Sellars’ attack on the “Myth of The Given” strikes at the very heart of the foundationalist project of empiricism, while yet attempting to preserve the sound epistemological and ontological intuitions on which it draws. To achieve this, the fatal predicaments bound up with the concept of the given first must be identified and defused. The result is a cautious redefinition of both the given as a non-epistemological concept and the relation between observation and theory, direct knowledge and inferential knowledge.

I defend a pragmatist reinterpretation of Sellars’s famous manifest-scientific distinction. I claim that in order to do justice to this important distinction we must first recognize, despite what philosophers—including, arguably, Sellars—often make of it, that the distinction does not draw an epistemological or metaphysical boundary between different kinds of objects and events, but a pragmatic boundary between different ways in which we interact with objects and events. Put differently, I argue that the manifest-scientific distinction, in my view, can be best (...) understood, not as a metaphysical distinction between apparent and real objects and events, or an epistemological distinction between perceptible and imperceptible objects and events, but rather as a distinction, which is not necessarily rigid over time, between distinct ways in which we collectively deal, in practice, with objects and events. (shrink)

I present an account of nihilism, following Foucault and Nietzsche, as a sort of colonization of our thinking by a religious form of normativity, grounded in our submission to truth as correspondence, in the idea that the facts themselves could be binding upon us. I then present Brassier’s radicalization of nihilism and showed how it remains subservient to this religious ideal of truth. I argue, further, that far than showing how a commitment to Enlightenment reason and science demands a cold (...) metaphysics of death, in dismissing the irreducibly plural ways in which what is determines thought, Brassier’s attempt to secure a fit between thought and disenchanted world suggests that the view is an expression of the unliveable condition of nihilism, rather than its proof. Finally, I present a form of naturalism that makes legitimate claim to the legacy of Enlightenment, drawing from French historical epistemology, and dispenses with the problems animating Brassier’s nihilism by radically transforming the concept of truth and how we relate to it. (shrink)

Overview of Wilfrid Sellars's philosophy.

Wilfrid Sellars se ve svém díle snaží propojit americký pragmatismus s řadou směrů filosofické tradice, včetně Platóna, Descarta a Kant. Přesto, že jeho otázky směřují ke snaze uchopit celek světa, neponechává stranou ani čistě pragmatický aspekt, jak něčeho naším poznáním dosáhnout. Centrálním tématem jeho filosofie je problém, se kterým se filosof v tomto úsilí setkává – tj. dvojí povaha skutečnosti, dva obrazy světa, které mají stejnou úroveň složitosti, oba si nárokují být kompletním obrazem člověka-ve-světě, a které, po podrobném prozkoumání, je (...) nutné spojit do jediné vize. Tyto dva obrazy nazývá Sellars zjevný (manifest) a vědecký (scientific) obraz člověka-ve-světě. Zjevný obraz je prvotnější než obraz vědecký. Zjevný obraz je, jak uvidíme, zpřesněním či zdokonalením obrazu, který Sellars nazývá původní (original). Zásadním rozdílem zjevného oproti vědeckému obrazu je absence postulovaných nevnímatelných entit – vědecký obraz je tak jistou idealizací obrazu zjevného. V tomto textu se pokusíme ukázat, jak se Sellers pokouší tyto dva obrazy spojit. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate Lange’s argument in support of Sellars’ scientific realism, which, if successful, surprisingly, undermines Sellars’ scientia mensura principle and justifies the anti-Sellarsian view to the effect that certain domains of discourse which use irreducibly normative descriptions and explanations are explanatorily autonomous. It will be argued that Lange’s argument against the layer-cake view is not strictly speaking Sellarsian, since Lange interprets Sellars’ argument in an overly abstract or formal manner. Moreover, I will suggest that, (...) within a properly Sellarsian context, Lange’s argument against the layer-cake picture can actually be used for quite un- Langean purposes, namely in order to show that folk- psychological descriptions and explanations are not if fact autonomous. However, Lange could insist that his reconstruction of Sellars’ argument is substantially correct and he does have the resources to do so. I will propose that the substantial issue between Lange and Sellars turns on their different views on the function of ceteris-paribus clauses, and ultimately, on issues about the unity of science. Finally, it will be suggested that the Sellarsian framework for tackling these issues constitutes a viable alternative to Lange’s picture of theoretical explanation, while at the same time incorporating be the sound insights of the latter. (shrink)

Central to Wilfrid Sellars ' philosophical system is his belief that science's current ontology is inadequate as it fails to provide for an acceptable account of perceptual experience. Unfortunately, this remains the most puzzling plank in his philosophy. Sellars himself argues for this position via his wellknown example of a pink ice cube and its homogeneous colour. This homogeneity, says Sellars, bars the acceptance of science's present ontology of achromatic particles, and requires the introduction of items which are truly coloured. (...) Only with such a revised and expanded ontology, with all that entails, can science adequately meet its explanatory demands. I aim here to remedy at least some of the confusions and misunderstandings this position has engendered. But I mean to take a different route from Sellars. In short, given the problems with Sellars ' views on homogeneity, I will argue for the Sellarsian conclusion as to the inadequacy of present scientific ontologies, yet without reliance on the puzzling doctrine of homogeneity. I begin then with a detailed examination of Sellars official position, indicate the trouble spots, and begin an alternative route. As I conceive things, however, the position I will sketch is still thoroughly Sellarsian, for it proceeds from premises Sellars himself has endorsed. (shrink)

La critique sellarsienne du «mythe du donné» touche en son cœur le projet empiriste fondationnaliste, dont elle entend néanmoins sauvegarder les intuitions épistémologiques et ontologiques saines. Pour ce faire, les difficultés dirimantes soulevées par l’usage de la notion de donné doivent être d’abord clairement identifiées, puis désamorcées. Ceci aboutit à la fois à une redéfinition précautionneuse du donné comme un concept non épistémologique, et à une révision de la conception traditionnelle du rapport entre observation et théorie, connaissance directe et connaissance (...) inférentielle. View HTML Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.Le mythe fondateur de l’empirisme : le donné épistémologiqueVolume 51, Issue 3AUDE BANDINI DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217312000789Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. Le mythe fondateur de l’empirisme : le donné épistémologiqueVolume 51, Issue 3AUDE BANDINI DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217312000789Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. Le mythe fondateur de l’empirisme : le donné épistémologiqueVolume 51, Issue 3AUDE BANDINI DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217312000789Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)