Fast Science

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (forthcoming)
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If scientists violate principles and practices of routine science to quickly develop interventions against catastrophic threats, they are engaged in what I call fast science. The magnitude, imminence, and plausibility of a threat justify engaging in and acting on fast science. Yet, that justification is incomplete. I defend two principles to assess fast science, which say: fast science should satisfy as much as possible the reliability-enhancing features of routine science, and the fast science developing an intervention against a threat should not depend on the same problematic assumptions as the fast science which estimates the magnitude, imminence, and plausibility of the threat.

Author's Profile

Jacob Stegenga
Cambridge University


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