the young in order to benefit the elderly, who were at the highest risk of severe illness and death from Covid. This represented a shifting of the (epidemiological) burden of Covid for the elderly to a systemic burden of lockdown upon the young. This article argues that even if lockdowns were a morally (...) permissible response to Covid, the harms and losses they imposed on the young ground a claim of compensation. I defend an intergenerational compensation argument that defends a claim for an egalitarian intergenerational transfer to compensate the young for the harms of lockdown. (shrink)

Infectious diseases figure prominently as (counter)examples in debates on how to conceptualize “disease.” But crucial epidemiological distinctions are often not heeded in the debate, and pathological and clinical perspectives focusing on individual patients are favored at the expense of perspectives from epidemiology focusing on populations. In clarifying epidemiological concepts, this paper highlights the distinct contributions infectious disease epidemiology can make to the conception of “disease,” and the fact that this is at least tacitly recognized by medical personnel and philosophers. Crucially, (...) infectious disease epidemiology can help elucidate how carrying and transmitting infectious, communicable entities is a disease, even if the carriers themselves are not directly affected by symptoms detrimental to them. (shrink)